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A Public Performance Right in Recordings:




Federal copyright law extends public performance rights only to
composers. Pursuant to these rights, composers are compensated
for broadcasts and other public performances of their music or
records using their music; record producers' earnings are limited
to record sales. Whether public performance rights should be
extended to record producers, although considered by Congress
during its numerous attempt to revise the Copyright Act of
1909, remains an unresolved issue. Evaluating this issue in
terms of economic theory and equitable and legal consequences,
Professors Bard and Kurlantzick find no convincing argument for
granting record producers such rights. Record public performance
rights, it is contended, will not redress alleged injustices to
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1970.
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Professors Bard and Kurlantzick wish to acknowledge the contributions of two
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aspects of the article.
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musical artists whose records continue to be broadcast long after
the exhaustion of their sales potential. Composers, rather than
record companies and performers, would be the most likely bene-
ficiaries of such a revision. Any benefits that accrued would not
be divided equally between performers and record companies, as
contemplated by the supporters of the proposed legislation, but
would be divided according to the relative bargaining positions of
the parties. The authors contend that the only potential positive
effect of a public performance right would be a slight increase in
the production of classical records with concomitant benefit to
classical record companies, and, perhaps, composers. It is feared,
however, that such a restriction would increase incentive to pay-
ola. These considerations are important because public perform-
ance rights will likely be included in the Copyright Revision bill
to be reintroduced in the 94th Congress. In the 93rd Congress,
the bill was initially referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee
and, after being reported out of that committee, was sent to the
Senate Commerce Committee. On September 9, 1974, the Senate
passed the measure without the public performance right provi-
sion, but the House failed to act. The authors refer to the bill as
amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee, with the subse-
quent modifications by the Senate indicated where appropriate.
The Federal Copyright Act grants the creator of a musical idea the
right to control three potential uses of his creation: Reproduction of
the idea in written form-sheet music; use of the music to produce
a record, tape, or movie soundtrack; and use of the music in a public
performance.' The right to control the recording of copyrighted mu-
sic is called the mechanical reproduction right, the right to control
the use of the music in a movie soundtrack is called the synchroniza-
tion right, and the right to control the use of copyrighted music in
a public performance is called the public performance right. Via the
public performance right, a music copyright holder may prohbit the
public performance of his music for profit, whether by live musicians
or through broadcast of a record using that music. Thus, under ex-
isting law, composers can demand compensation for the right to allow
live artists to perform the copyrighted music in concerts or radio or
television broadcasts, and for the right to broadcast records using their
music.
Record producers, that is, performers and record companies, have
sought analogous rights with respect to their product. They argue
that unauthorized record duplication threatens their financial integ-
rity and that uncompensated public performance of their records rep-
resents an expropriation by certain record users, principally broad-
casters, of economic benefits to which they have a legitimate claim.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), (e) (1970).
They also claim that certain members of the record producer family,
namely performers of classical and semi-classical music,2 are partic-
ularly injured under the existing legal regime. To remedy these al-
leged injustices, record producers have demanded protection against
unauthorized duplication of their recordings--"record piracy"--and
the right to profit from the public performance of their recordings.
The 1971 McClellan anti-piracy amendment granted temporary protec-
tion against unauthorized duplication, which Congress has since made
permanent, 3 and the latest version of the general Copyright Law Revi-
sion bill (Revision Bill), as introduced by Senator John McClellan (D-
Ark.), would provide record producers a public performance right
for their product.4 Limited federal protection of record producers
against unauthorized reproduction of their products is justifiable.
The lower production costs of duplicators permit them to undersell
original record producers who must incur the expenses of recording
a performance and must earn sufficient revenues from their successful
records to compensate for losses suffered from unprofitable releases.5
But we oppose a public performance right for record producers.
The conflict between record producers and broadcasters regarding
the appropriate measure of control record producers should exercise
over their product was formalized a generation ago when efforts were
made to establish a performance right for record producers through
the judicial process. For example, in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting
Station, Inc.,6 Fred Waring sued a Philadelphia radio station under
Pennsylvania law for unauthorized broadcast of records made by his
orchestra. By agreement with the record company, Waring's records
2. "Classical" refers to "serious" music, which is commonly considered to
include symphonies, chamber music, operas, choral works, oratorios, sonatas,
and other recital pieces. See generally Anderson, Editorially Speaking:
Classipops, STEREO REVIEW, June 1973, at 6. The term "semi-classical" has been
contrived by the authors. It refers to recorded music which continues to be
broadcast after the possibilities for sales of the record have been exhausted,
essentially the programming which is featured on so-called "good music" sta-
tions such as WPAT in New York. Performers of this music, such as Stan
Kenton, claim that they are particularly injured under current arrangements
by the lack of a public performance right in the recordings. See text accom-
panying notes 150-52 infra.
3. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, amended the Copy-
right Act to protect recordings against unauthorized duplication. The result
is that for the first time copyright protection has been extended to the recorded
performance or rendition of a musical composition in addition to the long
standing protection afforded by the Copyright Act to the composition itself.
See notes 62-66 infra and accompanying text. Congress has permanently pro-
tected record producers from record piracy. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
4. Revision Bill §§ 106, 114. The version passed by the Senate did not
grant record producers a public performance right.
5. In the authors' upcoming book, Legal Protection for Recordings: Pri-
vate Rights and the Public Interest, they analyze the need for protection of
recordings against duplication and define the dimensions of an optimal balance
between the requirements of record producers for protection and the interests
of the public in the widest dissemination of music at the lowest prices. There
they reject most of the traditional arguments for copyright protection. They
conclude that some measure of protection against unauthorized duplication is
appropriate, but that record producers need less protection than they have de-
manded.
6. 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937).
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bore the restrictive legend, "not licensed for radio broadcast." The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court enjoined the broadcasts, relying on a
number of grounds ranging from unfair competition to right of pri-
vacy. During the same period other suits were brought in other juris-
dictions against unauthorized users of records, with mixed results. 7
The last reported case involving purported common law performing
rights was R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman,8 a federal diversity case
factually indistinguishable from Waring. Applying New York law,
Judge Learned Hand, consistent with his deep suspicion of state copy-
right power, refused to follow the Waring decision and ruled that any
common law property of the record producer in the recorded perform-
ances ended with the record's sale, thereby making the restrictive
legend on the label legally ineffective.
The lack of suits since Whiteman may have resulted from record
producers' pessimistic evaluation of their opportunity for legal success
or a judgment that the sales promotional benefits of unrestricted radio
play of new records outweigh potential losses attributable to uncon-
trolled and unremunerated record broadcasts. Furthermore, record
companies have not tried to establish a public performance right
through state legislation as they successfully did with respect to un-
authorized record duplication.9 Additionally, while Waring presum-
7. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939) (suit to enjoin the
playing of electrical transcriptions which had never been sold to the public);
Noble v. One Sixty Commonwealth Ave., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 671 (D. Mass. 1937)(performer was denied an injunction against nightclub broadcasts because his
rights, if any, had been assigned to recorder); Crumit v. Marcus Loew Booking
Agency, 162 Misc. 225, 293 N.Y. Supp. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (performer denied
recovery because his rights, if any, were assigned to recorder).
Several cases on unlicensed broadcast analyze the issue in terms of the en-
forceability of equitable servitudes on chattels. See generally Chafee, The
Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 69 HAv.
L. REV. 1250 (1956); Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REV.
945 (1928).8. 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'g 28 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940). But cf. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records
Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
9. As of June 1, 1974, twenty-four states had enacted legislation which
makes the unauthorized manufacture or sale of duplicate recordings a crime:
An oNA REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1024 (Supp. 1973); ARmANsAs STAT. ANN.§§ 41-4617 to 41-4621 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 653h (West 1970);
Conn. Public Act No. 74-160 (Reg. Sess. 1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.041(1972); Indiana House Act No. 1192, amending IND. CODE of 1971, 35-17, by
adding a new chapter 7 (Reg. Sess. 1974); Kentucky House Bill No. 378 (Reg.
Sess. 1974); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 223-223.4 (Supp. 1974); Ch. 657, Laws
of Md. of 1973, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467A; MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
266, § 143 (Supp. 1974-75); MIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325.841-325.844 (Supp. 1974);
Miss. Senate Bill No. 2105 (1974); Legislative Bill 683, Nebraska Legislature,
1974; NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 205, 217 (CL 636) (1973); N.M. STAT Alm. § 40A-
16-41 (House bill 72, enacted 1974); N.Y. GENr. Bus. LAW § 561 (McKinney
1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-432 to 14-437 (Ch. 1279) (Sess. Laws 1974): ORE.
REv. STAT. 164.865 (Ch. 747) (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4116 (Supp.
1973); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4244 to 39-4250 (Supp. 1971); TExAs REV. Civ.
STAT. ANiN. art. 9012 (Supp. 1974); Ch. 17 (§§ 13-10-1 to 13-10-6), 1973 Utah
Laws; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-41.1 to 59.1-41.6 (1973); Ch. 100, 1974 Washington
1974)
ably still represents the law in Pennsylvania, there have been no at-
tempts in any state to use the authority of that decision to collect
performance right fees for recordings through establishment of a li-
censing system.10 On the contrary, it has been broadcasters who
have used legislative action to fight Waring. Through strenuous
lobbying, broadcasters have succeeded in persuading several states to
enact laws abrogating any common law performing rights in record-
ings once the records are publicly sold."
Moreover, state recognition of performance rights in records may
be constitutionally preempted by the Federal Copyright Act and may
also violate the commerce clause. Section 1(e) of the Copyright Act
gives the proprietor of a musical composition copyright exclusive con-
trol over public performance for profit. State recognition of a per-
formance right would involve a significant dilution of the control over
performance which Congress vested in the proprietor of the composi-
tion.' 2 The Federal Copyright Act should therefore be held to pre-
clude state recognition of a performance right in a recording of a copy-
righted work. Furthermore, state recognition of a performance right,
particularly as applied to the broadcasting media which operates
across state lines, might conceivably constitute undue interference
with interstate commerce.13 The recent Supreme Court decision in
Laws. New Hampshire has a civil statute which prohibits the unauthorized
manufacture or sale of duplicate recordings. N.H. REv. STAT. A-NN. §§ 352-
IA: 1-4 (Supp. 1973).
10. Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 15
VAND. L. REV. 419, 431 (1962).
11. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 543.02 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-28 (1965) (over-
ruling Waring v. Dunlea); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-101 (1962). Interestingly,
duplicators have argued that the state statutes passed in response to Waring
should be construed to sanction unauthorized duplication. See Helfer, Copy-
right Revision and the Unauthorized Duplication of Phonograph Records-A
New Statute and the Old Problems: A Job Half Done, 14 BULL. COPY. Soc'Y
137, 150 (1966). The two courts which have considered the claim, however,
have quite correctly rejected this construction. Liberty UA, Inc. v. Eastern
Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414, appeal dismissed, 278 N.C. 702, 181
S.E.2d 600 (1971); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Custom Recording
Co., 189 S.E.2d 305, 174 U.S.P.Q. 309 (S.C. 1972).
12. See Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1079, 1122 (1959). See
generally Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound
Recordings, 5 CONN. L. REv. 204, 228-36 (1972).
The preemptive effect of section 1 (e) of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e)(1970), should not extend to state-created public performance rights in a
recording of a work in the public domain. Works become part of the public
domain either after expiration of the copyright or if no copyright was obtained.
Thus there can be no dilution of the copyright proprietor's rights. The Act's
purpose in providing incentives for composers has already been satisfied. One
might argue that recognition of a right to control the performance of a record-
ing of a musical work would impair the congressional policy in support of
maximum public dedication of copyrighted works after the expiry of the copy-
right. Even if record producers are given a public performance right, however,
the public still will have access to the work through sheet music and purchase
of recordings, and it is probable that it will usually have access through radio
performances of the record, though at a higher cost to the broadcaster. But
see Kalodner & Vance, supra, 72 HARv. L. REv. at 1125-26. Cf. G. Ricordi &
Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952).
The commerce clause, though, would apply equally to recordings in the pub-
lic domain and to recordings protected by the Copyright Act.
13. See generally Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection
of Sound Recordings, supra note 12, 5 CONN. L. REv. at 236-46.
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Goldstein v. California,14 upholding the constitutionality of state anti-
piracy legislation, does not necessarily imply analogous state power
with respect to public performance rights. Though the Copyright Act
might be interpreted to give composers exclusive authority over the
duplication of records using their copyrighted music, it does not ex-
plicitly provide such powers. By contrast, state legislation granting
record producers a public performance right would directly conflict
with section 1(e) of the Copyright Act which explicitly grants com-
posers a public performance right.', Moreover, since radio and televi-
sion broadcasters are the predominant public performers of recorded
music the disruption of interstate commerce attributable to state rec-
ognition of a record public performance right would be considerably
more severe than that to be expected from state anti-piracy legislation.
The conflict has now shifted to Congress and its consideration of
the Revision Bill. Though certain factual ambiguities render it im-
possible to make completely unequivocal judgments, under the most
plausible assumptions the argument for granting a federal public per-
formance right to record producers is unconvincing. Although such
action might decrease the revenues collected by composers from
broadcasters, it probably would increase the aggregate revenues col-
lected by both composers' 6 and record companies from broadcasters.
This initial distribution, however, would be economically unstable.
The ultimate distribution of the revenues among composers, record
companies and performers, generated by the granting of a second per-
formance right, would depend upon the resolution of a complex set
of economic and legal factors. None of the possible permutations,
however, is clearly preferable to the existing distribution. Further-
more, the establishment of a record public performance right would
not materially assist certain categories of performers-classical and
semi-classical musicians-who allegedly are injured under current
arrangements.
Evaluation of the argument for such a right requires careful appli-
cation of price theory, resolution of certain factual issues, and some
difficult value judgments. Economic analysis is necessary to deter-
mine the economic relationships among the interested parties and the
14. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
16. Unless otherwise indicated by the context the term "composer" includes
both the creator of the music and the lyricist, as well as the music publisher,
who usually hold the copyright and shares mechanical reproduction and pub-
lic performance fees with the songwriter(s). While there may be conflicts
among these groups, cf. SHEnL & KAsULovsxy 131-32, they generally share
a common interest in the maximization of mechanical reproduction and public
performance fees. Depending on the details of corporate organization, there
may, however, be situations where the publisher's concern for maximizing roy-
alties is not as great as the songwriter's. See text accompanying notes 18-
19 infra.
1974]
effect on each of giving record producers a public performance right
for their product in addition to the extant composers' public perform-
ance right in the underlying music. Furthermore, one must consider
the additional costs of collecting and allocating license fees and the
economic effect upon performers, composers, broadcasters, the listen-
ing public, and private record buyers. Particular attention must be
given to the special claims made by classical music performers and
classical radio stations. Finally, the significance of copyright practices
in other countries must be considered.
Granting a public performance right to record producers, a group
allegedly injured under the existing legal regime, represents a legisla-
tive effort to redistribute the revenues attributable to the sale and
public performance of records for their benefit. The Revision Bill
also attempts to equally divide the expected benefits between record
companies and performers.' 7 Under all conceivable circumstances,
the ultimate division of record public performance revenues among
composers, record companies and performers will not conform to that
envisioned by the Revision Bill.
Since the establishment of a second public performance right will
redistribute some of the existing income derived from record produc-
tion, the gains by one or more groups will be at the expense of other
groups. In addition to record companies and performers, the impact
of the legislation potentially affects the interests of broadcasters, com-
posers, advertisers, the listening -audience and private record purchas-
ers. Our analysis suggests that record companies will derive short
term gains, though considerably less than would seem probable based
on the terms of the proposed legislation. Record companies, however,
would not gain in the long run. Performers should gain through in-
creased employment, though these gains will not be of particular ben-
efit to classical and semi-classical performers. Advertisers and radio
listeners will not be affected, composers and private record buyers will
benefit, and broadcasters will be injured. Therefore, evaluation of the
wisdom of establishing a public performance right for records requires
the assignment of priorities to the varied interest groups making claim
to the benefits conferred by the production and use of recorded music.
The specific redistribution of benefits and losses ultimately depends
upon the broadcasters' response to the increased costs of playing rec-
ords that would follow from granting record companies a public per-
formance right in addition to that now enjoyed by composers. Broad-
casters probably will absorb these costs without reducing their de-
mand for record licenses and, if so, both composers and record pur-
chasers will gain at the broadcasters' expense, though, in the short
run, the new public performance right will generate additional reven-
ues for record producers. Eventually, composers should capture a
portion of these new revenues; additional revenues not so cap-
tured should be dissipated by lower record prices resulting from
increased record production by existing and new record companies.
17. See note 82 infra and accompanying text.
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To the extent these predictions are erroneous, and record pro-
ducers do achieve some net increase in their income, this additional
income will not be divided between record companies and performers
according to the formula established by the Revision Bill. Therefore,
the fundamental policy issue is whether the losses to broadcasters can
be justified by any benefits to record producers, composers, and pri-
vate record buyers. Additionally, the consistency of such a redistribu-
tion with certain antitrust decrees imposed upon ASCAP also must
be considered.
Although unlikely, if the imposition of an additional license fee for
record producers of the magnitude contemplated by the Revision Bill
reduces broadcasters' demand for recorded music, the problem in-
creases in complexity. Record producers would gain and broadcasters
would lose. The impact upon composers would be more difficult to
predict. It would depend upon three considerations: the extent to
which composers are maximizing their revenues under the existing
regime; the extent to which the new price to broadcasters resulting
from the imposition of an additional license fee for record producers
departs from the price that maximizes the joint revenues of composers
and record producers; and the ability of composers to capture through
exercise of their mechanical reproduction rights some of the new rev-
enues earned by record producers pursuant to their public perform-
ance right. Under existing law administrative restraints and an
antitrust consent decree force composers to set their license fees below
the maximization point. The advent of a public performance right
for record producers will raise the price and cost of recorded music to
broadcasters, and any increase in the total license fees payable by
broadcasters initially must reduce the public performance earnings of
composers. If the new price of broadcasting recorded music increases
the joint revenues of composers and record producers above the reve-
nues that composers could earn if they were the sole owners of the
public performance right, however, some of the record producers'
earnings will be at the expense of broadcasters rather than composers.
Indeed, if the establishment of a second public performance right does
increase the joint revenues of composers and record producers, com-
posers could profit. This would occur if composers balance their pub-
lic performance losses by capturing some of the record producers' pub-
lic performance revenues through increases in the revenues composers
received from record companies for the privilege of recording their
music. The composers' ultimate position will depend, therefore, upon
the extent to which the second public performance right permits
record producers to extract revenues from broadcasters that compos-
ers cannot get by themselves, and the extent to which composers can
balance their public performance losses by capturing record producers'
1974]
public performance revenues through increases in mechanical repro-
duction fees.
Amending the Copyright Act confronts an important principle
which also is relevant to the formulation of copyright policy generally,
indeed, to all economic regulation. At times there are desires to re-
structure the benefits of copyright law to favor creators-authors,
composers, and performers-more, and the commercial participants in
the creative and distribution process, such as publishers, record com-
panies and broadcasters, less. It may be that authors and artists "de-
serve" a larger share of the revenues generated by the exploitation of
their work, but it may not be possible to achieve this through changes
in the copyright law. Whatever the initial allocation of rights in crea-
tive work under the law, a large part of these rights must be assigned
to others in order to render them capable of returning significant in-
come to their original holders. The author must usually deal with
a publisher, the performer with a record company, etc. The author's
success will depend less on the statutory rights which he initially pos-
sesses than on the variety of economic factors which determine his
relative bargaining strength. In most circumstances, attempts to
strengthen a weak bargaining position through granting an author or
artist additional legal rights which affect one part of the economic
relationship with a publisher or record company may be frustrated
by a compensating adjustment in the remaining relationship.' 8
Certainly our analysis of the possible results from granting record
companies and performers a public performance right in their records
is a prime example of this phenomenon. Another example may be the
experience of composers and lyricists who write for television and the
movies. The Copyright Act clearly permits the composer of such mu-
sic to own the copyright thereon. In practice, however, the television
or movie producer takes the copyright out in his own name. Due
to their superior bargaining position, producers have been able to in-
sist on standard terms which provide that the composer expressly
characterize himself as an employee for hire, that the composer per-
petually relinquish all rights to the composition, and that the com-
poser grant all publication rights to a publisher selected by the pro-
ducer. Composers have complained, to no avail, about these practices,
insisting that these publishers do not fully exploit the compositions,
but, rather, are only interested in them to the extent that they en-
hance the value of the television program or movie into which they are
integrated. Recently, one of the major television producers, CBS,
agreed to alter these terms to permit the composer to hold the copy-
right on the music. Under the new arrangements the composer will
retain all rights, except that CBS will receive a 50 percent share of
the ASCAP performance money for network performances plus syn-
chronization rights.' 9 This agreement, however, was not caused by
18. See generally EcoNomvic CouNcIL OF CANADA, REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL
AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 145-47 (1971); Keyes, Letter from Canada, COPY-
RIGHT, June 1972, at 137.
19. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1972, at 95, col. 1; Variety, Sept. 27, 1972, at 45.
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any change in the copyright law. Rather, it was due to an increase in
the composers' bargaining position stemming from their filing an anti-
trust suit against the producers. The suit charged the producers with
unlawfully refusing to contract with composers except on the stand-
ard terms noted above, in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.20
It is possible to alter existing economic relationships, but in
most instances the process is far more difficult and complex than
would appear. Rarely can a permanent change be accomplished
through a single, simple legislative action. Supply of and demand for
music and performers capable of recording songs with wide appeal
to record buyers and broadcasters constantly exert pressure to read-
just legislative schemes inconsistent with these economic forces. Of-
ten these forces induce the development of business practices better
able to exploit the economic advantages of particular interests. The
effectiveness of the legal scheme depends upon the comprehensiveness
of the legislative arrangements, and the vigor with which public and
interested private parties enforce these arrangements. If complete re-
adjustments to economic realities are not possible through existing in-
stitutions, and if these institutions cannot be changed, the result may
be a permanent disequilibrium always threatening to undermine the
official arrangements via legal and illegal means. Since enforcing a
legal regime inconsistent with prevailing economic forces always ex-
acts substantial social costs, these situations should be avoided unless
equitable and economic benefits are clear and substantial.
Legal Framework
Composers now earn most of their income from licensing broadcasters
to perform publicly records using their copyrighted music. They also
earn substantial revenues through licensing record companies to re-
cord their music pursuant to their mechanical reproduction right.
Since performances must be recorded before records can be broadcast,
the mechanical reproduction right is more powerful than the public
performance right, and for this reason, as we shall demonstrate, the
composer, as sole owner of the mechanical reproduction right, should
be able to appropriate much of the revenues that record producers
might earn through the proposed record public performance right.
A thorough understanding of the economic implications of establishing
a record public performance right, therefore, requires elucidation of
both mechanical reproduction and public performance rights.
20. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., Civil No. 72-542 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Feb. 7, 1972).
1974]
Composers also earn some revenues from sheet music although these
represent only a small percentage of composers' total returns from
their copyrighted compositions. Usually the copyright on a musical
composition is held in the name of the music publisher rather than
the composer, with the division of mechanical reproduction royalties
between composers and publishers specified by the contract establish-
ing their mutual rights and duties. Generally they are divided evenly
so that of every 2 cents paid to the publisher, the composer will be
entitled to 1 cent.21 Publishers, like composers, collect their public
performance revenues through joining a public performance licensing
association.
The Mechanical Reproduction Right
The mechanical reproduction right permits composers to control the
initial recording of their music and to profit from all subsequent re-
cordings. The composer's mechanical reproduction right is subject to
compulsory licensing which limits the degree of the composer's control
in this regard. Under the compulsory licensing provisions, whenever
the proprietor of the copyright on a musical composition agrees to
a recording of the composition, anyone else may record the song upon
following the statutory formalities and paying the prescribed fee of 2
cents per record to the copyright holder.22 Record companies usually
obtain voluntary licenses 23 which permit them to avoid the burden-
some statutory formalities.24 Negotiated licenses also permit record
21. See Songwriter Contract Form of American Guild of Authors and Com-
posers, 1 4(g), (h), in SHEKEL & KRAsimovsz 517; id. at 179-80.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (e) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
[A] s a condition of extending the copyright control to . . . me-
chanical reproductions .... whenever the owner of a musical copy-
right has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in the use of the
copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce
mechanically the musical work [e.g. piano rolls], any other person
may make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment to
the copyright proprietor of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part man-
ufactured, to be paid by the manufacturer thereof; and the copyright
proprietor may require, and if so the manufacturer shall furnish, a re-
port under oath on the 20th day of each month on the number of parts
of instruments manufactured during the previous month serving to re-
produce mechanically said musical work, and royalties shall be due
on the parts manufactured during any month upon the 20th of the next
succeeding month.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (e) (1970) provides in part:[W]henever any person, in the absence of a license agreement, intends
to use a copyrighted musical composition upon the parts of instru-
ments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, relying
upon the compulsory license provision of this title, he shall serve
notice of such intention, by registered mail, upon the copyright propri-
etor at his last address disclosed by the records of the copyright office,
sending to the copyright office a duplicate of such notice ....
23. See, e.g., Mechanical License, in SHEmEL & KRAsLovS=Y 534; Form 10.1,
Mechanical License, in REcoRD AND MUSIC PUrLISH1mG FORMS OF AGREEmENT
IN CURR ET USE 431 (I. Spiegel & J. Cooper eds. 1971).
24. For example, payments can be made quarterly rather than monthly,
as authorized by the statute. Moreover, the record company is relieved of its
obligation under section 101 (e) to file a notice of intention to use. See gener-
ally Diamond, Copyright Problems of the Phonograph Record Industry, 15
VAn L. REv. 419, 422 (1962); Seton, Music-Domestic Phonograph Records, inTnE BusnEss Am LAW OF Music 22-23 (J. Taubman ed. 1965).
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companies to pay royalties only on records sold rather than on those
manufactured and sometimes composers agree to accept less than 2
cents per record.25 It is difficult to determine the frequency of ar-
rangements in which record companies do not pay the full 2 cents per
song on a newly released full-price album, but there are at least two
recurrent situations in which they regularly pay less. The first is when
a number of songs from the same publisher are to be used in a particu-
lar album, and the second is when the featured performer is also the
songwriter-an increasingly common phenomenon. In both situations
the royalty is likely to be 1.5 cents per song.2 6
The Revision Bill continues the existing compulsory license scheme
with minor modifications. 27 Most importantly, the Revision Bill in-
creases the statutory rate to either 3 cents or 0.75 cent per minute of
playing time, whichever amount is larger.28 Under the proposed leg-
islation royalties are to be paid quarterly on records "made and distri-
buted" rather than on those "manufactured" as provided by the pres-
ent law. The Revision Bill also slightly extends the period of absolute
composer control. Under the present Act the license is triggered
when the owner of the musical copyright records the song or when
he "permits" or "knowingly acquiesces" in the recording by another.
Under the Revision Bill, however, the right of other companies to ob-
tain compulsory licenses is delayed until the initial distribution of rec-
ords to the public.
Composers' Public Performance Right
The Revision Bill slightly expands the categories of music users who
are liable to the composers' public performance right. Under the cur-
rent Copyright Act, the composers' right to control the public perform-
25. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 410-16.
26. See, e.g., Form 1.1, Exclusive Artist's Recording Agreement, 16, in
Spiegel & Cooper, supra note 23, at 7-8. In the case of songs of more than
normal length, where the duration of use on a recording is more than approxi-
mately 3.5 minutes, the license fee commonly exceeds 2 cents. Compositions
of more than 5 minutes duration are regularly licensed at more than 2 cents
by the Harry Fox Agency, which represents approximately 80 percent of the
popular music publishers. The extra compensation is ordinarily at the rate
of 0.5 cent for each additional minute or fraction thereof. SHEMEL & KRAsI-
LOVSKY 181-82.
Classical composition licenses are generally granted at the rate of 0.25 cent
for each minute of playing time. In no event, however, can the license fee
be less than 2 cents. Thus, for a 40 minute album of a copyrighted serious
composition a record company would pay a mechanical license fee of 10 cents.
S. Snm-mEL & M. KRasImovsKY, MORE ABOUT THis BusINEss OF Music 27 (1967).
27. Revision Bill § 115.
28. Revision Bill § 115 (c) (2), as amended by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, June 11, 1974. When originally introduced in 1965, the Revision Bill
called for an increase to 3 cents in the statutory royalty. Opposition from the
record industry led to the compromise figure of 2.5 cents, which was the roy-
alty contained in the bill which passed the House in 1967. See generally H.R.
REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-75 (1967). The Revision Bill as originally
introduced in the 93d Congress contained the 2.5 cents figure.
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ance of their music includes all performances "for profit."29 Thus,
composers are entitled to collect compensation when their copyrighted
music, including a recording incorporating that music, is broadcast
over radio or television.
Though "jukeboxes" are operated for profit, section 1(e) of the
Copyright Act exempts "[t]he reproduction or rendition of a musical
composition by or upon coin-operated machines" from payment of
public performance fees to composers "unless a fee is charged for
admission to the place where such reproduction or rendition occurs." 30
In 1909, when the current Copyright Act was enacted, coin-operated
music machines apparently were a novelty of little economic conse-
quence, and the exemption was included at the last minute with al-
most no discussion.31 Despite repeated hearings and numerous bills
aimed at its repeal or modification,32 the exemption has never been
dislodged.3 3 In the past the record industry opposed its repeal on two
grounds. First, jukebox operators purchase a substantial number of
records each year, and the record companies accordingly opposed any
change which might cut into their sales volume. Second, they ar-
gued that if the jukebox operator is compelled to pay the composer, he
also should have to pay the performers and record company who con-
tributed to the final product.3 4
The Revision Bill removes the exemption and substitutes a compul-
sory licensing system under which jukebox operators are obligated to
pay an annual fee of $8 per "coin-operated phonorecord player."35
29. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970). This section provides in pertinent part: "Any
person entitled thereto . . .shall have the exclusive right . . . [t]o perform
the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition ......
Throughout this article the existence and validity of composers' public per-
formance right and revenues is assumed.
30. Id.31. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST. SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsION,
REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW TO THE HousE
COMM. ON THE JuDic.ARY 32 (Comm. Print 1961). See Finkelstein, The Copy-
right Hang-up: Do We Hang Together or Separately, 3 PERroRmmG ARTS REv.
405, 422 (1972).
The jukebox exception did not appear in any of the bills considered at the
hearings on the entire Copyright Act of 1909, and there is no mention of itin the hearings. The only explanation appearing in the congressional proceed-ings for the jukebox exception is the terse statement in the report of the House
committee which reported out the 1909 bill:
The exception regarding the public performance of a musical composi-
tion upon coin-operated machines in a place where an admission fee
is not charged is understood to be satisfactory to the composers and
proprietors of musical copyrights. A representative of one of the larg-
est musical publishing houses in the country stated that the publisher
finds the so-called penny parlor of first assistance as an advertising
medium.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
32. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 75 (1967); S. Doc.
No. 155, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, 33 (1956).
33. A useful compilation of the arguments of proponents and opponents of
repeal of the exemption is contained in A REvimW OF THE EVIDENCE RELATING
TO THE COPYRIGHT LAW AS IT APPLIES TO JUKEBOXES, S. Doc. No. 155, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956). This document contains a succinct description of the structure
of the jukebox industry. Id. at 20-21.
34. See id. at 30-31.
35. Revision Bill § 116(b) (1) (A), as amended by Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, June 11, 1974. As originally introduced in the 93d Congress, the Bill called
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One-eighth of these fees is allocated to the recordings' copyright own-
ers, that is, the record companies, and the performers of recordings,
and the remainder is distributed to the owners of copyright in musical
works, the composers. The fees allocated to the record companies and
performers are to be divided equally.3 6 Although jukebox operation
is generally a small business, the Revision Bill probably will not result
in a significant reduction in the number of jukeboxes since the stat-
utory fee is relatively small when compared with the gross income
per machine.3 7
The Revision Bill also enlarges the range of music uses subject to
the public performance right in music. Currently, the public perform-
ance right applies only to performances "for profit." The bill elim-
inates the "for profit" limitation and substitutes specific exemptions.
The net effect is to require "public" or "educational" broadcasters
who do not now pay public performance fees to obtain permission and
pay performance royalties.
Composers' and publishers' public performance rights are exercised
through a performing rights organization. The two principal organ-
izations38 are the American Society of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). SESAC, Inc. is
a third such organization, though much smaller than ASCAP and
BMI. ASCAP, formed in 1914, is the oldest organization. BMI was
formed by broadcasters in 1940 in response to a dispute between
ASCAP and the broadcast industry.3 9 ASCAP and BMI function as
clearinghouses for the licensing of music performance rights. The
broadcasters' need for ready access to virtually the entire body of
copyrighted music, the huge number of copyrighted compositions and
the number of separate performances of such compositions each year,
the impracticability of negotiating individual licenses for each com-
for an annual payment of $9 per jukebox with one-ninth of the fees to be dis-
tributed to record companies and performers, and the remainder to the owners
of copyright in the underlying musical works.
36. Revision Bill §§ 116(c) (3) (B), 114 (f) (the version passed by the Sen-
ate deleted this provision).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 82-83 (1967) (average opera-
tor annually grosses roughly $1,000 per box).
38. The United States is unusual in having more than one performing rights
organization. In most other countries the common pattern is a single organiza-
tion which is subject to some measure of public regulation. In England, for
example, the Performing Right Society, Ltd. administers the performance right
in music and its actions are subject to review by a Performing Right Tribunal.
See Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eiz. 2, c.74, §§ 23-30.
39. Apparently, BMI was officially incorporated in 1939, but did not start
its operations until 1940. Letter from Edward M. Cramer, President of BNH,
to Lewis Kurlantzick, Aug. 6, 1973. For a short history of ASCAP and the
rise of BMI, see B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 424-441 (1960);
Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in Music and Performance Rights Soci-
eties, 7 COPYRIGHT PROBLEMS ANALYzED 69 (1951); Finkelstein, The Composer
and the Public Interest-Regulation of Performing Right Societies, 19 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 275 (1954).
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position, and the inability of composers to effectively enforce their
rights on an individual basis combine to require a central agency to
license performance of copyrighted music. ASCAP and BMI sell li-
censes, monitor unauthorized users to discover copyright violations,
bring infringement actions when unlicensed use is discovered, take
samples to determine the relative frequency with which various com-
positions are used, and distribute revenues to composers and music
publishers.40° Since at one time or another, almost every station will
wish to use compositions which are in the repertoire of one of the
performing rights organizations, virtually all radio and television
broadcasters operate with licenses from all three licensing agencies.
ASCAP presently charges radio stations 1.725 percent of net adver-
tising receipts for a blanket license to use any of ASCAP's repertoire
and BMI charges 1.7 percent for a similar license. Although per pro-
gram licenses which also permit use of the entire repertoire are avail-
able, broadcasters almost always take blanket licenses.4 1  Under a
blanket license the licensee is permitted unlimited use of the organiza-
tion's entire repertoire for a fee based on a percentage of annual net
advertising receipts.
Compositions from a musical play or opera may be used in two
ways. The music may be performed alone-the non-dramatic or so-
called "small" rights-or the entire production may be performed-
the dramatic or "grand" rights. The performing rights organizations
license the right to perform the music, but not the right to perform
the entire production from which the music derived. Thus, if a radio
or television station, or a dramatic society, wished to perform a musi-
cal comedy it would have to obtain a license from the proprietor of
the dramatic right. Recent cases involving concert performances of
songs from the show "Jesus Christ Superstar" illustrate the dif-
ficulties of drawing the line between non-dramatic and dramatic
rights.42
Both functional considerations and certain antitrust consent decrees
to which both major licensing organizations are subject 43 significantly
40. For an explanation of the workings of ASCAP and BMI, see SHEMEL& KRAsILovsxY 135-52; Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in Music and
Performance Rights Societies, note 39 supra; Finkelstein, ASCAP as an Exam-
ple of the Clearing House System in Operation, 14 BuLL. Copy. Soc'y 2 (1966);
Kleinfield, Name That Tune: If Joe Schmieg Can't Probably Nobody Can,
Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
41. The per program licensee pays a specified fee for each program in which
any of the licensor's music is performed. This fee is a percentage of the net
advertising receipts of the program involved.
42. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.
1972). The presentation of the whole or part of a musical play is usually ad-
ministered by the writers, pursuant to rights reserved to them by Dramatists'
Guild contracts. With respect to most music publishers who publish show
music, the copyright is maintained in the name of the writer; accordingly, pub-
lishers do not acquire dramatic rights. In many instances, shows previously
produced on the Broadway stage are licensed by writers' agents to amateur
and stock groups and to television for dramatic performances. SHEmEL &
KRAsIovsKY 151-52.
43. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers,[1940-1943J Trade Cas. 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), decree amended, [1950-1951]
Trade Cas. 1 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), decree amended, [1960] Trade Cas. 1
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limit the capacity of these organizations to maximize the earnings of
composers through exercise of their public performance rights. As
previously mentioned, the administrative problems associated with
making a huge number of individual copyrighted compositions avail-
able to a large number of users demand some form of central bulk
licensing of music, that is, broadcasters must be licensed to use the
entire repertoire of the performing rights organization rather than
be charged fees for use of individual compositions.44 The large number
of users and the even greater number of copyrighted compositions re-
quire performing rights societies to establish licensing rates through
collective bargaining with representatives of the major segments of
the broadcast industry.45 As of January 1, 1971, there were 687 com-
mercial TV stations, 4250 commercial AM radio stations, and 2122 com-
mercial FM radio stations on the air in the United States.46 A large
percentage of the revenues of both ASCAP and BMI is derived from a
small number of users; perhaps 80 to 85 percent of revenues comes
from 15 to 20 percent of licensees. These licensees are primarily the
commercial AM stations and the commercial TV stations. While TV
stations account for the largest portion of revenues from the licensing
of music, radio broadcasting is more relevant to this article because
radio stations are the principal large scale users of recordings. Ap-
69,612 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., [1940-1943] Trade
Cas. 56,096 (E.D. Wis. 1941), decree amended, [1966] Trade Cas. 71,941(S.D.N.Y.).
44. The most succinct statement of the need for bulk licensing by a central
licensing agency is probably found in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Solic-
itor General in a case involving anantitrust challenge to ASCAP and its li-
censing methods:
The extraordinary number of users spread across the land, the ease
with which a performance may be broadcast, the sheer volume of
copyrighted compositions, the enormous quantity of separate perform-
ances each year, the impracticability of negotiating individual licenses
for each composition, and the ephemeral nature of each performance
all combine to create unique market conditions for performance rights
to recorded music.
If this market is to function at all, there must be-at least with re-
spect to licensing the performance of recorded music-some kind of
central licensing agency by which copyright holders may offer their
works in a common pool to all who wish to use them.... And be-
cause users' requirements for separate pieces are continuous, the vol-
ume of demand enormous, and the value of each single performance
small, separate negotiations on a per piece basis are not practicable.
There is simply no escaping, as a practical matter, the licensing of
the works in bulk.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on the Petition for Certiorari
at 10-11. K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ. Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
45. See, e.g., Finkelstein, Antitrust Laws and the Arts, in CoNFERENCE ON
THE ARTs, PUBLISHING, A THE LAW 55, 58 (U. Chi. Law School Conference
Ser. No. 10, 1952); Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest-Regula-
tion of Performing Right Societies, supra note 39, at 275, 288. Other users
usually negotiate through their respective associations such as the American
Hotel Association and the National Association of Ballroom Operators.
46. BUREAU or =n CENsus, U.S. DEPT. or Commnvrsc STATiSTicAL ABSTRACT
or = UNIrsE STATES: 1972, at 496.
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proximately 75 percent of radio broadcasting is devoted to the pro-
gramming of recorded music. 47 Radio stations are represented by the
All-Industry Radio Music License Committee.4
Any combination of a large number of competing products into a
single sales unit is inherently anticompetitive and potentially danger-
ous. The dangers of price fixing, price discrimination and tying are
inherent in such arrangements. Clearinghouses which pool com-
posers' public performance rights for wholesale supply to music users
are no exception. The resulting problems are analogous to those crea-
ted by patent pooling49 and the package licensing of patents with per-
centage-of-sales royalties. 50 The risks of eliminating bargaining be-
tween individual copyright holders and individual broadcasters may
be less significant with respect to records than other products, how-
ever, since records are not completely fungible commodities. To a
considerable extent they are unique products not easily substituted
for each other in response to small price changes. 51
Despite their uniqueness, records are substantially interchangeable
and the concentration of virtually the entire supply of copyrighted
music in a single entity affords the composers a powerful bargaining
position vis-a-vis potential users. This power has induced economic
and legal reactions by music users. In 1940-41, a bitter conflict de-
veloped between ASCAP and the broadcast industry, at that time the
strongest and best organized customer for ASCAP's music, over the
size and method of calculating royalties. ASCAP music was not
played over the air for almost a year. One result of that conflict was
the establishment by the broadcast industry of BMI as an alternative
source of broadcast music. Another was the filing of civil antitrust
complaints against both ASCAP and BMI. The complaints charged
these organizations, inter alia, with price fixing, price discrimination,
and insistence upon blanket licenses which did not establish a direct
relationship between license fees and actual use of copyrighted music.
There were also extensive criticisms by composers and music publish-
ers of ASCAP's internal organization, including the requirements for
47. See C. Corry, The Phonograph Record Industry: An Economic Study 99
(M-150 Lib. of Cong. Leg. Ref. Service, Feb. 9, 1965); Hearings on S. 597, pt.
4, at 1344 & n.21; id., pt. 2, at 481, 485-93.
48. New ASCAP Agreement Gives Radio Big Break, BROADCASTUG, Dec. 11,
1972, at 9. The All-Industry Radio Music License Committee represents ap-
proximately 1200 stations. The Committee-recommended agreements, how-
ever, have historically been accepted by virtually all stations-whether or not
directly represented by the Committee. Id.
49. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945);
Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931).
50. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.
827 (1950); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
See generally Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern
Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of 1950, 19 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 294,
297-98 (1954); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on the Petition
for Certiorari, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publ. Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967).
51. See Finkelstein, Antitrust Laws and the Arts, supra note 45, at 67:
There is no competition between catalogues of songs such as there is
between commodities. One may choose to buy steel or automobiles
from any one of a number of companies. But a musical program must
be balanced and must include works from all repertories that contain
compositions demanded by the public.
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membership and the methods used in determining the distribution of
license fees.
As a result of these complaints, both performance rights organiza-
tions entered into consent decrees designed to curb their economic
power. These decrees, as amended, remain in force52 and constitute
a prime restraint on ASCAP's and BMI's behavior with respect to the
sale of public performance rights. Both organizations are prohibited
from discriminating in rates between licensees similarly situated. 53
This bars the kind of price discrimination that would permit ASCAP
to vary its rates for use of its music in accordance with the ability of
the user to profit from such use. They also must offer users the op-
tion of license arrangements which establish fees in proportion to the
use of the performing right society's music. Until now the proportion-
ality requirement has had few practical consequences because virtu-
ally all users have opted for blanket licenses. 4 At least one music
user, however, the CBS television network, may have altered its posi-
tion in this regard. In a recently filed lawsuit, CBS's complaint
charges that the practical unavailability of per use licensing fee struc-
tures violates the antitrust laws.55
In addition, the consent decree establishes judicial supervision over
ASCAP's prices. Under the procedure outlined in the decree, on re-
ceipt of a written application for a license, ASCAP is obliged to inform
the applicant of the proposed fee. If the parties are unable to agree
on the fee within 60 days of the receipt by ASCAP of the initial
application, the potential user of copyrighted music under ASCAP's
control may request the federal district court for the Southern District
of New York to determine a reasonable rate. ASCAP has the burden
52. See note 43 supra.
53. United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., [1966] Trade Cas. 71,941 at
83,326 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, [1950-1951] Trade Cas. 62,595 at 63,752 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Al-
though joint action by broadcasters in negotiating with ASCAP arguably con-
stitutes an antitrust violation, the cost of bargaining individually with broad-
casters would be prohibitively expensive. The restraints on competition flow-
kng from such action are therefore unavoidable and should be legally accept-
able. Furthermore, the legality of such bargaining seems implicit in the con-
sent decrees' recognition of the need for central bulk licensing and in the de-
crees' prohibition of price discrimination among similarly situated licensees.
54. Broadcasters rarely request per program licenses. See note 41 supra and
accompanying text. A BMI spokesman estimated that it had granted a dozen
such licenses to stations in a recent year; ASCAP estimated even less. Al-
though under the consent decree music users now may obtain a license for an
individual selection, this option is rarely, if ever, used, since the difficulty and
relative expense of negotiating an individual license make it impractical.
55. The CBS action is presently before the courts. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civil
No. 69-5740 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 31, 1969). The refusal of summary judgment
in favor of ASCAP is reported in 337 F. Supp. 394, 172 U.S.P.Q. 355 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
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of proving the reasonableness of its proposed fee.56 Broadcasters fre-
quently have invoked this right,57 but so far, the federal district judge
never actually has set the rate himself; rather, he has induced the
parties to agree upon a rate which he has then approved, though some-
times the judge has participated further by mediating the dispute.58
Certainly, the ultimate power of the judge to set the rate himself
strongly influences the parties to seek agreement at mutually ac-
ceptable rates.
Although formally, BMI's decree is less restrictive than ASCAP's,
the net effect upon BMI is substantially similar. BMI's prices are not
subject to judicial supervision, and while ASCAP's decree extensively
regulates its internal structure and operations, BMI retains greater
freedom in this regard. Many of the limitations imposed on ASCAP
by the consent decree, however, affect BMI as well. Thus, it is
doubtful whether BMI could refuse to deal with a potential user. Fur-
thermore, BMI's bargaining strategy in negotiating rates with broad-
casters is affected by ASCAP's rates which are, in turn, subject to
judicial scrutiny. For example, the present ASCAP rate for radio sta-
tions, established at the end of 1972 for a five-year term, is
1.725 percent of net advertising receipts. The prior rate had been
2 percent. In negotiating its new arrangement with radio stations
BMI was able to resist any decrease in the old rate of 1.7 percent.
One probable reason for BMI's success is that there are now more
performances of BMI music on the radio than ASCAP music, which
justifies rates charged by BMI at least as high as tho e charged by
ASCAP. Also, B1IVI's agreement with local television stations
presently gives BMI 58 percent of the amount payable to ASCAP
under the terms of the current form of blanket license between AS-
CAP and local stations, again showing a close nexus between BMI's
and ASCAP's rates.59
Public Performance Right for Recordings
The present Copyright Act does not give the producers of a recorded
performance of a song any control over the public performance of
their product.60 That is, commercial users of recordings need only
56. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,[1950-1951] Trade Cas. 62,595 at 63,754 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
57. See, e.g., Hearings on Policies of ASCAP Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Select Comm. on Small Business, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1958) (State-
ment of Victor R. Hansen, Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Anti-
trust Division: "This right to secure licenses at reasonable royalties given
users of ASCAP music has been invoked many more times than has the compa-
rable right given in other judgments in connection with patent licenses.");
ASCAP Consolidated Statement of Receipts, Expenses and Change in Fund
Balance for Year Ended Dec. 31, 1971, Note 4 ("The Society is continually in-
volved in rate proceedings with licensees .... ").
58. See generally New ASCAP Agreement Gives Radio Big Break, BROAD-
cASTING, Dec. 11, 1972, at 9.
59. Broadcast Music, Inc., Local Station Television License Agreement
4A (1971-1973).
60. Both the existing Act and the Revision Bill use the term "sound record-
ing" to identify the object of copyright protection. Sound recordings are de-
fined as "works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken,
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receive permission from ASCAP and BMI, the composers' represent-
atives, and need not seek permission from or provide compensation
to the record company and performers who produced the recording.
The same is true for performances of dramatic and literary works.
The author of the underlying work is granted a public performance
right; but the actors and record company who produce the recording
of the work are not entitled to a separate performance right in the
recording.61 The only federal copyright protection presently given to
recordings is against unauthorized duplication, and that protection has
only recently been granted. Until 1971, recordings received no protec-
tion under the Copyright Act. In October of that year the Act was
amended to protect recordings against unauthorized duplication, i.e.,
record "piracy. '62 Thus, records "fixed"6 3 and published between
February 15, 1972, and January 1, 1975, were entitled to copyright pro-
tection against unauthorized reproduction. 64 The January 1, 1975
termination date for protection has since been eliminated.65 Record-
ings of both copyrighted and uncopyrighted music are eligible for this
protection. The Revision Bill also would provide permanent protec-
tion against unauthorized duplication of records. ° 6
The Revision Bill would drastically alter the current treatment of
public performance of copyrighted music by establishing in the sound
recording itself a public performance right parallel to that long en-
joyed by composers.6 7 Under the structure established in the bill,
commercial users of a record would have to pay the producers of the
or other sounds ... ." 17 U.S.C. § 26 (Supp. 11, 1972); Revision Bill § 101.
The sound recording, that is, the performance which is captured, is to be dis-
tinguished from the "phonorecords," the material objects in which the record-
ing is embodied and from which the sounds can be communicated. See id.
61. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(c), (d) (1970).
62. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19, 20, 26 (Supp. II, 1972).
63. "Fixation" refers to the embodiment of the work in a tangible form
which is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit the work to be perceived,
reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration. See Revision Bill § 101. Thus, in the case of a sound recording the
work is fixed when the series of sounds is first produced on a final master
recording that is later reproduced in published copies. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COPYRIGHT FOR Soum RECORDINGS 1, 2 (Circular 56, 1972).
64. According to the House Report, the purpose of limiting the amendment
to recordings produced before January 1, 1975, was "to provide a period for
further consideration of various alternatives for solving the problems in this
area, before resorting to permanent legislative enactment. By January 1, 1975,
moreover, the protection of sound recordings will, it is hoped, be part of a
copyright law revision." H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1971).
65. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 101, 88 Stat. 1873.
66. Revision Bill §§ 106(1), (3). If Congress had failed to extend such pro-
tection to recordings produced after January 1, 1975, however, record produc-
ers could have only relied upon state law for protection of these recordings.
The Supreme Court recently held that state laws aimed at unauthorized dupli-
cation of recordings are constitutional. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546(1973). See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
67. Revision Bill §§ 106(4), 114(b) (these provisions were deleted in the
version passed by the Senate).
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recording used, as well as the composer of the song recorded. The
bill establishes the fee payable to record producers for broadcast of
their works at I percent of the broadcaster's net advertising revenues,
although those with relatively small advertising revenues will
pay less than the 1 percent rate.08 This fee is to be divided equally
between record companies and performers. In addition, similar to the
current treatment of the composers' public performance rights, record
companies are obligated to license all potential users of their product
at the statutory fee.69
The original form of the Revision Bill introduced in the mid-1960's
did not include a public performance right for recordings. The Regis-
ter of Copyrights viewed the establishment of a performance right
as a highly explosive issue. The vigorous opposition by broadcasters
to such a right would, he feared, endanger the chances for passage
of the bill.7 0 The House Judiciary Committee agreed that recognition
of a performance right was then "impracticable,"7' and the bill which
passed the House in 1967 did not include a public performance provi-
sion. Up to that point, the record industry had taken no official posi-
tion on the performance right question, although individual record
company executives had supported such a right. Instead, the industry
had concentrated its efforts on maintenance of the compulsory license
for music and prevention or limitation of any increase in the com-
pulsory license royalty rate. At the 1967 Senate Hearings on the Re-
vision Bill,72 however, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA), the American Federation of Musicians (AFM), and the Na-
tional Committee for the Recordings Arts, an organization of well-
known performers, supported recognition of a performance right.
The resulting amendment to the bill, introduced in 1967 by Senator
Harrison Williams of New Jersey, 73 was the precursor of the public
performance provision in the present Revision Bill.
Under the Revision Bill, the record producers' ability to control the
public performance of their recordings would be limited by compul-
sory licensing requirements.74 Once records have been distributed to
the public under the authority of the copyright owner, any user could
publicly perform the recording upon compliance with the various no-
tice and reporting requirements and payment of the statutory royalty.
The compulsory license ensures that public performance licenses will
not be refused in situations where the prospective licensee is willing
to pay a fee. In England, where no compulsory license exists, licenses
68. Revision Bill § 114(c) (4) (this provision was deleted in the version
passed by the Senate).
69. Revision Bill § 114, as amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
June 11, 1974 (this provision was deleted in the version-passed by the Senate).
70. Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm.
No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1863
(1965).
71. H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 (1967).
72. Hearings on S. 597.
73. Performers' Amendment, S. Amend. No. 9 to S. 543, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.(1969).
74. Revision Bill § 114(c) (this provision was deleted in the version passed
by the Senate).
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are refused in such situations. The reason for such refusals is that
the English Musicians' Union uses the performance right to safeguard
employment by controlling the use of recorded music. The Union re-
gards the imposition of fees for the public performance of records and
restrictions on their use as a means of promoting and safeguarding
its members' interests. They are not so much concerned with the pay-
ment of fees as with the control of record broadcasts, and they
employ this control to limit the amount of air time for radio record
play and to promote the employment of live musicians.75 The Amer-
ican Federation of Musicians (AFM), long an opponent of record use
by broadcasters, undoubtedly would use an unrestricted public per-
formance right to control record broadcasts. The AFM, however, has
endorsed the Revision Bill with its compulsory license provision. This
endorsement reflects two factors. First, the AFM recognizes that
Congress would not accept the British system.76 Second, the impact
of displacement of live musicians probably no longer plays a critical
role in the union's thinking. A generation has passed since the intro-
duction of widespread record use on the radio. To a union member
there is a significant difference between having a job and losing it
and never having a radio job. Thus, internal pressure on the union
leadership on this issue probably has diminished substantially. As
a result, the AFM is quite willing to accept the Revision Bill.77
The statutory fee for the right to use any and all recordings ap-
plicable to radio and television stations licensed by the FCC would
depend upon the gross annual receipts from advertising sponsors. For
stations with gross receipts of more than $25,000 but less than $100,000,
the yearly fee is $250; for stations with gross receipts between $100,000
and $200,000, the yearly fee is $750; stations with gross receipts of
more than $200,000 will pay a blanket rate of 1 percent of net advertis-
75. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COPYRIGHT COM1VITTEE, CMD No. 8662, at 51-53,
55-56 (1952); Luddisirn on the Record, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1955, at 723;
Stewart, Royalties for Record Play on the Radio, 13 BULL. Copy Soc'Y 61, 63(1965); BILLBOARD, Oct. 21, 1972, at 56, col. 3; id., Oct. 28, 1972, at 56, col. 2(new agreement regulates amount of record airplay, "needle time," and re-
quires new stations to allocate 3 percent of their advertising revenue to the
employment of live musicians).
76. See 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1970) (Lea Act).
77. Some conflict has always existed within the AFM membership with re-
spect to the attitude towards recordings. A small percentage of the union
membership record with regularity and accordingly have an interest in in-
creasing their earnings from recorded performances. The AFM, as represent-
ative of all musicians, has opposed their displacement by mechanical reproduc-
tion, despite the fact that a few of its members can find employment in the
making of such reproductions. Any action which the union may take in oppo-
sition to the use of mechanical music will be contrary to the interests of those
few members, and opposition by the AFM to any campaign by recording art-
ists to increase the value of those interests may generate hostility among such
members to the union. See Countryman, The Organized Musicians: II, 16 U.
CmI. L. REV. 239, 251-62 (1949). For a statement and analysis of the opposing
arguments of broadcasters and the AFM with respect to commercial use of re-
corded music, see id. at 288-92.
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ing receipts or, if a prorated rate is chosen, some fraction of I percent.
The prorated fee is to be established by the Register of Copyrights,
taking into account the amount of the stations' commercial time de-
voted to playing copyrighted recordings and whether the station is
a radio or television broadcaster.7 8 The bill also sets the royalty rate
for background music services and other transmitters of performances
of sound recordings. The blanket rate is 2 percent of the gross
receipts from subscribers. Again, the Register of Copyrights will de-
fine an alternative prorated rate.7 9  It is difficult to estimate the
revenue that might be earned by record companies from public
performances by background music services. While some producers
of such services duplicate and then piece together existing re-
cordings, the larger services, such as Muzak, hire musicians to create
their own musical product.80 In the absence of negotiated licenses
between record users and record producers, royalties due under com-
pulsory licenses are to be paid to the Copyright Office, which will
administer the public performance scheme.
In lieu of using the compulsory licensing procedures, record users
and record producers may negotiate a license. But the negotiated li-
cense cannot set a fee less than the rate established by the statute
or by the regulations of the Register of Copyrights.8 1 Since a user
78. Revision Bill § 114(c) (4) (A), as amended by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, June 11, 1974 (this provision was deleted in the version passed by the
Senate). The bill exempts from liability non-profit and small radio stations
with annual gross advertising receipts of less than $25,000. Revision Bill §§
114(c) (4) (A), (d) (1). As originally introduced in the 93d Congress, the Re-
vision Bill's fee for radio and television broadcasters, except for the small
exempt stations, was 2 percent of net advertising receipts. The prorated fee
would have been a fraction of the 2 percent rate. The amendments adopted
by the Senate Judiciary Committee altered and substantially reduced this fee
schedule.
"Educational" broadcasters, such as a college radio station with no advertis-
ing support, are exempt from liability under the record public performance
right. The Revision Bill sets the royalty rate for stations licensed by the FCC
at a percentage of net advertising receipts; such a station is both licensed by
the FCC and without advertising receipts and therefore exempt. Such stations
will be subject to the composer's public performance right under the Revision
Bill, which deletes the "for profit" phrase from the definition of the composer's
performance right. Whether de jure or de facto, such stations presently pay
no fees under the Copyright Act. If approached, BMI extends a gratuitous li-
cense; ASCAP simply leaves them alone. Whether such stations are presently
liable legally depends upon one's reading of Associated Music Publishers v.
Debs Memorial Radio Fund, 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944), the leading case on
this subject, where the court found a performance "for profit," although the
broadcaster was a non-profit organization. Part of its operating exense was
covered by income from commercially sponsored programs which constituted
only a part of its total air time. The rest of the air time, about two-thirds,
consisted of unsponsored programming. Expenses not covered by the income
from commercial broadcasts were paid through substantial private donations.
The alleged infringement had occurred during one of the unsponsored pro-
grams. See generally Varmer, Limitations on Performing Rights, in STUDIES
FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEmARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SEN.
COMm. ON THE JuDIciARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVIsION 90-91(Comm. Print 1960); 1 M. NWimER, COPYRIGHT § 107.32 (1973).
79. 'evision Bill § 114(c) (4) (B) (this provision was deleted in the version
passed by the Senate).
80. See S. SHEmEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, MoRE AsorT THis Busnss or Music
61-63 (1967).
81. Revision Bill § 114(c) (4) (this provision was deleted in the version
passed by the Senate).
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would have no reason to pay more than the statutory fee, the statute,
in effect, establishes a fixed compulsory license rate. Apparently this
provision, the language of which was negotiated by the represent-
atives of record companies and performing artists, was motivated by
the performers' concern that financial relationships between record
companies and radio stations might result in license rates which did
not adequately reflect the performers' contribution, since both NBC
and CBS are affiliated with large record companies, RCA Victor and
Columbia respectively. In short, they wished to preclude the possi-
bility of "sweetheart" contracts.
The Revision Bill also specifies the division of performance royalties
between performers and record companies. These revenues are to be
equally divided between the copyright owners, presumably the record
companies, and the performers of the records.8 2 Apparently the pro-
vision mandating an even distribution between performers and record
companies and precluding any other arrangement was included to
meet performers' concern that the superior bargaining position of rec-
ord companies could result in performing artists being forced to sign
contracts giving most of the performance royalties to the record com-
pany. As will be demonstrated, despite the statutory language, thd
ultimate distribution of these revenues between record companies and
performers will, in fact, be strongly influenced by the parties' relative
bargaining strength.
The bill, however, does not explicitly indicate how the two equal
license fee pools, established for record companies and performers re-
spectively, are to be divided among the individual record companies
and individual performers. The bill probably anticipates that
the criteria for distribution will be determined by contractual ar-
rangements within the class concerned. With respect to distribution
of royalties by the Copyright Office, and presumptively with respect
to negotiated arrangements, the bill provides that claimants may agree
among themselves to the proportional division of fees in each pool
among them or may designate a common agent to receive payment
without risking antitrust violations.8 The American Federation of
TV and Radio Artists (AFTRA), which represents vocalists, and the
AFM, which represents instrumentalists, already have held discus-
sions with respect to the division of the performers' pool. The provi-
sion permitting claimants to agree among themselves over the propor-
tionate division of royalties refers to distribution of the individual roy-
alty funds which have been equally allocated to the record companies
82. Id. §§ 114(e) (3) (A), (f) (this provision was deleted in the version
passed by the Senate).
83. Id. § 114(e) (1) (this provision was deleted in the version passed by the
Senate). The motivation for this provision is obscure since it is difficult to
see how such arrangements could violate the antitrust laws.
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and performers. It does not permit variations in the equal distribu-
tion of royalties between the two groups themselves. 84
The bill anticipates the formation of an ASCAP-like organization
representing both record companies and performers to collect and dis-
burse performance right revenues. These revenues would be dis-
bursed in accordance with the arrangements negotiated by the parties.
In their congressional testimony, record company spokesmen explicitly
indicated their intention to establish a clearinghouse. 85 The ability
to negotiate licensing arrangements is a prerequisite to a private clear-
inghouse arrangement, and the bill recognizes, albeit obliquely, the
possibility of a negotiated, rather than a statutory, license. Section
114(c) (3) provides that in the case of a negotiated license the user.
need not comply with the notice and reporting formalities incident
to a statutory license, nor need he deposit his royalty payments with
the Copyright Office. As noted previously, however, the negotiated
license cannot set a fee less than the rate established by the statute
or by the regulations of the Register of Copyrights. 6
The Economic Case for a Record
Public Performance Right
The establishment of new legal rights for particular economic units
can be justified upon only two grounds: the better use of exist-
ing resources to satisfy consumer wants, or the rectification of
inequities in the existing distribution of revenues among those pro-
viding goods or services to a particular productive process. Under
most varieties of private capitalism, including our own, maximization
of consumer satisfaction is the primary concern. Theoretically, the
equitable distribution of revenues among suppliers of economic goods
and services is less important. Our legal-economic system, in theory,
84. The draftsmen of the Revision Bill intended that negotiations among
claimants not vary the initial fifty-fifty division and that the interested parties
share this understanding. Telephone Conversation between Lewis Kurlantzick
and Thomas C. Brennan, chief counsel, Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights, Aug. 2, 1973. The language of the bill, though, is
ambiguous. Section 114(e) (3) (A) dictates an equal division of royalties with
respect to recordings "for which claims have been made under clause (1)."
Clause 1 outlines the procedure for claiming royalties deposited with the Reg-
ister of Copyrights. If an ASCAP-like organization is established, however,
it will directly receive and distribute license fees. Since such a structure will
obviate the need for administration of the performance right by the Copyright
Office no "claims made under clause (1)" will result. Similarly, the provision
permitting claimants to agree among themselves to the division of their roy-
alty pool without fear of antitrust violation states that this exemption from
antitrust scrutiny is "for purposes of this subsection." Revision Bill § 114
(e) (1). The subsection deals with the process of making claims on the Reg-
ister of Copyrights. As already noted, the Register will not function as a col-
lector and distributor of revenues if an ASCAP-like organization is formed.
The antitrust exemption presumably will apply to negotiated arrangements
among claimants on the ASCAP-like organization since there are no functional
differences in the two situations, and that is the reading of the draftsmen. Tel-
ephone Conversation between Lewis Kurlantzick and Thomas C. Brennan, su-
pra. The language, however, is unclear in this regard.
85. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 506-10.
86. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
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does not require any proportionality between the price of the good
and the benefits it confers. Prices need be paid only to the extent
necessary to induce the desired level of production. In the past 50
years, however, capitalist countries have paid increasing attention to
the economic needs of particular groups, especially labor and agricul-
ture.
Impact Upon Price and Records Output
Although granting record producers a public performance right prob-
ably will increase record production and lower record prices, the re-
sulting increase in consumer satisfaction does not necessitate govern-
ment intervention. Certainly, popular record producers and perform-
ers do not seem to require a public performance right to provide ade-
quate incentives for maintaining popular record production and dis-
semination at existing levels, particularly if records are protected
against unauthorized duplication. There is no shortage of record com-
panies and, unlike the situation with respect to record piracy where
even without federal protection state remedies have been available,
the record companies are prospering without a public performance
right, state or federal.87 Finally, there are no positive externalities;
87. See, e.g., Pop Records: Moguls, Money & Monsters, Tnvm, Feb. 12, 1973,
at 60. See generally F. Stuart, Distribution of Income from Broadcast Per-
formance and Sale of Phonograph Records (1970) (unpublished study done for
National Ass'n of Broadcasters). The market for records has grown dra-
matically since 1950. The introduction of the long-playing record, high-fidelity
and stereophonic reproduction and magnetic tape recording, plus improved
demographics accompanied by a general increase in income available for rec-
reation and culture, tripled the record market from 1950 to 1960 and doubled
it again during the next decade. The only available statistics are based on
suggested retail list price.
COIPOSITE ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL RECORD COMPANY
SALES TO DISTRIBUTORS AND RETAILERS IN THE
UNITED STATES (RIAA)
Retail List Price Value

















increased production will render no benefits beyond those en-j oyed by record purchasers and radio listeners.
Impact Upon Popular Records. The establishment of a public per-
formance right for records should increase record production, lower
record prices, and temporarily increase record company earnings.
Profits of existing record companies will increase since the record pro-
duction costs will be unaffected while some records will earn
public performance fees in addition to revenues realized from record
sales. Assuming the demand for broadcast recording licenses remains







Moreover, in the period from 1967 to 1970, the dollar volume of pre-recorded
tape sales quadrupled, from approximately $120 million to $480 million, repre-
senting a jump from approximately 10 to 30 percent of the total record-tape
market.
MANIUFACTURERS' SALES TO RETAILERS AND
DISTRIBUTORS OF PRE-RECORDED TAPES
1967 1968 1969 1970(Retail List Price Value in Millions)
8-Track Cartridges $60 $155 $300 $378
Cassettes 6 17 75 77
Reel-to-Reel 20 22 20 18
4-Track Cartridges & Others 36 40 21 5
Total Pre-Recorded Tapes $122 $234 $416 $478
These statistics are conservative estimates compiled by the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA), the trade association of record producers.
See also $2 Billion Worth of Noise, FoRBEs, July 15, 1968, at 22.
Record companies charge distributors about 40-45 percent of list price. For
example, the record company sells a record with a $5.98 list price to the dis-
tributor for approximately $2.55. But to compute total earnings, earnings from
foreign sales, which are significant, must be included. See, e.g., BILLBOARD,
June 5, 1971, at 1, col. 1 (CBS Int'l.); Strauss, Foreign Income in the Music
Industry, 3 THE VANDERBILT INT'L 90 (1970). (The RIAA figures include sales
of foreign produced recordings sold by United States companies in the United
States.)
The bulk of the increase in record sales is attributable to popular music,
a popular record considered one that appears in trade magazine charts under
the headings of "Top 100," "Soul" (or "Rhythm & Blues"), "Easy Listening"(or "Middle of the Road"), or "Country." Although classical record sales have
increased in absolute terms, their share of the total record market has de-
creased. Today, classical recordings represent only approximately 5 percent
of the market. E.g., Crisis in American Classical Music Recording, STEREO RE-
viEw, Feb., 1971, at 57; Classical-Record Crisis, NEwswEEK, Aug. 10, 1970, at
78
The only available published data concerning the financial operations of rec-
ord companies from industry or government sources are annual estimates of
total record and tape sales (see tables above). Most companies are divisions
or subsidiaries of larger corporate entities, and the results of divisional opera-
tions are not publicly available. Moreover, unlike some other trade associa-
tions, the RIAA does not compile detailed industry information. Annual sur-
veys performed for the textbook and tradebook publishers' associations, for ex-
ample, not only break down total publishing revenues by categories of books,
but also report pre-tax profits as a percentage of sales and indicate the per-
centage of net revenues, on the average, spent on particular cost items, such
as promotion or editorial work. Furthermore, the Commerce Department does
not publish figures on record production comparable to those provided for
book publishing. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT or COMMERCE, BUREAU oF
THE CENSUS, 1967 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, 2 INDUSTRY STATISTICS, pt. 3,
at 360-27; id., pt. 2 at 27A25-27; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF CoMMERCE, 1972
UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 67-70, 252.
[VoL. 43:152
A Public Performance Right in Recordings
TEM GEORGE WASHIMGTO LAW REVIEW
Bill, gross revenues for record producers from public performances
could total approximately $11.3 million annually.8 8 Assuming these
88. This estimate is based, in part, on the amounts paid to ASCAP pursuant
to the composers' public performance right. In 1971, ASCAP's rate to radiobroadcasters was 2 percent of net advertising receipts, which is twice the rate
set in the Revision Bill for a record public performance right. In 1971, ASCAP
received $18.7 million from radio licenses. Application of a 1 percent rate
would have yielded $9.35 million. Adjusting for an 11.8 percent increase in
radio revenues through 1972, the latest year for which data is available, the
radio figure would reach $10.45 million. Radio station payments, however,
would be less than this figure since those stations with annual gross advertis-ing receipts of less than $200,000 will not pay at the 1 percent rate; rather,
most will pay a yearly fee of $250 or $750 depending on their gross receipts.
See text accompanying note 78 supra. Approximately 60 percent of radio sta-
tions have revenues of under $200,000. See Letter from Thomas C. Brennan,
chief counsel, Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, to
Lewis Kurlantzick, June 28, 1974. The National Association of Broadcasters(NAB) estimates that the fee schedule will generate $11.5 million in payments
from radio broadcasters. The chief counsel to the Senate Subcommittee esti-
mates revenues in the range of $9.6 million to $11.1 million. See Letter from
Thomas C. Brennan, supra. In light of our ASCAP-derived figure, the NAB
estimate seems a bit high, though it may be correct since it purports to account
for revenue increases since 1972, and we have employed an estimate of $10 mil-
lion in reaching our figure in the text.
Estimates of radio station payments must be qualified in one further respect.
We have assumed that stations with gross advertising receipts, of more than$200,000 will pay the blanket rate of 1 percent of net advertising receipts.
However, for several years many stations might well choose to use the pro-
rated fee, which will be a fraction of 1 percent. See text accompanying note
78 supra. The reason is that the public performance right will not cover all
performances subsequent to the effective date of the Revision Bill; rather, it
will only apply to performances of copyrighted recordings, which means either
those recordings produced after the effective date of the Bill or, more probably,
those recordings produced after February 15, 1972, the effective date of copy-
right protection for recordings against unauthorized duplication. The latter is
the interpretation of the chief counsel to the Senate Subcommittee, Telephone
Conversation between Thomas C. Brennan and Lewis Kurlantzick, July 19,
1974. The Recording Industry Association of America itself estimates that
more than 60 percent of radio airplay is devoted to "oldies," that is, recordings
which no longer have significant retail sales. See RECORDING INDusTRY Associ-
ATiON OF AMERIcA, S. 1361 PERFOmwANcE ROYALTY Q. & A. 4 (1974). Those sta-
tions which program a large percentage of "oldies" would probably choose, for
several years, to pay the prorated fee established by the Register of Copyrights
rather than the 1 percent rate.
In 1971, ASCAP received $31.9 million from television licensees, of which ap-
proximately $12.2 million represented payments by the television networks.
Thus, payments by television stations were approximately $19.7 million. The
Revision Bill only requires payments by stations licensed by the FCC; it makes
no provision for payments by the networks. In 1971, ASCAP's effective rate
for television stations was 1.67 percent of net advertising receipts. Using that
rate as a base, the 1 percent rate in the Revision Bill would yield approxi-
19.7 x
mately $11.8 million. (- = - ; x = 11.8) Again, this figure should be
1.67 1
adjusted for the increase in television revenues since 1971. Through 1972,
television revenues had increased 15.6 percent, but this increase includes in-
creases in network revenues. In 1971, network advertising receipts comprised
approximately 45 percent of gross television revenues from sales to advertisers.
See UNrIED STATES DEPARTmENT OF COMMERcE, BUREAU OF THE CENsus, 1973
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 500. Using these proportions the stations' revenues must
be adjusted upward by a factor of 8.27 percent, yielding a figure of $12.8 mil-
lion.
Whether the above figure is too low depends on whether the term "net re-
ceipts from advertising sponsors" in the Revision Bill is read to include the
revenues earned by affiliated stations from the sale of station time to the net-
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revenues are divided evenly 9 between record companies and perform-
ers, as provided by the Revision Bill, record company revenues will
increase by $5.65 million. This represents a 0.65 percent increase over
present gross revenues, which are estimated at $867 million.9 0
Potential public performance revenues also might induce existing
record companies to issue new records that previously seemed to offer
too low a potential return to warrant the necessary investment.9 1
Such effects would be concentrated on so called "adult popular art-
ists," such as Andre Kostelanetz and Henry Mancini, who play estab-
lished favorites with conventional instrumentation, that is, without
works, so-called "network compensation." ASCAP and BMI do not include
these revenues in their definitions of "net receipts." See ASCAP, Local Station
Blanket Television License Agreement 5D; BMI, Local Station Television Li-
cense Agreement 4D. But these societies receive substantial compensation
directly from the networks. If the sale of station time to networks were in-
cluded, it would significantly raise "net receipts from advertising sponsors"
since network compensation comprises a significant proportion of an affiliated
station's total revenues. In 1972, for example, sale of time to networks
amounted to approximately 10 percent of total sales of station time. See FCC,
1972 TV Broadcast Financial Data, Schedule 1, Public Notice (Aug. 22, 1973).
It is most probable that "net receipts" does not include the revenues earned
from the sale of station time to the networks. The Revision Bill as reported
by the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights on April
16, 1974, added a definition of "net receipts from advertising sponsors." Such
receipts constitute gross receipts from advertising sponsors less any commis-
sions paid by a radio station to advertising agencies." (Apparently the limita-
tion to radio stations was inadvertent and the bill in final form will apply
the same definition to television stations.) This definition, which is similar
to those used by ASCAP and BMI, should be read to exclude network compen-
sation from "net receipts" and such is the understanding of the Subcommittee
counsel. See Letter from Thomas C. Brennan, chief counsel, Senate Subcomm.
on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, to Lewis Kurlantzick, June 13, 1974.
The television figure of $12.8 million must be modified in an important re-
spect in order to obtain an accurate projection. Under the Revision Bill a
broadcaster may choose to compute his record public performance royalty fees
on an alternative, prorated basis. This prorated fee, which will be a fraction
of I percent, will be established by the Register of Copyrights, which will con-
sider the amount of the station's commercial time devoted to playing copy-
righted recordings and whether the station is a radio or television broadcaster.
Since television stations make very little use of recordings, they will choose
the prorated basis for payment rather than the I percent rate. They might
well pay at a 0.1 percent rate. Using that rate, television station license fees
would equal approximately $1.3 million. Combining that sum with the radio
figure derived previously yields a total of $11.3 million, the figure referred to
in the text.
The $11.3 million is, of course, a gross figure which does not account for the
administrative costs involved in operating a public performance system.
ASCAP's expenses in 1971, for example, were $13.6 million.
89. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 153-56 infra, the ultimate
earnings of record companies will not correspond to those specified in the Re-
vision Bill.
90. According to the RIAA's estimate, in 1973 record sales at retail list value
amounted to $1.436 billion and pre-recorded tape sales amounted to $581 mil-
lion, a total of $2.017 billion. Using a 43 percent figure, see note 87 supra,
record companies' gross revenues from domestic sales would approximate $617
million for records and $250 million for tapes, a total of $867 million.
91. Record production is characterized by a large proportion of fixed versus
variable costs. The major fixed cost is the recording cost, which involves the
creation of the master tape. Recording costs include studio charges and pay-
ments at union scale to the featured performer, as well as scale payments to
back-up instrumentalists, vocalists, copyists, and arrangers. In addition, the
company must contribute to the pension and welfare funds of the American
Federation of Musicians (AFM) and the American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists (AFTRA). While recording costs vary and while several
rock groups are known for spending inordinate amounts of time in the studio,
the common and representative cost for popular records is $25,000-$30,000.
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electric guitars. The actual effect of a public performance right on
record production will depend on record companies' estimates of the
amount of expected additional revenue per record from public per-
formance fees. The effect will be most pronounced for adult pop-
ular artists since these artists' recordings, compared to popular rock
artists, enjoy relatively greater public performance potential and rela-
tively lower sales potential, although it is unlikely that a public per-
formance right would significantly affect the decision-making process
of record companies with respect to new releases. In fact, these artists'
records seem to enjoy substantial sales, and public performance rev-
enues would constitute a small fraction of earnings from record sales.
Potential additional revenues from a public performance right are
even less likely to affect decisions on new records of established rock
performers and composers and those of unproven songwriters and per-
formers. New songs from composers and performers with good repu-
tations will be recorded automatically. Records of new songs from
unproven composers, performed by unproven artists, are risky enter-
prises and decisions to make such records are based on educated
guesses regarding the sales potential and the record companies' need
to maintain their flow of new releases. Public performance revenues
in these instances will be very difficult to calculate and only represent
a small fraction of revenues obtainable from record sales. The margin
of error in these decisions is so large that the small amounts of addi-
tional potential revenues from the sale of a public performance right
are unlikely to be considered. Conceivably, public performance reve-
nues might be weighed where a record company is considering making
a new recording of an already successful song with proven performers.
Here, calculations of potential revenues may be easier to make and
additional revenues from public performances may be considered.
Whatever the impact of a record public performance right upon the
behavior of individual record companies, overall record production
will increase and, assuming some elasticity in record demand,
record prices should decrease. Increased production can originate from
two sources: an increase in new releases by existing companies or
the entry of new companies attracted by higher record company pro-
fits attributable to public performance revenues. The new entrants
add to the supply of records, which decreases prices, or, if prices are
rigid, reduces sales of older companies. The price reductions might
initiate at the manufacturing, wholesale or retail level, depending
upon each component's response to changes in costs, supply and de-
mand.
For these and other reasons, record company profits will revert to
pre-public performance right levels, that is, resumption of normal pro-
fit levels for the marginal producer. Since entrance into the record
1974]
industry is relatively easy, this process should develop rather rapidly.
In addition, some, perhaps all, revenues derived from a record public
performance right will be captured by composers through exercise of
their mechanical reproduction right.9 2 Finally, the performers might
be able to obtain more than their statutory half of the record public
performance revenues, or record companies might be able to increase
their revenues from a public performance right by encroaching upon
the performers' statutory share.9 3
It appears, then, that establishment of a record public performance
right will make more records, popular and classical, available to con-
sumers at lower prices. But do we "need" more records? That is,
do we want more resources devoted to record making? To a strong
free market proponent it is rank heresy to even ask that question.
For him the only standard is maximum responsiveness to consumer
preferences at prices covering all costs. This test, however, will not
work here. Government already is interfering with market processes
by establishing copyright protection for composers. The issue is
whether further intervention is appropriate via public performance
protection for records. Here, the only available standard is personal
preference. Our intuition, naturally, is that we need more "good"
music and less soft "rock."
Before reaching final conclusions in this regard, however, the real
costs of increased record production should be determined. Strictly
speaking, the cost of any product is measured by the value of the al-
ternative product that could be made with the same resources. For
records, it costs approximately 43 cents to make a record from a mas-
ter tape.9 4 Much of this consists of raw material costs. Under our old
92. See text at pages 227-31 infra for a discussion of this phenomenon.
93. See text accompanying notes 153-54 infra.
94. Manufacturing includes the costs of pressing and packaging the album.
The manufacturing cost might break down as follows:
Printing of album artwork into "slicks" 3 cents per copy
Fabrication of jacket cover with mounting
of slicks onto cardboard shells 6 cents per copy
Pressing (including cost of vinyl, print-
ing of labels, white inner sleeve, and
shrinkwrap) 34 cents per copy
43 cents per copy
Within the last year the costs of materials required for manufacturing-for ex-
ample, vinyl-have been increasing continuously. The figures in the text and
this footnote are estimates as of the end of 1973.
Records are issued today in two forms. The first is the "single" or "45."
This is a seven-inch disc containing one song or performance on each side and
designed to be played on a turntable revolving at 45 revolutions per minute.
The cost of pressing a single is about 11-12 cents. The second is the "album"
or "LP." This is a twelve-inch long-playing stereophonic (or quadraphonic)
disc containing, in the case of a pop album, usually eleven performances or
"cuts" and designed to be played on a turntable revolving at 33% revolu-
tions per minute. In recent years albums have accounted for an increasing
percentage of record company revenues. In 1971, this percentage reached ap-
proximately 87 percent. The number of albums released annually has risen
from approximately 1600 in 1955 to approximately 4000 in 1972. See generaflu,
Trow, Profiles: Kal Rudmian, THx NEW Yom=n, Dec. 23, 1972, at 34 ("Except
for black-oriented companies, no important record company counts on making
real money from its singles business. . .. The record business is really the
record-album business. .. 2.
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wasteful ways this would not be of much importance. Now, however,
we face a worldwide vinyl shortage and, therefore, we must give more
weight to the materials cost of increased record production.
The professional services of composers, performers, and technicians
comprise the bulk of record production costs.9 5 These may be rela-
tively unimportant for our purposes, however, since musicians, singers
and composers eager for the chance to make records are in great sur-
plus and most of these artists have few productive alternatives to a
musical profession. Therefore, increased demand for recording artists
would not divert resources from more productive ventures. Indeed,
it may well be argued that increased record production would help
find productive use for talents currently without any useful outlet.
Whether these possible gains are worth the extra vinyl is hard to say.
Classical Music. The same economic forces that would "convert" a
record public performance right into increased production of popular
music, assuming no decrease in the demand for broadcast licenses, also
should increase production of classical records. This will benefit both
classical record companies and performers, and perhaps classical com-
posers. Arguably, the continuity and development of our musical cul-
ture requires a reasonably stable stock of trained classical musicians
and composers. If so, the financial assistance rendered to classical
performers provides some justification for a record public perform-
ance right. However, record industry spokesmen go further. They
predict particular benefits to classical music that would help
classical music relatively more than popular music. Although the par-
ticular benefit theory can muster some theoretical support, the prac-
tical effect is likely to be an insignificant factor in support of a record
public performance right.
Certainly the record industry is heavily weighted in favor of youth-
oriented popular music.9 6 The record industry claims this imbalance
95. Technicians include sound engineers and "producers." As the term is
used in the record industry, the producer is the person who is formally in
charge of both the recording session and the final editing or "mixing" process.
He often shares equal responsibility with the performing artist for the quality
of a recording. See Rich, Some Definitions Redefined, NEW YORK, March 13,
1972, at 68-69; Kwitny, How Record Producers Use Electronic Gear To Create
Big Sellers, Wall Street J., Feb. 12, 1974, at 1, col. 1. See generally P. Hirsch,
The Structure of the Popular Music Industry 26A (Institute for Social Re-
search, Univ. of Mich. 1969). Salaried staff producers have become rare, and
most records are made with the use of an outside producer hired by the rec-
ord company on either a one-shot or a continuing basis.
96. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 499, 503-04, 542-43; Hearings on H.R.
4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 950-51, 956 (1965). According to
record companies, the lack of a performance right forces them to concentrate
on recording youth-oriented popular music to the detriment of classical and
adult popular music. The term "adult popular" music as used by record indus-
try spokesmen corresponds essentially with our term "semi-classical." See
note 2 supra. It refers to the type of music generally included in middle-of-
the-road easy listening radio formats. In a letter to one of the authors, Alan
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is due, in part, to the unfairness of the current legal regime towards
classical music and musicians. According to this argument, the pop-
ular music audience is not only much larger than that for classical,
but it has a higher propensity to purchase records.9 7 Classical music
listeners, it is argued, though numerous, are more likely than popular
fans to listen to their music over the radio than to purchase records.
Under current copyright law, however, radio play yields no revenue
for the record performers or producers. Moreover, the free advertis-
ing that partially compensates popular record companies for the lack
of revenue from the broadcast of their recordings may not stimulate
classical sales to the same extent. Unlike listeners to popular music
who "pay" the record producers for broadcast music through increased
purchase of the records they have heard without charge, classical
broadcast listeners do not make an equivalent contribution to the
cost of producing classical records. The reason may be that radio play
is less likely to stimulate record purchases, or simply that for classical
fans broadcast music represents a larger proportion of their total mu-
sic listening than is true for popular music listeners.
Assuming the validity of these factual assumptions, establishment
of a record public performance right would permit classical music pro-
ducers to profit from classical music broadcasts which, under current
law, neither produce direct revenues from public performance fees nor
induce much indirect revenues through increased record sales. Con-
ceivably, the higher preference of classical music fans for broadcast
music even might increase classical music's share of total record pro-
duction.
Every decision to issue a record is based upon the costs of producing
the record compared with the anticipated revenues to be derived
therefrom. Classical records always suffer from a relatively small au-
dience and high production costs. Under current law the only source of
revenues for record producers is record sales. With the establishment
of a public performance right, record companies can expect additional
revenues from public performance of their product, particularly radio
broadcasts. Assuming costs of production remain constant, increased
potential revenues will induce record companies to issue records with
Livingston, the former president of Capitol Records who testified in favor of
a public performance right at the 1965 and 1967 congressional hearings, offered
examples of performers whom he would place in the "adult popular" or "good
music" category. These included instrumentalists such as David Rose, Henry
Mancini and Andre Kostelanetz, jazz artists such as George Shearing, and vo-
calists such as Tony Bennett, Peggy Lee and Perry Como. According to Mr.
Livingston,
although there are occasional exceptions, recordings by most of these
artists sell relatively little, and certainly not enough to keep a record
company in business by themselves, let alone supply a satisfactory
source of income to the artists in relation to the use and exposure to
which the recordings are put.
Letter from Alan W. Livingston to Lewis Kurlantzick, July 30, 1973. One must
at least wonder whether sizable sales for the instrumentalists named are more
than an "occasional exception." Albums by these artists are consistently re-
leased and are consistently profitable, though their sales, of course, do not ap-
proach the proportions of a hot "rock" artist.
97. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 504, 542-43.
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lower sales potential, since sales revenues will be augmented by public
performance earnings. If classical music fans, indeed, listen to a
larger percentage of their music over the radio than do popular music
fans, the potential earnings for the marginal classical record should
increase relatively more than the increased total earnings of the mar-
ginal popular record. This should increase the proportion of total re-
cords represented by classical records, since the revenue earning po-
tential of public performance of classical records is relatively greater
than that of popular records. These arguments are valid even if most
of the revenues earned by record makers through a public per-
formance right ultimately would be captured by the composers, which
we believe would occur.98 Most classical music is uncopyrighted and
therefore there is no music copyright holder with which to contend.
Thus, unlike the situation with respect to recordings of copyrighted
music, the classical record maker could retain all earnings from public
performances.
The validity of the aid-to-classical-music argument depends, in part,
upon the actual record buying habits of classical music listeners.
There are no statistics upon which one can calculate either the mar-
ginal propensity of classical music lovers to purchase records or their
likelihood to buy records heard over the air. While there is
some overlap among those who purchase popular records and those
who purchase classical, the demographics of record consumption make
it clear that purchasers of popular recordings comprise an essentially
different group than those who purchase classical. According to the
market research of one major record company, 16 percent of classical
purchasers are under twenty years of age, 49 percent are between
twenty and forty, and 35 percent are over forty. On the other hand,
78 percent of "contemporary," i.e., "rock" and its variants, purchasers
are under twenty, 21 percent are between twenty and forty, and 1
percent are over forty. It may be that popular music fans spend more
of their available income on records, but this could be a function of
the relative youth of the popular audience who, as a group, have fewer
demands upon their resources. Classical music listeners, however,
probably have higher incomes.9 9 Therefore, the higher propensity of
popular music listeners to purchase records may be counterbalanced
by the larger total income available to classical music listeners for rec-
ord purchases.
It does seem reasonable to conclude that broadcasting affects clas-
sical record sales less than popular record sales. Unlike popular
music, which is ephemeral and ever-changing, the pool of classical
98. See text at pages 227-31 infra.
99. See BLLBOARD, Sept. 8, 1973, (study indicated classical listeners received
highest income of any radio audience).
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music, by definition, changes very slowly,10 0 and classical music fans
already are familiar with the body of classical music. Thus, the de-
cision to purchase a new classical record will be less dependent upon
hearing it broadcast than is the case with popular music. That clas-
sical music producers actively seek exposure for their new releases
does not contradict this position, since the cost of gaining such ex-
posure is low and therefore worthwhile so long as there is any pos-
sible chance of increasing sales.
The high income level of classical music listeners lends some further
support to the unfairness arguments of record producers. Certain ad-
vertisers are attracted to programs which command high income aud-
iences. This attitude benefits broadcasters in their program sales, but
does not benefit record producers. This is worse than the analogous
situation with respect to popular records with low sales but high pub-
lic performance potential. Popular record producers benefit from
their product's public performance possibilities through their ability
to negotiate lower royalty rates with composers concerning the
mechanical reproduction right. That is, composers should be willing
to consider potential earnings from the broadcast of records using
their music during negotiations with record producers over the royalty
rates to be paid on record sales.' 0 ' But classical music usually is not
copyrighted, and record companies, which must rely exclusively on
record sales, are unable to take any advantage of the advertising value
of classical music broadcasts, since the broadcasters keep all the bene-
fits.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, classical records will not
earn sufficient revenues from public performance fees to have any
appreciable impact upon the production of classical records. In 1973,
gross revenues from classical record sales were roughly $32 million. 02
According to our estimates, record producers will earn no more than
$59,000 from public performance fees, and probably less.'03 These rev-
100. See generally Anderson, Editorially Speaking: Popsical Music (Second
Verse), STEREo RzrIw, July 1973, at 6.
101. See text at page 227 infra.
102. This figure is an estimate which was derived as follows. In 1973, the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the record industry trade
association, estimated LP record sales at list price value at $1,246,000,000 and
pre-recorded tape sales at $581,000,000. The approximate percentage of the LP
market held by classical recordings is 5 percent, see, e.g., Wall Street J., Sept.
19, 1974, at 1, col. 5; Crisis in American Classical Music Recording, STEaEo RE-
viEw, Feb. 1971, at 57; and classical recordings represent 2 percent or less of
pre-recorded tape sales. Multiplication of the RIAA totals by 5 percent and
2 percent respectively produces a figure of $73,920,000. The record producer
qua producer generally receives 40-45 percent of the list price. For example,
a $5.98 list price record is sold to distributors for about $2.55. Multiplication
of the $73.9 million figure by 43 percent yields gross revenues to classical pro-
ducers of $31.8 million.
Thirty-two million is a rough estimate. The sales figures are RIAA esti-
mates and "classical," as used in the industry, is a vague term. If anything,
this figure may be too high. In any event, the order of magnitude of sales
revenues compared with probable public performance revenues clearly indi-
cates the de minimis effect of public performance rights on classical record
production.
103. This estimate was derived from the amount presently paid composers
by classical stations pursuant to the composers' public performance right.
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enues would be divided equally between performers and producers.
The producers' portion will, in turn, be divided, presumably on the
basis of frequency of current play, among those classical producers
whose recordings have been publicly performed. 0 4 Obviously, for
each record company the increased income from this source is far too
small to be considered in estimating the potential revenues from new
classical record releases.
Although the earnings of classicial records cannot be significantly
increased directly through public performance fees, classical music
could be helped indirectly. Record producers argue that increased
revenue from broadcasts will improve their general economic position,
thereby permitting increased support to unremunerative but cultur-
ally worthwhile music projects. 10 5 There is evidence that at least one
secure record company, Columbia, has used some of its profits from
nonclassical records for "good works," such as classical record produc-
tion. 06 In fact, this is another variation of a familiar theme:
High profits from popular records are justified because they can be
used to subsidize classical music.
Obviously, this argument presumes that record company profits will
increase. As previously demonstrated, such profits should not in-
crease, at least not for very long. Even if record company profits
Though a high percentage of the music programmed by classical stations is in
the public domain, these stations are charged the same royalty rate by ASCAP
and BMI as are other commercial stations. See text accompanying notes 113
and 115 infra. The rate charged by BMI is 1.7 percent of net advertising reve-
nues. In recent years the application of this rate has resulted in the payment
of less than $100,000 a year to BMI by commercial classical stations. If one
took $100,000 as the base figure indicating the current return under the 1.7 per-
cent rate and then applied a 1 percent rate, the Revision Bill rate, the result
would be approximately $59,000 as the probable return from classical stations
under the record public performance right of the Revision Bill
1.7 1( = - ; X = $59,000).
$100,000 X
In fact, classical stations will pay less than $59,000 since many of them
have gross annual advertising revenues of less than $200,000. These stations
will not pay at the 1 percent rate, but, rather, will pay an annual fee of $250
or $750. See text accompanying note 78 supra. Of the thirty-two members
of the Concert Music Broadcasters Association twelve have gross revenues of
less than $100,000, seven have revenues of more than $100,000 but less than
$200,000, and thirteen have revenues in excess of $200,000.
Though the payment figure and the sales revenue figure are admittedly
rough estimates, they are sufficiently precise to support the conclusion reached
in this footnote.
104. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 499, 503-04, 542-43; Hearings on H.R.
4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Ju-
diciary Comm., 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 933-34, 950-51, 956 (1965); Note,
Protection of Sound Recordings Under the Proposed Copyright Revision Bill,
51 AIDN. L. REV. 746, 773 (1967).
106. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 3, at 808; Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680,
H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Judiciary Comm.,
89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 933-34 (1965). See generally F. MACHLUP, Tm
EcoNoiMcs OF SELLERS' COMPETTON 553-54, 556 (1952).
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do increase, this variation of trickle down theory involves complex
fact and value judgments. For example, there is no evidence that
record companies commonly use supernormal profits to support classi-
cal music. 10 7 Furthermore, if support of classical music from popular
music earnings would be a significant factor in a congressional de-
cision to establish a public performance right for records, there is no
easy way of ensuring that the extra revenues that might flow to rec-
ord companies from that source would, in fact, be used to assist clas-
sical music.'0 8 It would be difficult to know precisely where these
revenues were going, and there is no public body to find out. Thus,
the new public performance right would be based, in part, upon anti-
cipated support to classical music, but continuation of the right would
not be dependent on proof of delivery.10 9
Assuming classical music "deserves" more support, it would be bet-
ter to accomplish this through direct government subsidy. Much of
the thrust of recent writings on the respective merits of tax incentives
and direct expenditures in achieving social objectives seems applicable
to this question. Particularly relevant is the recognition that the di-
rect expenditure process may provide a somewhat better opportunity
to order priorities by decisions on open subsidies, to maintain control
over expenditures, and to ensure they are being used for the desired
purposes." 0 Assuming that all records will receive protection against
unauthorized duplication, if the market process fails to yield a large
output of classical records, the considerations for and against an open
subsidy would be similar to those relevant to subsidizing the perform-
ing arts in general."' On the other hand, if popular record makers
really are supporting classical music to a significant extent, one may
hesitate to alter the existing structure and be reluctant to exchange
this seemingly solid support for problematical support through the
political process. The point is that there are better means, aside from
copyright, to foster and develop creative activities. With respect to
107. According to the recordings editor of the New York Times, most clas-
sical and popular departments are operated as separate entities, and each must
be self-supporting:One of the more popular myths of the record industry, and one that
dies hard, is the notion that profits from popular sales sustain the
losses from the manufacture of classical albums. Actually the two de-
partments are generally run as separate entities and must support
themselves.
Davis, The Classical Upsurge, HIGH FmE.rTy, April 1973, at 62.
108. See generally Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1
ECONOMICA 167, 192 (new series 1934); Davis, supra note 107, at 63.
109. "Subsidies to an activity that are not conditional upon the recipient per-
forming that activity... are usually inefficient." B. HiNDLEY, THE EcoxorV c
THEORY OF PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, AND REGISTERED INDUsTRIAL DEsIGNs 65 n.1
(1971).
110. See, e.g., Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Govern-
ment Policy: A Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 705 (1970); Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, Property Tax Exemptionsfor Charitable, Educational, Religious and Governmental Institutions in Con-
necticut, 4 CONN. L. REV. 181, 292-306 (1971). See also Wilson, The Dead Hand
of Regulation, 25 THE PuBLIc INTERIsT 39, 45-46 (Fall 1971).
111. For a succinct statement of these considerations from an economist's
perspective, see W. BAuMOL & W. BowEN, PRFORmIG ARTS--TH; EcONoMIc
DLEMMA 369-86 (1966).
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performers, for example, particularly younger and less well known
performers in certain classes of cultural activity, necessary support
might be provided more effectively through an expanded use of select-
ive grants and subsidies from public sources. Of course, these subsid-
ies should be carefully structured so that the intended beneficiaries
would, in fact, be the ones benefited.
Although the effect of establishing a record public performance
right on the production of classical records would be negligible, it
might have a profound impact upon classical music broadcasters. Few
classical stations are profitable, and many are marginally opera-
tional.112 Under these circumstances any additional payments would
threaten their financial integrity.
In considering the effect of a record public performance right upon
classical broadcasters, it should be noted that broadcasters, in effect,
now pay fees to composers for performance of uncopyrighted music.
Thus, it could not be argued that fees paid to record companies would
represent payment for access to music which classical broadcasters
now get free. Current arrangements with ASCAP and BMI require
radio stations using any copyrighted music to pay composers a stip-
ulated percentage of advertising revenues. Thus, for the purpose of
computing composers' public performance license fees, it does not mat-
ter that some of the music played is uncopyrighted. In effect, this
arrangement already seems to treat uncopyrighted music as if it were
copyrighted. But this may not be the case. True, the method chosen
by ASCAP and broadcasters for computing public performance fees
does not distinguish between copyrighted and uncopyrighted music.
Yet, in all probability this payment arrangement is dictated by consid-
erations of administrative convenience rather than a desire to use
copyrighted music as leverage to charge broadcasters for use of un-
copyrighted music, since it is much easier to calculate net advertis-
ing revenue from all sources than to keep track of elapsed air time
devoted to copyrighted music. Given the administrative difficulties
and the small proportion of total broadcast music represented by un-
112. Hyatt, Classical Radio Stations Find Dollars Are Harder To Come By
Than Fans, Wall Street J., April 5, 1972, at 1, col. I ("[B] roadcasters estimate
that only one-third to one-half of the 30 or so full-time commercial classical
stations are profitable."); Gent, Classical Music Dwindling on City's Radio Sta-
tions, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1971, at 51, col. 1; Letter from John H. Beck,
Program Director, WGBH Radio, Boston, Mass., to Robert L. Bard, Jan. 10,
1974 ("The great problem in having fees paid to classical record producers
is that [commercial] classical radio stations are . . . scarcely profitable....
For commercial classical stations, many of which already lose money, to pay
such a fee would probably cause many to change to a more profitableformat."). The number of commercial classical stations may be larger than
previously believed. A recent survey indicated that there are at least 43 com-
mercial stations that devote all or a substantial amount of their time to classi-
cal music. Previous industry estimates were as low as 25. BILLBOARD, July
21, 1973, at 67.
1974]
copyrighted classical music, the best arrangement would be to apply
a slightly lower rate to an advertising revenue base which includes
revenues attributable to use of uncopyrighted music. Since classical
stations earn less advertising revenues than standard commercial sta-
tions, they pay less in public performance fees per broadcast hour.
ASCAP and BMI impose the same terms upon classical stations, how-
ever, as are imposed upon commercial stations, including percent-
age-of-revenues royalty terms." 3 As one might expect, radio stations
which specialize in classical music and thus program a high percentage
of public domain works are unhappy with current arrangements and
would support alternative payment schemes which would recognize
their lesser use of copyrighted music. 114
If current practices are, indeed, dictated by administrative consider-
ations, and composers do not really earn fees from the broadcast of
uncopyrighted music, establishment of a public performance right for
recordings of uncopyrighted as well as copyrighted music might be
of particular benefit to classical music. Since usually no one owns
a copyright on the composition, only broadcasters, record companies
and performers would be affected.
Conceivably, if necessary to protect their principal means of expos-
ure, classical record producers might be willing to reduce their license
fees or to forego performance fees entirely." 5 Analogously, efforts
have been made to obtain occasional waiver of the performance fee
with respect to recordings of contemporary operas to ensure that these
works receive radio exposure." 6 The Revision Bill makes such an ad-
justment by record companies difficult, however, by providing that
a negotiated license substituted for the compulsory license must not
113. As one might expect, there have been recent indications that classi-
cal stations are not content with this situation. At least twenty-three members
of the Concert Music Broadcasters Association declined to sign the new ASCAP
five-year contract and conducted negotiations with ASCAP in which the sta-
tions requested new "more equitable" agreements to reflect "the special cir-
cumstances of such stations, which are devoted largely to 'public domain'
music." BiLBsOAi, Aug. 18, 1973, at 1, col. 1. These negotiations between
ASCAP and the Concert Music Broadcasters Association failed to produce an
agreement. As a result, pursuant to the ASCAP antitrust consent decree, 14
members of the Association filed suit in the Southern District of New York
on Nov. 28, 1973, for the determination of reasonable fees and other license
terms. The petitioners have asked the court to fix a reasonable licensing
agreement reflecting the amount of ASCAP music realistically available to,
and played by, petitioners. United States v. ASCAP, Civil No. 13-95 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Nov. 28, 1973).
114. Industry sources estimate that 20 to 30 percent of the music played by
classical stations is copyrighted. Some music which otherwise would be in
the public domain is subject to copyrighted arrangements, see 17 U.S.C. § 7
(1970), but the amount of such music is relatively insignificant.
115. An executive of one leading classical producer expressed to one of the
authors the fear that payment to record companies and artists for radio play
would cause a further attrition of classical broadcasting, and he thought that
major record companies would be willing to reduce or forego the receipt of
oublic performance fees from classical stations under certain conditions. It
has been contended that in recognition of their low profitability, ASCAP
charges stations specializing in classical music lower license fees than those
applying to normal commercial stations. See Note, Protection of Sound Re-
cordings Under the Proposed Copyright Revision Bill, 51 MiNN. L. Rnv. 746,
772 n.167 (1967). This contention is erroneous. See text accompanying note
113 supra.
116. BmmoARD, July 10, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
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provide for a negotiated royalty rate less than the statutory fee.117
As noted previously, the reason for this provision was a concern by
performers that financial relationships between record companies and
radio stations might result in license fees which did not adequately
reflect the artist's contribution. In short, they wished to preclude the
possibility of "sweetheart" contracts. The language of the provision
was negotiated by the representatives of record companies and per-
forming artists. Conceivably, the record producer could refrain from
suing the station for the statutory fee, and could further agree in ad-
vance not to sue the station. For the agreement to be effective, how-
ever, the performers who were involved in the creation of the particu-
lar recording and who have a claim on one-half the statutory fee
would have to participate and be made parties. Furthermore, it might
prove difficult and costly to negotiate an agreement with all the neces-
sary performer-parties, particularly where a classical recording em-
ployed a large number of musicians.
However, even if composers actually do not earn revenues from
the radio play of uncopyrighted music, classical music stations do
pay composers royalties computed in accordance with total ad-
vertising revenues, and pay at the same rate as stations which pri-
marily use copyrighted music. Imposition upon classical broadcasters
of an additional public performance fee for record producers would
injure them further, although no more than all other broadcasters,
and to the extent public performance fees affect the use of recorded
music, classical records would be injured. Classical music would bene-
fit most from legal arrangements which reduce or eliminate payments
by broadcasters to composers based upon use of uncopyrighted music.
Classical music programs then would be liable only to record produc-
ers for public performances of uncopyrighted music. Classical record
producers would then be able to retain all such revenues, since com-
posers could not use their mechanical reproduction right as leverage to
capture producers' public performance earnings. Of course, classical
broadcasters would have to pay these fees and, given their well known
precarious financial health, such additional costs might threaten their
economic viability. The loss of even a few of the limited number of
classical stations might well outweigh any gains classical record pro-
ducers might make from access to public performance revenues.
Impact on Efficiency of Recorded Music Distribution
Economic justification for legal intervention into a particular industry
normally is grounded upon an anticipated redistribution of resources
to better meet consumer preferences or on the achievement of some
117. Revision Bill § 114(c) (4) (this provision was deleted in the version
passed by the Senate).
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collective end. According to the previous analysis, a record public per-
formance right probably will not have such effects. A third possible
justification would be that a public performance right would permit
the distribution of recorded music at lower real costs. It is more
likely, however, that the opposite would occur; that is, the establish-
ment of a record public performance right would increase the costs
of disseminating music through recordings. The extent of the cost
increase and the willingness of various parties to meet such costs
would depend upon the legal form of the public performance right,
the benefits of that right to each potentially affected group and the
economic factors inherent in the recorded music process.
The cost factors affected by a public performance right are those
administrative expenses incurred in securing permission to use a work,
including the cost of contacting the copyright owner, negotiating with
him and arranging for payment, as well as the costs involved in struc-
turing the contractual relations of the relevant parties-composers,
performers, record companies, and broadcasters-in accordance with
the relevant legal and economic requirements. For purposes of this
analysis, the term "transaction costs" is used to describe this set of
distinct but related 'costs. Transaction costs, similar to all economic
costs, affect the economic decisions of record makers and record users,
and impose a burden on the entire economy. These factors must be
considered in determining the wisdom of restructuring the legal
framework of the record industry in directions proposed by the Revi-
sion Bill.
Transaction costs would be very large if every potential record user
had to bargain individually with holders of a public performance right
over the price and terms of licenses. Use of a clearinghouse would
reduce these costs, but experience with performing rights societies
which represent composers and music publishers indicates that a
clearinghouse arrangement still would involve substantial costs. In
1971, ASCAP spent approximately $13.6 million to collect and distrib-
ute gross domestic and foreign receipts of $68.2 million. BMI, in fiscal
1971, distributed $31.5 million to its members from revenues of $36.3
million. As noted previously, ASCAP and BMI sell licenses, monitor
unauthorized users to detect violations, bring infringement actions
when unlicensed use is discovered, take samples to determine the rela-
tive frequency with which various works are used, and distribute reve-
nues to numerous composers and music publishers. Administration of
a public performance right in recordings would involve similar func-
tions and costs.
The public performance right proposed in the Revision Bill entails
compulsory licensing at statutorily determined fees,118 thereby elim-
inating negotiations over rates with the copyright holder. The other
costs incident to the administration of a public performance right,
however, would not be eliminated. In addition, the simplification
118. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
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gained by compulsory licensing at a fixed fee creates other problems.
To have Congress establish a fixed fee may embed an arbitrary sum
in the law for many years."19 The Revision Bill attempts to minimize
this possibility by providing for periodic review of royalty rates by
a copyright royalty tribunal. 20 Nevertheless, to ask a copyright roy-
alty tribunal or the Register of Copyrights to set and adjust the price
involves complex and virtually unsolvable disputes over the fairness
of any suggested price.
Another category of transaction costs implicit in granting a record
public performance right is the costs attributable to the need to de-
velop new kinds of contractual relations among the various parties
to respond to the new legal regime. Initially, all contractual arrange-
ments would have to be restructured to reflect the new legislation.
Undoubtedly, this would initially be costly, but much of the restruc-
turing need only be done once and then the new arrangements could
be used without further major changes or associated costs. A second
kind of cost within the same general category, though, would be a
continual one. According to our analysis, if a second public perform-
ance right were granted with respect to records, composers would at-
tempt to increase their compensation with respect to record sales as
a means of sharing in revenues earned through public performance
fees. This strategy necessarily requires composers to estimate rev-
enues from three sources rather than two, thereby increasing the prob-
ability of miscalculations by any or all of the participating parties.
The seriousness of this additional burden is moderated by the fact that
in calculating the public performance earnings of record companies,
the estimation of the frequency of public performances will be the
same figure the composer uses to calculate -his returns from his own
public performance right. The only additional factor will be the rate
of return per performance for the record company. After the system
has operated for some period, this rate should stabilize. In general,
misestimations by parties to a contract are presumed to result in some
misallocation of resources. Such errors may be conceived as transac-
tion costs, and to the extent miscalculations are more probable, trans-
action costs are thereby increased.
Increased transaction costs, like increases in any cost, make it more
expensive to provide the same good or service. Such increases may
lead suppliers of the service to reduce their demand for recorded
music in favor of relatively cheaper services. An example would be
119. Ciancimino, The Copyright Hang-up: Do We Hang Together or Sepa-
rately, 3 PERFORmNG ARTS REV. 405, 415 (1972). See generally Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 H-Auv. L. REV. 281, 326, 333-34 (1970).
120. See Revision Bill §§ 801-09 (adjustment of royalty rates may be re-
quested every five years).
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the substitution of live musicians for records by broadcasters occa-
sioned by the increased cost of using recorded music. This might pro-
vide work for unemployed musicians which would have some positive
effect. If musicians were scarce, however, the society would be using a
scarce resource, talented musicians, when a recording could provide
the listener with equivalent entertainment at a much lower expendi-
ture of resources. If such substitution were not warranted, and the
economics of broadcasting were such that the increased transaction
cost would not reduce the broadcast of recorded music, the sole impact
would be the additional expenditure of resources to meet the transac-
tion requirements.
The only way in which transaction costs may be distinguished from
other costs is in their relative invisibility. The license fees broadcasters
will pay record companies under the Revision Bill are clear enough,
although the costs broadcasters might incur in keeping the necessary
records, or in negotiating fee schedules and requirements with record
companies, are less visible. Indeed, broadcasters themselves might
have difficulty in calculating them; Therefore, in making legislative
decisions in this area, it is important to consider these hidden trans-
action costs as well as the specified license fee rates.
Record companies, of course, will be perfectly willing to incur these
transaction costs since they are necessary to benefit from their newly
acquired public performance right. From the perspective of the econ-
omy as a whole, however, these increased costs are pure waste, since
they redistribute existing wealth rather than create new wealth. That
is, the additional income record comanies may earn from a public per-
formance right does not flow from an increase in the supply of broad-
cast music or a net reduction in the costs of producing and distributing
such music; rather, the increased income is at the expense of com-
posers, broadcasters, advertisers or consumers.
It has been demonstrated that establishment of a public perform-
ance right for records will increase the transaction costs of the record
and broadcast industries, thereby increasing the total amount of so-
ciety's resources commanded by this particular segment of the eco-
nomy. Generally, there is no easy method of determining whether
such a reallocation of resources is appropriate. Under a free enter-
prise system, individuals have very wide capacity to command and
thereby reallocate resources by bidding them away from other poten-
tial users. Thus, it is usually very difficult to judge each new demand
for resources by particular individuals or enterprises. In this situa-
tion, however, some judgments can be made.
Since the primary impact of a record public performance right will
be redistributional, the propriety of society expending additional re-
sources for this purpose must rest on grounds of fairness and equity
rather than increased economic efficiency. Our analysis, however,
questions the principal reasons adduced by the record industry in sup-
port of a record public performance right. Record companies and
artists make the general moral argument that broadcasters who play
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records without paying the record company which produced them are
depriving record companies of some kind of property right. In addi-
tion, certain artists argue that performers whose records are broadcast
more than they are sold are being injured. It will be demonstrated
that under the existing system performers are compensated for their
contribution to the production of those records likely to be widely
broadcast. It also will be demonstrated that record companies now
benefit to some degree from public performances of their product in
that the revenues a composer may earn through his public perform-
ance right may serve to reduce the composers' price for licensing their
mechanical reproduction right on record sales. Beyond this, no con-
clusions can be made. Once it is concluded that increased compensa-
tion for record companies is not required to encourage an adequate
supply of recorded music, one can only estimate the actual redistribu-
tive effect of the record companies' public performance right specified
in the Revision Bill upon all participants in the process of producing
and publicly performing records by calculating all the costs of such
redistribution, and then trying to determine if the increased equity
of the new system is worth the anticipated costs.
A public performance right based upon record broadcasts would ex-
acerbate the allocational difficulties caused by the free advertising un-
avoidably provided by record broadcasts. It is an accepted fact that
radio play stimulates record sales by exposing new releases to poten-
tial buyers; in other words, radio play advertises records.121 Further-
121. Airplay is the principal way record companies get their product before
the public. It is radio which provides effective advertising and creates con-
sumer demand. It is not surprising, therefore, that companies direct a good
deal of their promotional energies to getting their material broadcast. See P.
Hirsch, The Structure of the Popular Music Industry (Institute for Social Re-
search, Univ. of Mich., 1969); STF oF HousE Comnm. ON INTERSTATE Am
FOREIGN CoMMERCE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., SONGPLUGGING AND THE AIRWAVES:
A FUNCTIONAL OuTLNE OF THE PopuLAR Music BusINEss 9 (Comm. Print
1960); Trow, Profiles: Kal Rudman, Tum NEW YoRKER, Dec. 23, 1972, at 33-
34; I. REIN, Runv's RED WAGON: Comxu'IcATioN STRATEIs nT CONTEmpO-
RARY SocIETY 88 (1972) ("a manufacturer's survey of rock sales found that over
80 percent of albums are purchased because people have heard a particular
portion-one or two of the songs-over the radio and liked them").
Until five or ten years ago, airplay was more important for singles than al-
bums. At that time, it was unusual to release an album by an unknown artist.
Singles were usually the vehicle for introducing new artists who could ill af-
ford the loss of exposure through airplay. Albums usually were reserved for
established artists or new artists with a hit single, who had some reputation
to attract buyers. Today, many companies will launch a new artist with an
album release. Therefore, there is now a need for airplay of both singles and
albums.
More fundamentally, the strategy of most companies is to use singles as a
promotional vehicle to sell albums, which are significantly more profitable.
"Except for black-oriented companies, no important record company counts on
making real money from its singles business .... The record business is
really the record-album business .... " Trow, Profiles: Kal Rudman, supra,
at 34. For example, in 1971 and 1972, albums accounted for approximately 87
percent of total record sales in terms of dollar volume. Thus, the objective
is to get airplay for a particular performance by a particular artist. The ve-
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more, if air time is free there is no opportunity for market processes
to allocate the resource among potential users and, therefore, though
the net effect is difficult to measure and judge, the availability of
free advertising probably distorts the allocation of air time among rec-
ord companies. Since air time is scarce, those desiring it, includ-
ing record companies, could be forced to bid for it. Those who deem
this time most valuable thus would be assured of receiving it. We
are not, however, dealing with normal economic goods. Broadcasting,
records, and advertising do not easily lend themselves to standard
price theory analysis. Since it is very difficult to determine the bene-
fits conferred by advertising, it is difficult to be sure that giving more
air time to the records of the company willing to pay the most for
the opportunity would result in a better allocation of resources.
While it is difficult to measure the benefits, the advertising supplied
by broadcasting new record releases is most effective. Unlike
most advertising which only describes the product and its effec-
tiveness, a record broadcast precisely apprises potential record buyers
of the nature of the product involved. Moreover, the record carries
the endorsement of a supposedly neutral source, the station's music
programmer or the disc jockey who plays it.
Broadcasters have been unable to charge for their advertising be-
cause all effective methods for making record companies pay for
broadcast of their records are precluded by legal or business consid-
erations. They cannot openly charge record companies for the privi-
lege of having their products played on record shows because this
would undermine the integrity of record programs, such as the "top
forty" stations, which, presumptively, select their records on the basis
of current popularity or the disc jockey's judgment of their intrinsic
artistic merit. Additionally, they cannot charge record companies cov-
ertly because the Federal Communications Act requires on the air dis-
closure of any payments received by radio stations for the purpose of
promoting the play of particular records. 2 2 Similar constraints apply
to the relationships between broadcasters and composers' representa-
tives, who also have a great financial interest in getting their records
played in order to maximize public performance revenues. Currently
the only economic nexus between record companies and broadcasters
is the radio advertising purchased to promote particular records.
Broadcasters could try to coerce record companies into increasing such
advertising as a means of recompensing broadcasters for the free ad-
vertising provided. Prospects here, however, are not promising. Al-
though radio stations might threaten an overall reduction in record
play unless record companies increase their radio advertising, broad-
hicle required in order to approach most radio stations is a single record,
although some stations will play album cuts. However, the single selection is
often picked from an album, and a concentrated effort is made to make a hit
of the single. If the single hits, album sales should increase dramatically. Ad-
ditionally, if the selection is only released as a single, any significant sales
movement which indicates hit potential will often result in an album being
readied for market.
122. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (1970).
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casters are too dependent upon record shows to make such reductions
a credible threat.123 Furthermore, threats against individual record
companies with respect to the use of their records would run afoul of
anti-payola legislation.
Free advertising has one unambiguously bad effect. It tempts
those interested in record sales to bribe those selecting records to be
broadcast. The advertising effect alone has been sufficient to make
payola a perennial problem. 24 The advent of record public perform-
ance rights will make it worse by adding to the incentives of record
companies to get their recordings broadcast.
Payola primarily stems from the effectiveness of radio play as a
means of advertising new records, particularly new records by rela-
tively unknown artists. Payola is indefensible in that the recipients
are employees of radio stations who, presumptively, are pocketing
the proceeds from the sale of an asset belonging to their employer,
the use of air time to advertise records. Although such practices have
long been common knowledge in the broadcast and record industry,
they first came to public knowledge around 1960 as the result of a
congressional investigation into record and broadcast industry prac-
tices.125 Congress responded by amending the Communications Act
to make payola, in effect, a federal criminal offense. Under the 1960
amendment an employee accepting a payment is obliged to inform
the station, which must inform the public through an announcement
on the program involved. Any violation of these provisions of the
Act subjects the offender to a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment
for up to one year or both. 26 Following the payola revelations, many
123. The requirements of radio broadcasting make it difficult to reduce the
use of records without drastic changes in broadcast strategy.
124. As used in the record industry, "payola" refers to the secret payment
to and acceptance by broadcasting personnel of money, services or other valu-
able consideration in exchange for their broadcast use of a particular record
or song. The broadcasting personnel usually involved are disc jockeys, record
librarians and program directors.
125. Hearings on payola were conducted in 1960, Responsibilities of Broad-
casting Licensees and Station Personnel, Hearings on Payola and Other Decep-
tive Practices in the Broadcasting Field Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-2
(1960), and received a good deal of publicity. The subcommittee issued an
interim report in February, 1960, INTRIM REPORT OF THE SUBcOMM. ON LEGISLA-
TWVE OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE Covnv. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
INVESTIGATION OF REGULATORY ComiSSIoNs AmD AGENCIES, H.R. REP. No. 1258,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), and its recommendations ultimately resulted in
the 1960 amendments to the Communications Act aimed at payola, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 317, 508-09 (1970).
One author has speculated that the taint on the record industry's image pro-
duced by the payola revelations may have hindered the industry's efforts to
gain copyright protection for its products. C. McCaghy '& R. Denisoff, The
Criminalization of Record Piracy: An Analysis of Conflict and Politicalization
13 (unpublished mimeo, Sociology Dept., Bowling Green State Univ.). See
generally BLLBOARD, July 7, 1973, at 1, col. 4 (recent payola reports may harm
chances for enactment of public performance right in recordings).
126. 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508 (1970). For the legislative history and purpose
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radio stations responded by depriving disc jockeys of the authority
to select records for broadcast. This function was to be performed
by a non-broadcasting music director who compiles a weekly playlist
of records. Nevertheless, the practice of payola has not died out. Re-
cently there have been reports of continued payola1 27 which have
instigated investigations by several federal agencies, including the
Justice Department. 28 These reports indicate that gifts to radio sta-
tion personnel persist, ranging from cash to airline tickets to drugs. 2 9
As noted above, optimum allocation of broadcast time seems to re-
quire that record companies pay for the advertising services
provided by record broadcasts. If the price of these services equalled
their value to the marginal record company purchaser of advertising,
payola would disappear. Unfortunately, legal business considerations
extraneous to a claim for compensation for valuable services rendered
preclude broadcasters from charging record companies for the full ad-
vertising value of record broadcasts. Although radio stations may be
unable to capitalize on the value of the air time they control, employ-
ees of the radio station may be tempted to so capitalize for their per-
sonal benefit. Thus we have the classic ingredients for corruption: a
valuable product sought by people willing to pay for it, no legitimate
method for meeting these demands, opportunity for individuals to cov-
ertly provide the service, and most importantly, a highly ambiguous
moral situation where it is difficult to pinpoint the actual harm done
by such corruption. It is not difficult for a person offered payola
to argue that someone is entitled to be paid for giving records free
air time, and, if the radio station cannot be paid, an employee is the
next best recipient. In fact, the victims are listeners who are deprived
of the unbiased judgment of the person selecting the music to be
played. The extent of the injury, however, is blurred by the inherent
arbitrariness of such choices even when no payola is involved.
If payola is an almost inevitable consequence of the pressure of
economic forces operative in the broadcast record industry, it seems
unwise, all things being equal, to increase such pressure by adding
direct financial returns to record companies from license fees for pub-
lic performance in addition to the inherent and unavoidable indirect
benefits to record sales from radio play.
of the 1960 amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).127. It is not clear, but the dismissal of Clive Davis as president of Columbia
Records in May, 1973, was probably related to the allegations of a new payola
scandal.
128. See, e.g., Kwitny, Oiling the Wheels: Is It Just Business as Usual in
Record Industry or Do New Probes Reveal Crime at High Levels?, Wall StreetJ., June 19, 1973, at 46, col. 1. The Federal Trade Commission has also con-
strued payola to be an "unfair or deceptive" practice under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). See Hearings on Payola
and Other Deceptive Practices in the Broadcasting Field, supra note 125, pt.
1, at 641. For a short description of the various forms of payola and the legal
responses thereto, see SHF&= & Kp smovsKY 96-101.
129. Some reports suggest that payola is more prevalent at black-oriented
radio stations where the disc jockeys are not paid as well as their counterparts
at other stations. See Kwitny, Oiling the Wheels: Is It Just Business as Usual
in Record Industry or Do New Probes Reveal Crime at High Levels?, Wall
Street J., June 19, 1973, at 46, col. 1.
[VOL. 43:152
A Public Performance Right in Recordings
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
In theory, any public performance right provides incentives for such
owners to influence record broadcast selection. In practice, however,
composers generally have not engaged in payola. This may be par-
tially explained by the fact that the sale of composers' public perform-
ance right has been institutionalized through ASCAP and BMI. What-
ever the reason, it is clear that record companies have been the payola
culprits, and, therefore, the potential effect of a record public perform-
ance right, increasing temptations towards influencing record selec-
tion, must be counted against the case for a record public performance
right.
Externalities
The direct economic and social consequences from possible legal inter-
vention into a particular economic sector often are accompanied by
positive and negative side effects, externalities, extending beyond the
particular area where the intervention occurs. There are situations
where the social benefits of production exceed the value of that prod-
uct to individual consumers. Such arguments have been advanced in
support of copyright; that is, the social benefits of increased avail-
ability of literary published work are such to warrant increasing au-
thors' income through copyright protection even though this raises the
price of books to consumers. The externalities of a record public per-
formance right are primarily negative ones such as the increased in-
centive to payola. The only potential beneficial externality is the cul-
tural benefit from increased support of classical music and musicians.
These arguments have been explored above and little merit has been
found in them.
Conceivably, the establishment of a record public performance right
might also affect efforts to establish effective international copyright
protection. International considerations, however, are not particu-
larly relevant to a determination of the desirability of granting a pub-
lic performance right to records produced in the United States.
Although many foreign countries recognize a performing right in re-
cordings, 1 0  Canada recently has abolished public performance
rights.' 31 The widespread endorsement of public performance rights
by European countries may be due to a particular attitude toward
the promotional value of radio air play. While the American record
130. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 4, at 1340-53.
131. An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 19 & 20 Eliz. 11, c. 60 (Assented to
Dec. 23, 1971). See Keyes, Letter from Canada, supra note 18, at 138; Alleyn,
The Phonographic Industry Deprived of Its Performing Right in Canada,
EuRoPEx BROADCASTING UNION REV., March 1972, at 46. The action of the Ca-
nadian Parliament, and the recommendations of the official studies preceding
it, seem particularly noteworthy since Canada has traditionally modeled its
copyright law on the British statute, and that statute recognizes a perform-
ance right in recordings.
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industry generally regards air play as an essential, effective means
of advertising with a direct correlation between the extent of radio
exposure and sales, European record executives often fear that un-
restricted play of a record will diminish its sales.13 2 Canada's experi-
ence may be of particular relevance here since, like the United States,
its broadcast industry is largely privately owned and managed.'3 3
Canada's action undoubtedly was influenced by two extensive studies
of intellectual property.3 4 The opposition of the first commission to
public performance rights was based upon its concern that the British
experience, where performance rights are used by the Musicians'
Union to control the broadcast of records, would be repeated in Can-
ada. 35 The more recent report exhibited misgivings with the concept
of paying a record company for each use of the record. Record com-
panies, they argued, were "really in the business of selling a physical
item.' 36 Moreover, charging for each record broadcast would be like
charging for each reading of a book.' 37 This report also found no
shortage of records and concluded that public performance rights were
unnecessary as an incentive. Ignoring questions of administrative fea-
sibility, we find no difficulty with the author of a book charging actor
Emlyn Williams for each public reading of the author's work. Simi-
larly, a record company is in the business of making money from its
product through any means permitted by the law and the market.
Some of the countries that recognize public performance rights, such
as the Scandinavian countries, insist upon reciprocal treatment
for their records as a condition for recognizing public performance
rights of foreign records.8 8 Therefore, because our law does not
provide any system of compensation when their recordings are per-
formed publicly in the United States, recordings originating in the
United States are not entitled to any compensation when they are per-
132. See BILLBOARD, July 10, 1971, at IMIC-13, col. 3. But see BILLBOARD, Oct.
28, 1972, at 56, col. 1; REPORT OF TE COPYRIGHT CommIrrEE, supra note 75, at55 (improbable that unlimited broadcasting injures a record's sales in Britain).
133. The Canadian broadcasting industry is owned and operated both byprivate interests and by the government. The government operation is under
the Canadian Broadcasting Commission (CBC) and is. much smaller than the
private operation.134. ROYAL COMIVIISSlON ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND IN-
DUSTRIAL DESIGNS, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT 77-78 (1957) (Ilsley Commission);
EcONoMIc COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra note 18, at 158-59. In abolishing the per-formance right the Canadian Parliament was probably influenced by at least
two other factors. First, the relevant committees expressed sympathy for theperformers on recordings, and the failure of the record companies to conclude
a voluntary sharing arrangement with musicians may have hurt the com-
panies' cause. Second, those committees might have seen the benefits of the
right as likely to go to foreign, rather than domestic producers and performers.
The picture which emerged from prior hearings was that of an industry pri-
marily "controlled from abroad ... and having shown in the past very little
concern for the development of Canadian talent or of a domestic record indus-
try." Alleyn, The Phonographic Industry Deprived of Its Performing Right in
Canada, supra note 131, at 49-50.135. ROYAL COMMISSION ON PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND IN-
DUSTRIAL DESIGNS, supra note 134, at 78. The British experience is described
at note 75 supra and accompanying text.
136. ECONOnIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, supra note 18, at 158.
137. Id.
138. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 508-09 (Denmark); Stewart, Royaltiesfor Record Play on the Radio, supra note 75, at 66 (Sweden).
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formed in these countries. While this might support the United States
in granting a public performance right for records on the grounds that
the increased earnings for American record producers through the
public performance rights of these foreign countries might be suffi-
ciently great to overcome the drawbacks of such action, this argument
is faulty. All countries do not insist upon reciprocity. For example,
public performance fees are generally paid in Great Britain with
respect to recordings of United States origin. Under British law all
recordings first, or simultaneously, published in the United Kingdom
are entitled to public performance protection, 18 9 and the major Ameri-
can companies appear to effect such simultaneous publication. 40 Simi-
larly, an American recording receives public performance protection in
Germany if it is published there within 30 days after publication
in the United States.'41 Moreover, the lack of royalties from those
countries requiring reciprocity does not seem to have undermined in-
centives for record production in the United States.
A second international aspect of public performance rights relates
to the effect from granting such rights upon the structure of interna-
tional protection of artistic works. Two international conventions are
relevant here. The International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organiza-
tions (The Rome Convention), which went into effect on May 18, 1964,
fixes certain minimum requirements for the protection to be granted
by each contracting state to performing artists in their performances,
to record manufacturers in their recordings, and to broadcasting
organizations in their broadcasts. 42 The Convention for the Protec-
139. See Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. I, c.74, §§ 12(2), (5); Letter
from W. Wallace, Assistant Comptroller, Department of Trade and Industry,
London, to Lewis Kurlantzick, Jan. 29, 1973. More precisely, simultaneous
publication either in Britain or in one of the countries listed in Schedule 3
of the Copyright (International Conventions) Order 1972, STAT. INSTR. 1972,
No. 673, secures the necessary protection. The practice of American companies
appears to be to publish simultaneously either in the United Kingdom or in
a "scheduled" country. hi
140. Letter from I.D. Thomas, International Federation of the Phonographic
Industry, London, to Lewis Kurlantzick, March 16, 1973.
141. See Copyright Statute, Art. 125 (3), 126 (2) (German Federal Republic),
1 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORM (1971). See a~so In-
ternational Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention), May 18, 1964, art.
5, § 2, 496 U.N.T.S. 46, 48.
142. The official text of the International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations is con-
tained in 496 U.N.T.S. 43 (1964). The text was agreed upon in Rome in Octo-
ber, 1961, and the Convention went into effect on May 18, 1964. The series
of meetings leading up to the Convention and its subsequent history can be
followed in the annual reports of the director-general of UNESCO. Useful
background and comparative material can be found in Bodenhausen, Protec-
tion of "Neighboring Rights", 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 156 (1954); E. ULMSR,
THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMING ARTISTS, PRODUCERS OF SOUND RECORDINGS AND
BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COVEPARATIVE
LAw (1957); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT ON
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tion of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication
of Their Phonograms, in Article 2, commits each contracting state to
protect producers of recordings who are nationals of other contracting
states against the making, distribution, and importation of duplicate
recordings without the consent of the producers. The Convention be-
came effective on April 18, 1973, three months after deposit of the fifth
ratification. The United States ratified the Convention on October
1, 1973, and it went into effect with respect to the United States on
March 10, 1974.143 Only a few countries have joined the Rome Con-
vention.144 The United States has not joined nor does it appear likely
to. In any event, the United States could join the Convention without
establishing a performance right since the terms of the Convention
provide that declarations of reservations are admissible. A contract-
ing country may thus declare that it will not apply the performing
right provisions, without losing the other benefits of Convention
membership. 145 Similarly, failure to establish a public performance
right would not prevent United States participation in the Convention
for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms, the recently concluded interna-
tional treaty to deal with record "piracy." This treaty focuses exclus-
ively on the problem of unauthorized duplication of recordings.
Therefore, international considerations do not require the establish-
ment of a public performance right for record producers.
The Equitable Case for a Record
Public Performance Right
Traditional economic arguments do not seem to support the establish-
ment of a record public performance right. If anything, a public per-
formance right will misdirect resources towards marginally needed
record production and increase the costs of disseminating recorded
music. Therefore, the establishment of a public performance right
must be justified, if at all, by its power to correct existing distributive
injustices and not by possible improvements in the allocation of eco-
nomic resources. Thus, the question is whether the existing system
THE DIpLowATIc CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CoNvEN-
TION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF PERFORIiERS, PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS
AND BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS IN ROME, ITALY (Comm. Print 1962); Ulmer,
The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-grams and Broadcasting Organizations, 10 BULL. Copy. Soc'y 90, 165, 219 (1963).
143. The text of the convention is printed in BNA PATENT, TRADEmARx &
COPYRIGHT J., at D-1 (Nov. 18, 1971). For a report on the October, 1971, diplo-
matic conference at which the final draft was approved and signed by twenty-
three nations, including the United States, and a summary of the convention'sprovisions, see Kaminstein, Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, 19 B L .Copy. Soc'y 175 (1972); Ulmer, The Convention for the Protection of Producers
of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplications of Their Phonograms, 3
INT'L REV. OF InDUs. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 317 (1972).
144. See COPYRIGHT, Jan. 1973, at 26.
145. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, May 18, 1964, arts. 12, 16, 496
U.N.T.S. 52, 54.
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works unacceptable injustices upon the individuals comprising the
record industry.
Benefits to Record Companies and Performers
Whatever sophisticated arguments may be offered in favor of the
existing legal-economic arrangements respecting the public perform-
ance of recorded music, broadcasters using records as a major part
of their programming seem to receive very large economic benefits
without any cost, since new releases usually are promoted by giving
them to radio stations free of charge. This kind of imbalance raises
the suspicion that someone is being hurt, and that broadcasters are
receiving something they do not deserve. The groups that might be
injured under current legal arrangements include record producers,
performers, particularly classical and semi-classical performers, and
composers. In this section the current position of record companies
and performers will be explored. The position of comiposers under the
existing and proposed legal regime will be analyzed at length in a
subsequent section.
It is argued that unrestricted record broadcasting substantially re-
duces record sales and, therefore, record producers should receive
some compensation from broadcasters for these losses.146 Through free
use of records, broadcasters are able to obtain the prime ingredient of
saleable entertainment at zero cost. This, of course, sharply contrasts
with almost every other enterprise, including other forms of radio
entertainment, which must pay for the products or services they pur-
vey. Moreover, record broadcasts further injure record producers by
providing music listeners with a service that they otherwise could
receive only by purchasing records. Yet, record sales are assisted
through the free advertising provided by these same record broadcasts.
Thus, the reasonable proposition that broadcasters should pay rec-
ord companies for the recorded music, produced at great expense and
risk by the record companies, which fills so much of the commercial
broadcast day, may be countered by the equally cogent response that
broadcasters provide record companies an equally valuable service
without charge. Until now these crossclaims have, in effect, nullified
each other. The record companies have been unable to charge for
their services because they had no legal right to preclude any use
made of their product by a purchaser. Also, they recognized the value
of the free advertising they received.
If the value to record companies of free advertising exceeds the
value of lost sales from listeners who otherwise would have purchased
146. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 541; Bass, Interpretative Rights of Per-forming Artists, 42 DicK. L. REv. 57-58 (1938); Diamond & Adler, Proposed
Copyright Revision and Phonograph Records, 11 Am. L. REv. 29,42 (1940).
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the record, there is little reason to give records a public performance
right the principal effect of which would be to require broacasters to
pay additional sums to record companies. Furthermore, if a public
performance right is granted, it should take a form which permits the
broadcasters to offset the free advertising services against their public
performance fee liability. This would be possible if public perform-
ance fees were to some extent negotiable. The implicit threat to re-
duce use of recorded music might cause record industry negotiators to
moderate their demands with respect to public performance fees, just
as similar threats to composers' representatives may have an equiv-
alent impact in view of the composers' dual interest in record broad-
casts: They collect public performance fees and record sales are pro-
moted, which increases their mechanical reproduction royalties.
The proposed legislation, however, establishes mandatory public
performance fees, thereby precluding any possibility for such adjust-
ments. Broadcasters would seem to be doubly injured. They must
pay fees for playing records which they previously played without
charge, and they are deprived of the opportunity of using negotiations
over public performance fees as a means of recouping the value of
the free advertising they provide the record industry. The legally im-
posed relationships are, therefore, inconsistent with the applicable eco-
nomic forces. Such situations inevitably generate pressures to avoid
or violate the legal restraints. Payola is one response to a situation
where no legitimate market mechanisms exist to adjust the price of
radio services to reflect the value of record play to record companies.
Record companies and performers, especially the latter, have sup-
ported their claim for a public performance right as compensation for
the damage caused by radio broadcasts to the possibilities for live per-
formances by singers and musicians. 147  The demise of live radio
broadcasting reduces one potential kind of damage from unrestricted
record broadcasting since it can no longer be claimed that the playing
of a performer's record involves self-competition with his own live
radio show. 148 Actually, radio and television exposure is likely to be
helpful rather than detrimental to the artist's live bookings. Indeed,
that exposure of his record will benefit him in other markets leads
performers, particularly new artists, to record initially for small com-
pensation.
Of course, granting record producers a public performance right will
not eliminate the possibility that record broadcasts would adversely
affect record sales and live performances; it will only provide addi-
tional revenues which might be deemed to compensate for such losses.
Although the Revision Bill recognizes a public performance right, it
does not permit record producers to stop broadcasters from using their
product. Pursuant to the compulsory licensing requirements, radio
147. Bass, Interpretative Rights of Performing Artists, supra note 146, at 57-
58; Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: II, 45 CoLum. L. REV. 719,
733 (1945); Diamond & Adler, Proposed Copyright Revision and Phonograph
Records, supra note 146, at 42-43.
148. Comment, The Twilight Zone: Meanderings in the Area of Performers'
Rights, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 819, 861 (1962).
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stations are permitted unlimited broadcast of records upon payment
of the legally established license fees.149
Extension of a public performance right to record producers has also
been justified in terms of the beneficial effect of such action upon
groups allegedly injured under the existing copyright laws. In addi-
tion to the alleged unfairness of permitting broadcasters to profit from
the use of records without compensating record producers, it has been
further contended that certain performers of recorded music are
particularly injured by the existing system. These are artists
whose records continue to be broadcast after the possibilities for sales
of the records have been exhausted.' 50
Record companies derive their bargaining power from the ability
of artists under contract to make records which will be purchased and
publicly performed. Thus, record companies and artists should be
viewed as a single bargaining unit vis-a-vis composers and broadcast-
ers. Between record companies and artists, the artists' bargaining
power derives from the same source, and, to the extent that certain
artists have established themselves as effective record sellers,
they may demand a premium for their services. Since there are many
record companies, competition will ensure that artists are paid in ac-
cordance with their record selling capacity. Of course, performers
without proven capacities are in a much weaker bargaining position
and must compete with the numerous musical artists anxious to make
recordings.' 5 ' To some extent the compensation of marginal per-
149. See Revision Bill § 114(c). Cf. Hearings on S. 597, pt. 3 at 866.
150. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 2, at 542-43; Kenton, The Recording Artists'
Case for Copyright Revision, BEvER.Y HILLS BAR J., Jan. 1970, at 21.
151. In fact, most performing artists never get to the point where they earn
royalties on record sales. See Kwitny, Genya Ravan Struggles To Become a
Success on Rock Music Circuit, Wall Street J., May 11, 1972, at 1, col. 1. A
prime reason for this result is the standard recoupment arrangement between
artists and companies. Generally, agreements between performers and record
companies provide that recording costs are recouped from the artist's royalties.
Recording costs include studio charges and payments at union scale to the fea-
tured performer, as well as scale payments to back up instrumentalists, vocal-
ists, copyists and arrangers. In other words, until the royalties otherwise pay-
able to the artist equal the recording costs, no royalty is payable to the artist,
and he is only paid royalties thereafter. See, e.g., Agreement Between Record
Company and Recording Artist § 4 in SHEmEL & KIRAsmoVSKY 546. For ex-
ample, assume recording costs of $25,000 and a royalty of 24 cents per al-
bum sold, the figures based on a 5 percent royalty rate on 90 percent of
sales on a $5.98 album, and subject to a 10 percent deduction for packaging.
Under such an arrangement, the artist would begin to receive royalties only
after approximately 104,000 records had been sold. In addition, recording
agreements commonly provide that no royalties will be paid on a profitable
recording until the unrecouped costs attributable to previous recordings by the
artist have been recovered. A survey performed on behalf of the National
Committee for the Recording Arts (NCRA) found that in 1966, of 1449 record-
ing artists under contract to a variety of record companies, only 13.8 percent
received sufficient royalties to offset recording costs. The remaining 86.2 per-
cent were paid the minimum union scale. See Hearings on S. 597, pt. 4, at
1251-52. (The authors attempted to obtain a copy of this survey in order to
assess its validity. However, NCRA's counsel was unwilling to make it avail-
able.)
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formers may be increased through union negotiated minimum per re-
cording session wages. If these wages exceed these performers' pro-
ductivity, this may affect the amount record companies can pay artists
who can command compensation above the minimum scale.
The performer's bargaining power derives from his capacity to make
records that sell or that are broadcast. Contrary to popular impres-
sion, performers whose records do not sell particularly well, but which
are publicly performed over a long period, will be compensated for
their talents. Thus, the complaints by artists, such as Stan Kenton,
that their work is appropriated by broadcasters without benefit to
them is ill founded. Under existing law, in choosing which company
will first record their song, and in determining the price which they
will charge that company to record their song, composers evaluate the
capacity of the artists under contract to the company to make records
which will yield the composer revenues through public performances
as well as through record sales. This factor will be taken into account
in the negotiations between the composer and the record company,
and the artist with such capabilities can compel record companies to
compensate him accordingly. For the same reasons the performer
with public performance potential also will be compensated by record
companies exercising their compulsory licensing power.152
The Revision Bill, as initially introduced, both grants a record pub-
lic performance right and specifies that revenues earned through pub-
lic performance of recordings be equally divided between record com-
panies and performers. Although the legislation does not specify how
the ultimate distribution to individual companies and performers is
to be achieved, the expectation seems to be that record companies and
performers will form an ASCAP-like organization which will collect
revenues, divide them equally between record companies and per-
formers, and distribute the equal pools according to some nego-
tiated arrangements. 1 53  To the extent that the fifty-fifty split pro-
vided by the Revision Bill conflicts with the relative bargaining posi-
tions of the parties, compensating adjustments will be made in the
royalties with respect to record sales.
While the recoupment structure sketched above is typical, it is, of course,
not unalterable. The bargaining power of some big-selling popular artists
may enable them to negotiate not only higher royalty percentages but also
a "flat" arrangement whereby part or all of the recording costs are absorbed
by the record company and not charged to the artist as an advance against
royalties. But this is uncommon. In the case of established classical perform-
ers, however, particularly "star" solo artists, recording costs often are not re-
coupable from royalties. Also, the royalty rate itself may be relatively high
when public domain music is recorded. See S. SHE ML & M. KRAsImovsKY,
MoRi ABOUT Tnis BusINEss or Music 23-24, 27 (1967).
152. The price-setting process between composers and record companies is
analyzed in the text at pages 227-33 infra.
153. As noted previously, see text accompanying notes 83-84 supra; the AFM
and AFTRA have already discussed how the performers' pool will be divided.
Presumably the principal determinant of the distribution of revenues will be
the current frequency of performances of a recording. Other criteria are pos-
sible, however. ASCAP, for example, offers composers the option of compensa-
tion solely on the basis of current performances of their works or on a more
complex "four-fund" basis which provides for long-range factors and is de-
signed to give steadier income to a songwriter as compared to the income
based on a current performance computation.
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Statutory specification of the performer's compensation for public
performance of the records he helps make may affect, but will not
finally determine, the performer's actual earnings from this source.
With respect to every record, the artist's compensation can be divided
into two components: his compensation with respect to record sales,
and his compensation with respect to public performances. Under
existing legislation, the artist sets a single price for his services based
upon his combined capacity to sell records and to have them broad-
cast. Since now only composers enjoy a public performance right, the
broadcast potential of an artist does not directly benefit record com-
panies, but it is relevant to the agreement between composer and rec-
ord company which, in turn, affects the compensation of the per-
former. Under the new public performance right provided by the Re-
vision Bill, record companies are granted a specified percentage of
broadcasters' advertising revenues, and performers are to receive one-
half of these revenues. Since these requirements, however, will in
most instances be inconsistent with the market power of the various
participants in the record-making and performance process, the statu-
tory division will be under constant pressure from extant market
forces.
With respect to the ultimate outcome of the conflict between the
statutory division and market forces, one must remember that both
record companies and performers are interested only in the perform-
ers' total compensation; the division into record sale and public per-
formance components is irrelevant. Therefore, if the public perform-
ance component of the performer's compensation is fixed and if the
total of public performance fees and normal compensation for record
sales exceeds the compensation that the performer could earn through
the free play of market forces, downward adjustments would be made
in that component of the performer's compensation attributable to
record sales. Subject to the limits imposed by union minimum scales,
one would expect that the record sale component would be reduced
to the extent necessary to bring the total compensation in conformity
with economic realities.
Complete adjustment to market forces might be prevented by sev-
eral factors. Conceivably, with respect to less popular artists, the re-
quired reduction of the record sale component might bring it below
minimum union scale. In addition, such adjustments in the perform-
ers' compensation may be deemed inconsistent with the equal division
specified by the Revision Bill. It is difficult to predict the ultimate
outcome of the possible conflict between union minimum scales and
market forces. The most direct response would be reduction of the
union scale, but experience clearly demonstrates the difficulty in re-
ducing minimum union scales. It is more likely that record com-
panies would have to make the necessary adjustments similar to that
1974]
of employers responding to minimum wage legislation. In this in-
stance, this means a reduction in the employment of artists whose
"productivity" falls below the compensation record companies must
pay them under the terms of the Revision Bill, 50 percent of public
performance revenues, and minimum scale requirements. It also may
force marginal record companies out of business, which would, in turn,
reduce the demand for performers. This would free resources for
other uses, however, given the relatively small size of the additional
costs imposed by a record public performance right, the effect on em-
ployment opportunities is likely to be very insignificant.154
154. The reduction in the number of record companies would shift resources
from record production and make them available for other uses. Whether
this would be desirable depends entirely upon one's judgment on the appropri-
ate level of record output compared to the output of those goods and services
which could be produced with the resources now devoted to record production.
In the context of book publishing, for example, Professor Stephen Breyer has
speculated that a modest decline in college textbook revenue should not cause
serious social concern. Threats to the royalty income of authors, who are pri-
marily college teachers, might induce these authors towards scholarly articles
or to devote more time to teaching. Since these activities provide consider-
able spillover benefits, he concludes that substituting more of them for some-
what fewer college textbooks should not prove socially harmful. Breyer, The
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 Hanv. L. REv. 281, 309 (1970).
It is impossible to know where the resources withdrawn from record pro-
duction will move and difficult to determine the value of the alternate social
product that would be produced by the marginal performer and the capital
and managerial resources of the marginal record company. The capital and
human resources commanded by record companies should be readily transfer-
able to a wide variety of economic goods with little loss of efficiency. Per-
formers, however, may be uniquely qualified for making records and little else.
That is, for any other purpose than record making, performers must be viewed
as unskilled labor. Professional athletes are in a similar position. Thus, it
would appear that up to some point, total social product will be maximized
by keeping performers in the record business rather than having them shift
to the next best use of their capacities. Moreover, many performers derive
great psychic income from their profession, which means that they would be
likely to continue as performers for less compensation than they could earn
elsewhere. This gives both record companies and society the opportunity to
exploit such people. Therefore, there may be considerable justification for
union established minimum scales, even where the minimum salary is higher
than actual productivity.
Though the marginal performer may be vulnerable to exploitation, success-
ful performers and composers are overpaid in the sense that many recording
artists, and many popular composers would probably continue to record and
compose for less than they are presently paid rather than resort to other occu-
pations. Among performers who consistently produce best-selling albums and
composers who consistently produce best-selling songs, the fact that their in-
comes are comparatively large, that some have a particular talent for music
and recording, that they enjoy what they are doing, and that some at least
may be more interested in music than money, all suggest that these performers
and composers will not prove highly sensitive to changes in income. Econo-
mists would term part of the return to a successful performer or composer
with a large income a "pure rent." That is, like the successful professional
ballplayer, the highly paid performer or composer is paid more than is nec-
essary to coax out his talent. If part or all of this pure rent could be elimi-
nated without causing the performer or composer to refrain from recording
or composing, the result would be one which increases the general welfare
of consumers, for the outcome would be that output would remain the same
and consumer wants would be satisfied while cost would be reduced. See gen-
erally P. SAM-JELSON, EcoNoMIcs 369 n.8, 380, 541, 546, 555 (8th ed. 1970).
However, in considering actions which might reduce the income of composers
and performers, it should not be overlooked that price structures which provide
pure rent also serve other allocative functions which might be impaired by
efforts to reduce the rent component in the income of composers and perform-
ers. Whether such a reduction would be fair to composers and artists is a
difficult and unresolved problem.
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The Revision Bill, as introduced, grants a public performance right
to the companies producing the record, but then requires that reven-
ues earned by the companies from this source be divided equally with
the performers involved.155 Other arrangements are possible, but in
fact it does not matter which of these two groups is the legal holder
of the right. The production and exploitation of records require the
cooperation of record companies and performers, so that neither can
profit from the public performance right without assistance from the
other. Thus, no matter who is given the legal right to public perform-
ance revenues, such revenues would be seen by both groups as part
of the total financial returns that can be expected to flow from the
production of a successful record. The share of each party will depend
upon their respective bargaining power, which depends in turn upon
the contribution each can make to the record sales and public perform-
ances, and the availability and skill of other record companies and
other performers. The only circumstances in which distribution
of the legal rights in the public performance of records might be sig-
nificant is where full adjustment of these legal rights to accord with
the underlying market power of each group is blocked by outside
circumstances, such as union established minimum wage scales. In
any event, the key circumstance is the mutual interdependence of per-
formers and record companies with respect to earning revenues from
public performances, which requires that whoever is formally granted
the legal right to such benefit must in practice share this right with
the other party.
The foregoing analysis of the underlying economic factors affecting
the division of public performance proceeds between record companies
and performers also applies to jukebox performances. The Revision
Bill calls for an equal split, between record companies and performers,
of the licensing fees earned by record producers from jukebox opera-
tors.156 The ultimate distribution of these revenues, however, is likely
to differ from the statutory scheme and will be determined by the
relative bargaining positions of the parties. Adjustments in response
to the economic realities would be accomplished within the contract,
which defines the performer's compensation with respect to record
sales.
Who Pays the Piper?
So far, our efforts to probe the validity of the major equitable argu-
ments that have been or might be advanced in support of a public
performance right for records have focused upon the possible benefits
155. This provision was deleted in the version passed by the Senate.
156. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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of such action to particular groups allegedly injured by the existing
legal-economic structure. Another important consideration is to
determine who will bear the costs.
Granting a public performance right to record producers, in addition
to that held by composers, initially increases the profitability of mak-
ing records by increasing the potential revenues from each new record
by the amount of record public performance fees that a record pro-
ducer can collect and retain. It has been demonstrated, however, that
a record public performance right will not increase the productivity
of the record or broadcasting industries. Furthermore, assuming full
employment of the nation's material and human resources, an increase
in the earnings of record producers must be at someone else's expense,
either broadcasters, composers, advertisers, or the radio and television
audience. Determination of the impact upon composers requires some
rather complex analysis, which will be presented in the next section.
The radio and television audience will be affected if broadcasters at-
tempt to raise their advertising rates, and advertisers, in turn, attempt
to recoup these costs by raising the prices of advertised products.
They also will be affected if broadcasters reduce their use of recorded
music in response to higher license fees.
Broadcasters, however, are unlikely to attempt to increase advertis-
ing rates in response to the increase in public performance license fees
that would result from granting a public performance right to record
producers. Broadcasting is a highly atypical economic enterprise.
The radio music listener pays nothing for his music qua listener since
the cost of the broadcast is supported by advertisers who pass the
cost on to the purchasers of their products. Determination of the eco-
nomic impact of advertising requires very complex economic analysis.
Therefore, if advertising rates were raised, it is difficult to determine
how this would affect advertisers and consumers of the advertised
products. Advertising rate increases, however, are unlikely. In the
short run, radio stations establish their advertising rates in accordance
with the value of their product, which is determined by the audience
commanded by each broadcaster. Rates are changed only in response
to changes in audience size and not in response to cost changes. 157
157. Starting from an equilibrium position, in the long run, the least effi-
cient producer must earn enough revenues to cover his full costs of providing
a good or service. If not, this producer must stop production, and total supply
will contract. This will cause prices to rise, which will, in turn, induce in-
creased production, either by new or existing firms, and equilibrium will be
established at the new, higher price. In the short run, however, price is de-
termined by demand. Price increases in the cost of goods or services used to
produce a product must be absorbed by the producers because demand condi-
tions establish the optimum price, and no producer can increase his price with-
out reducing total revenues. Advertising rates are set in accordance with the
audience commanded by a particular station in a particular time period. In-
creases in the cost of recorded music caused by the necessity to pay record
companies for the use of their product do not increase the value of the spon-
sored programs to advertisers. Therefore, they will not pay higher advertis-
ing rates and the broadcasters must absorb these costs.
If these costs, however, are substantial, advertising rates will increase. This
will occur through the mechanism specified above, viz., marginal broadcasters
must get higher rates or cease production. Advertisers will recognize this fact
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Moreover, advertising rates are based upon the time period within
which the program is broadcast rather than the nature of the specified
program. Thus, any rate increases could not be limited to record pro-
grams, but would have to apply to all programs within each relevant
time period. For these reasons small cost increases, such as paying
public performance license fees, are likely to be absorbed by the sta-
tion and would not be passed on to advertisers through rate increases.
If broadcasters are unlikely to raise their advertising rates in re-
sponse to higher costs for playing records caused by the imposition
of a license fee payable to record producers in addition to that charged
by composers, they might be expected to reduce their demand for
music licenses. If this occurs to any significant extent, composers
probably will be injured, as will those listeners who prefer record
shows. It is very unlikely, however, that broadcasters will reduce
their demand for records. A reduction in the demand for records in-
volves rather drastic action. One simply cannot reduce the number
of records played during a show; rather, one must cancel the entire
show and substitute another program for the cancelled record show,
since dead air is bad for business and discouraged by the FCC.
It is very unlikely that broadcasters would attempt to substitute
other types of programs for record programs to any appreciable ex-
tent. Although program selection is affected by costs, it is primarily
determined by listener acceptability. Therefore, broadcasters do not
lightly change a format they deem effective in a particular time slot.
Moreover, license fees represent a very small component of the total
costs of producing a record show. Although the presence of large over-
head costs makes precise allocation of costs difficult, 58 license fees
represent no more than approximately 3.7 percent of a typical record
show's costs.159 Under the proposed legislation, the fee for record
licenses would increase total license fees by 29 percent. 68 This would
and pay the higher rates, though they may well reduce their demand for radio
and television programs through shifts to cheaper media, if available, or reduc-
tions in their total advertising efforts.
158. A very large proportion of broadcast expenses, such as technical ex-
penses, selling expenses and general and administrative expenses, would be
incurred no matter what the program format.
159. According to FCC data, total radio broadcast expenses in 1972
amounted to $1,101,110,000. Music license fees were $32,765,000, and thus rep-
resented approximately 3 percent of total expenses. See FCC, 1972 AM-FM
Broadcast Financial Data, Schedule 2, Public Notice (Dec. 21, 1973). Ap-
proximately 75-80 percent of radio broadcasting is devoted to the programming
of recorded music. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. By taking 80
percent of total broadcast expenses, $880,888,000, the percentage of these ex-
penses which went to music license fees, $32,765,000, would be 3.7 percent.
160. ASCAP presently charges radio stations 1.725 percent of net advertising
receipts, and BMI charges 1.7 percent for a total of 3.425 percent. The Revision
Bill adds a charge of at most 1 percent of net advertising receipts for the record
public performance right. The total license fees, thus, would amount to 4.425
percent, which is a 29 percent increase.
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raise the costs of record licenses to only 4.7 percent of total record
show costs,16 ' hardly enough to warrant a change in format. Finally,
record shows are one of the least expensive available broadcast for-
mats. Talk shows using mediocre talent also are inexpensive, but a
station can have only so many uninspired talk shows during a broad-
cast day.
The peculiar method of packaging music licenses constitutes a
further impediment to reductions in the use of recorded music. Price
and administrative considerations lead virtually all broadcasters to
purchase licenses on a blanket rather than a per program basis. This
behavior is based on factors that would continue to operate if record
producers were granted public performance rights. Under a blanket
license broadcasters pay composers a percentage of all their net adver-
tising receipts. Under a per program license the station pays on only
those programs in which music in the licensing society's repertoire
is performed. ASCAP's fee for a blanket license is 1.725 percent of
all advertising revenues and BMI's is 1.7 percent. But for a program
license the ASCAP fee is 8 percent of net advertising receipts from
these programs and BMI's fee is 4 percent. Under these rate schedules,
it rarely pays to use per program licenses since, as the portion of
broadcast time devoted to recorded music programs increases, a point
is reached where total per program fees exceed those payable under
a blanket license and it benefits broadcasters to switch to the blanket
license.
Another feature of the blanket license is that a single fee is charged
for unlimited use of the entire repertoire of each of the two major
composers' performing rights licensing societies. Therefore, unless
broadcasters could switch to purchasing music licenses on a per pro-
gram basis, they would have to eliminate all use of recordings of copy-
righted music. Theoretically, licenses are available on a per program
basis, but under most broadcasting formats, per program licenses are
more expensive and involve substantial additional administrative
costs. They are only preferable for stations which use very little
music, for example, an all news and talk station. It is therefore
doubtful that many broadcasters would shift from a blanket license
to per program licensing unless they were prepared to adopt program-
ming formats requiring practically no use of recorded music.
Not only are per program licenses usually more expensive, but they
also involve substantial additional administrative costs. First, the
broadcaster must keep separate records of the revenues earned by any
show(s) in which copyrighted music is played. Second, both AS-
CAP and BMI require per program licensees to keep logs of all the
music they play' 62 in order to permit the licensing society to ensure
that the station, which cannot be familiar with the society's entire
161. A 29 percent increase would raise license fees and total broadcast ex-
penses allocated to record shows by approximately $9.5 million to $880,888,000.
See note 159 supra. The result would be that license fees would account for
approximately 4.7 percent of record show costs.
162. See ASCAP, Local Station Per Program Radio License 5A; BMI,
Single Station Per Program License, Radio 11 VI.
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repertoire, -has not failed to pay license fees with respect to a program
which in fact has used some of the society's music. Under these cir-
cumstances it would be preferable for a broadcaster to take a per pro-
gram license only when its use of music had been reduced to the point
where the total of per program fees plus additional administrative
costs was less than the blanket license fee. Generally such a situation
would arise only if a station drastically reduced its use of music or
introduced a highly atypical pattern of music programming. For ex-
ample, broadcasters might schedule one hour of copyrighted music and
11 hours of public domain music. Of course, if a record public per-
formance right increased license fees to the point where they threat-
ened serious injury to broadcasters, the entire rate structure might
have to be changed to permit reductions in record use without the
drastic consequences of such action under the current arrangements.
Choosing the Victim
For all these reasons, broadcasters almost certainly would absorb the
increased costs of record shows without reducing their demand for
recorded music. More precisely, broadcasters would not attempt to
substitute cheaper forms of entertainment for records, and, therefore,
would maintain their present demand for record licenses, unless the
increased license costs drove stations, or their successors, out of com-
mercial broadcasting. Obviously, if the advent of a public perform-
ance right for record companies does not reduce broadcasters' demand
for records, composers would maintain their current earnings level.
Indeed, as will be later demonstrated, composers might increase their
earnings. Record producers, of course, would gain, though not to the
extent contemplated by the Revision Bill. Broadcasters would thus
foot the entire bill. As previously discussed, increased record pro-
ducer earnings should result in greater output of popular and classical
records, with all that entails.163
The gains of record producers, consumers, and composers would be
at the broadcasters' expense. The establishment of a record public
performance right would increase the costs of broadcasting records,
but the broadcaster would be unable to fully compensate for these
additional expenses. Assuming that broadcasters could not substitute
other forms of entertainment for records and assuming further that
broadcasters were maximizing their profits, if forced by law to pay
a specified additional licensor, record producers, for the right to broad-
cast records, it would be irrational for the station to raise its advertis-
ing rates. In the short run, under these circumstances, the new public
163. See text at page 183 supra.
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performance right would be paid from these broadcasters' above
normal or monopoly profits. If no such profits are earned, the
station would suffer losses and in the long run, if license fees were
not reduced, such broadcasters might go out of business.
By virtue of their exclusive FCC licenses many radio and television
stations enjoy substantial monopoly power and, therefore, may well
earn more than competitive profits.16 4 The strongest equitable argu-
ment for a record public performance right is that such action Will
transfer income to record producers from broadcasters who now earn
unjustifiably high profits from their legal monopolies. Arguably,
broadcasters have no right to monopoly profits and no legitimate in-
terest would be damaged if broadcasters were forced to share monop-
oly profits with record producers and composers. Although licensed
broadcasters enjoy a monopoly of a particular broadcast frequency,
they must compete with other stations and with other advertising
media. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to determine the
degree of monopoly power possessed by each broadcaster. Certainly,
stations will vary greatly in this regard. But all stations will have
to pay the increased license fees that will result from establishing the
record public performance right, and there is no necessary correlation
between extent of record use and extent of monopoly power.
As we have said, record companies only could be sure of earning
increased profits in the short run. Thereafter, these extra profits are
subject to redistribution. Increased mechanical reproduction fees
charged by composers would take away part of these profits. Remain-
ing public performance revenues may be dissipated by increased out-
put and lower record prices or through sharing these profits with new
record companies until the marginal record company's earnings are
reduced to competitive levels. If increased record production derives
from existing firms rather than new entrants, however, existing
record companies might enjoy increased profits beyond the short
run. Record performers also will gain from increased record produc-
tion through increased employment opportunities. In any event, con-
sumers would benefit through the availability of more and cheaper
records, both popular and classical.
Broadcasters, as legal monopolists, have no valid complaint concern-
ing income losses that might result from granting record producers a
public performance right. Neither record companies nor composers
warrant our eleemosynary concern. The Justice Department, at least,
has been willing to use the antitrust laws to protect broadcasters from
the market power of composers' performing rights licensing societies.
If record producers presently enjoyed a public performance right and
the issue was whether they should be terminated, the fact that broad-
casters would be the principal beneficiaries of such action would be
164. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & Ecow.
1, 22-23 (1959).
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a good argument against changing the status quo. However, if we
accept the concept that the burden of proof always is upon the pro-
ponents of redistribution of existing benefits through the exercise of
public power, the fact that broadcasters may be undeserving benefici-
aries of monopoly power is not sufficient reason to justify granting
record producers a public performance right. It is necessary to demon-
strate that a redistribution of a portion of broadcasters' proven mo-
nopoly profits to record companies and composers would be better,
in some sense, than the existing distribution. There is little merit in
the record producers' economic and equitable case for a public per-
formance right. The only significant effects of redistribution of possi-
ble broadcast monopoly profits to the record industry would be an
increase in the production of popular records and increased earnings
for composers. 165 The question then boils down to a choice between
devoting additional resources to record output vis-a-vis whatever use
the recipients of broadcast profits would make of the same income if
the legal status quo were retained.
Impact on Composers
Of all the economic participants in the process of producing and dis-
tributing recorded music-composers, record companies, performers,
broadcasters, advertisers, record buyers, radio listeners-the economic
impact of a record public performance right upon composers is most
difficult to predict. Understandably, composers fear that the reven-
ues earned by record producers from a public performance right will
be at their expense. Under certain circumstances, this could occur.
It is more likely, however, that composers will benefit from the estab-
lishment of a public performance right for record producers. The
ultimate effect upon composers will depend upon the broadcasters'
reaction to higher license fees for the privilege of airing recorded
music, the extent to which legal and administrative obstacles preclude
composers from maximizing their own public performance rights, and
the composers' capacity to use their mechanical reproduction right to
capture the record producers' public performance revenues. It should
be noted, however, that the price for public performance licenses will
not be set in accordance with standard price theory. Composers bar-
gain through two large organizations, ASCAP and BMI, and broad-
casters, the overwhelmingly predominant purchaser of public per-
formance licenses, bargain collectively as a unit. Thus, we have a du-
opoly selling to a monopsonist and the result is called bilateral monop-
oly.
165. See note 91 supra and accompanying text; text at pages 226-31 infra.
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Every broadcaster requires access to the repertoires of all three li-
censing agencies. Theoretically, the repertoires of ASCAP and BMI
are substitutable. In practice they are not. An ASCAP spokesman
could recall only one example of a radio station operating solely with
a license from BMI and not infringing upon any ASCAP copy-
right. Since there are three public performance licensing agen-
cies and each negotiates separately with representatives of the broad-
cast industry in bargaining with each licensing agency the broad-
casters must always consider the fees they will have to pay the other
agencies. Record selection depends upon listener interest and very few
record shows could survive if they limited their selections to those
of one of the two major licensing agencies. Even if a station could
structure its programming around just one of the licensing agencies,
the administrative expense of segregating ASCAP and BMI songs and
monitoring their performance to avoid infringements would be more
costly than the license fee paid the second performing rights
organization- This de facto non-substitutability operates in favor of
the licensing organizations and their principals since broadcasters
must purchase licenses from both licensing agencies and thus cannot
offset one organization against the other. Composers, however, still
would earn more with a single organization since it is more difficult
for two sellers acting independently to set license fees at the maximi-
zation point than it would be for one.
Under normal demand conditions economic theory would clearly in-
dicate how a composer should behave to maximize his return from
the public performance of his copyrighted music. Administrative, eco-
nomic and legal considerations, however, limit his ability to reach this
objective. In theory, each potential music user has a demand sched-
ule which represents the amount he will pay to secure the right to
play a given quantity of music. In addition, for each composer there
exists a price or fee which maximizes the total revenue obtainable
from the broadcast performance of his music or a record using his
music. Under existing law the composer would attempt to set
each broadcaster's price at the point which maximizes total revenues
obtainable from that broadcaster. Unlike most other economic goods,
cost curves are irrelevant here. Once a composition has been recorded,
licensing public performers imposes no further costs upon the com-
poser. Therefore, to maximize returns from licensing, the composer,
since marginal cost is zero, should set the price at that quantity where
marginal revenue equals zero. Full price discrimination should be
possible since the product is an intangible and therefore cannot be
traded among purchasers.
Both administrative and legal considerations require that public
performance fees be set for all broadcasters through industry-
wide bargaining between ASCAP and BMI and representatives of the
major segments of the broadcast industry. Normally, one would ex-
pect that this method of price setting would limit ASCAP's capacity
to maximize its revenues from the sale of public performance licenses
through price discrimination among music users. The peculiar method
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for computing license fees, however, results in a considerable degree of
price discrimination among broadcast music users. Although ASCAP
cannot charge higher rates to stations which make greater use of its
repertoire, ASCAP's earnings still are directly related to broadcasters'
intensity of demand for such products.
License fees are computed as a percentage of net advertising reven-
ues earned by broadcasters. Advertising rates for broadcasters vary
in accordance with the buying power of their audience. Stations with
wide audiences in large cities command far higher advertising rates
than marginal stations in small towns. For example, the 'highest rate
charged by WABC radio in New York City for a one minute spot
announcement broadcast one time per week is $224. KFQD radio in
Anchorage, Alaska charges $16 for the same spot.160 Obviously, the
higher the rates a broadcaster may charge advertisers., the more it
is willing to pay for the items it requires to maintain its listening
audience. And if record shows are effective formats, it will be will-
ing to pay a substantial price for the privilege of playing records em-
bodying copyrighted music. Therefore, the payment formula used by
ASCAP and BMI takes full advantage of the broadcaster's relative
need for recorded music. License fees are computed as a fixed per-
centage of advertising revenues and the higher the advertising rates,
the higher the advertising revenues, and the greater the license fees.
In effect, the composers have achieved very substantial price discrim-
ination while under legal restraints requiring them not to discriminate
among record users. They comply with this requirement by charging
all record users at the same rate. But since the rate is applied to
advertising revenues which greatly vary in accordance with the in-
tensity of demand for record licenses, the broadcasters are subject to
intense discrimination.
Broadcasters' monopsony power is the most significant limitation
upon the composers' capacity to maximize their returns from public
performance rights under existing conditions. Since there is no alter-
native to radio broadcasting as a medium for the public performance
of records, broadcasters as a unit are monopsonists with respect to
ASCAP and BMT, who are, of course, duopolists. Moreover, broad-
casters are licensed monopsonists. Under these conditions, price is set
through a bargaining process which divides the monopoly profits or
revenues attributable to broadcasting copyrighted music between the
two monopolists, broadcasters and composers, in accordance with their
bargaining power and negotiation skills. Thus, under existing law,,
broadcasters probably are retaining a very sizeable portion of the
profits they earn through public performance of copyrighted music.
166. See STA=mxU RATE & DATA SERvIc, INc., SPOT RADIO RATES AN DATA
at 94, 610 (May 1, 1974). Charges for such a spot ranged from $25 to $95
among radio stations in Hartford, Conn. Id. at 191-93.
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As previously discussed, the operations of ASCAP and BMI are
restricted by antitrust consent decrees.167 These decrees prohibit
price discrimination and provide for judicial supervision of licensing
charges. While there is no way to quantify the impact of these restric-
tions upon composers' earnings, we must assume that they have some
measureable effect. A further limitation which may become relevant
if record makers are granted a public performance right stems from
the compulsory licensing requirements of the existing and proposed
copyright legislation.
Effect of a Record Public Performance Right Upon Composers'
Public Performance Revenues
This section will analyze the impact of a record public performance
right upon composers' public performance revenues. The extent to
which the composers' loss of public performance revenues can be
balanced through increased earnings from their mechanical reproduc-
tion right will be discussed in the next section. Composers will not
lose public performance revenues if broadcasters do not reduce their
demand for music licenses. If broadcasters do reduce their demand,
composers will lose public performance revenues, but the extent of
the loss will depend upon how successful composers had been in
maximizing their public performance revenues when they held the
only public performance right.
As contended previously, public performance fees represent
a small portion of the total costs of producing a recorded
music show. Therefore, the additional fees paid to record companies
probably would be absorbed by most broadcasters without reducing
their demand for records. This would mean that under a dual rights
system composers would be selling the same quantity of music public
performance licenses at the same price and that the record companies'
revenues would be extracted from the broadcaster's profits rather
than at the composers' expense. 68 Demand for recorded music would
be reduced only to the extent higher license fees force station owners
either to cease commercial broadcasting or to adopt formats not re-
quiring recorded music.
If composers have been maximizing revenues and if higher license
fees do cause broadcasters to reduce their demand for record and
music licenses, the establishment of a second public performance right
for record producers must reduce composers' revenues from public
performance rights and may reduce the total revenues extracted from
broadcasters for broadcasting recorded music. That is, the total price
broadcasters must pay composers and record producers for the privil-
ege of playing copyrighted music and records will not correspond with
the price that maximizes the joint revenues of composers and record
producers. 69 Composers will be forced to share these revenues with
167. See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
168. See text at pages 210-13 supra.
169. It would be very difficult for two copyright holders setting their fees
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record producers, whereas under existing law, composers, of course,
need not share public performance revenues.
Assuming that ASCAP has been setting its fees at the maximization
point, which leaves the marginal broadcaster no profits, a higher price
would reduce the number of licenses demanded sufficiently to reduce
total revenues, whereas a lower price would not increase the number
of licenses demanded sufficiently to compensate for the lower unit
price. Armed with a coordinate public performance right, record com-
panies will require broadcasters to pay a fee for use of their
records in addition to the fee charged by the composers' representa-
tives. If the demand for music licenses is affected by this price in-
crease, in the absence of coordination the price to broadcasters will
be above the maximization level, thereby injuring composers and rec-
ord companies as well as broadcasters and the listening public. Since
record companies previously earned no public performance revenues
they would not mind a reduction in total joint revenues. Under
these circumstances any gains by the record companies would be at
the expense of the composers. This would not be true, however, under
all circumstances. To some extent the categories of composers and
record producers overlap. Many popular performers, who are guar-
anteed by the Revision Bill 50 percent of the revenues earned
through public performances of the recordings, write their own music,
and record companies maintain music publishing affiliates. 170 Under
these circumstances, losses to composers and publishers would be off-
set to some extent by revenues earned by performers and by rec-
ord companies from record public performance fees. That license fees
charged broadcasters by record companies exercising their public per-
formance right are statutorily limited by compulsory licensing at a
predesignated fee limits the potential loss to composers. 171 Thus, the
independently to achieve the revenue maximizing price. Game theory would
be relevant to an analysis of the probable outcome of moves and countermoves
by the holders of the two performance rights. See generally P. SAMuELSON,
EcoNoivcs 480-82 (8th ed. 1970).
170. See F. Stuart, Distribution of Income from Broadcast Performance and
Sale of Phonograph Records 2-3, 36-38 (1970) (unpublished mimeo, study donefor National Ass'n of Broadcasters). For example, Columbia Records main-
tains two publishing firms, April Music and Blackwood Music, one of which
is associated with ASCAP, and the other with BMI. In recent years the record
companies' in-house publishing firms have begun to exert a more active role
and have increased their relative share of the income going to music publish-
ers. While their share is decreasing, however, the bulk of the payments made
by ASCAP and ,BMI still go to the older, larger music publishers, like MGM,
who are not in-house affiliates of record companies. This generalization, how-
ever, must be qualified in light of the relationship of some older publishers
to new conglomerate corporations. Thus, Warner Brothers Music, one of the
large pubishers, is now part of the Warner Communications Company, whichalso includes three record companies within its overall corporate structure.See generally Lees, Record Companies and Music Publishers-When They
Unite, Music Suffers, HIGH FIDEITrY, Oct. 1973. at 36.171. If re ord producers had full discretion in setting their fees, their capac-
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capacity of the record company either to affect the total price of
broadcasting recorded music or to cut into the composers' share of
public performance revenues is limited by its inability to increase its
license fees above the statutory amount, or to threaten composers with
such action.
If coordination between record companies and composers were pos-
sible and legally permissible, composers would offer to lower their
price sufficiently to bring the total price to the maximization point,
if record companies shared with composers some of the additional
revenues earned thereby. There are a number of possible arrange-
ments which might improve their ability to achieve a revenue maxim-
izing price. The holder of the second right might, for example, assign
his right to the other holder or appoint the other as his agent, or
the two might appoint a common agent to bargain with users.
These arrangements, however, raise serious antitrust problems. The
legal status of the joint arrangements under the antitrust laws in-
volves the balancing of several factors: the probable anticompetitive
effects, their severity, and the social benefits expected from the ar-
rangements at issue. While the two parties are selling to the same
buyer, they are not selling the same product. Also, as previously
noted, in the absence of a collusive agreement the total price of both
license fees is likely to be above the maximization level. Under these
circumstances, everyone will lose including broadcasters and the lis-
tening public. In addition to possible antitrust violations, these co-
ordinating arrangements also might be deemed inconsistent with the
intent of the statute which recognizes a second performance right at a
fixed fee.
To the extent composers are not now maximizing their legal mon-
opoly, some portion of the revenues paid by broadcasters to record
producers will not be at the composers' expense; rather, they will
represent revenues that composers cannot reach under existing
legal and economic conditions. Under these circumstances, super-
imposing a fee for record producers over that charged by composers
might raise the price of recorded music, that is, place the total cost
of the two licenses closer to the maximization point. Broadcasters
could pay record producers the additional fees without reducing,
or even increasing, the total revenues earned by both composers and
record producers. Since composers must share these revenues with
record producers, composers' revenues would be reduced. As will be
shown, however, composers should be able to recapture some of these
revenues through manipulation of the mechanical reproduction right.
Since the advent of a second public performance right may increase
the total revenues available to composers and record producers, com-
posers' earnings can increase to the extent record producer revenues
can be captured through increasing the price composers charge record
companies for the privilege of recording their copyrighted music.
ity to cut into composers' revenues by charging high fees which reduce demandfor records by broadcasters would be increased significantly. Composers' ca-
pacity to retaliate is limited by the consent decrees.
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It is very difficult to predict the potential increase in the joint
revenues of composers and record companies under a dual rights sys-
tem. All such increases must represent revenues that now escape
composers resulting from the economic and legal constraints upon
their bargaining power. ASCAP now charges radio broadcasters 1.725
percent of net advertising receipts for use of its music, and BVII
charges 1.7 percent. Since almost every broadcaster uses both ASCAP
and BMI music, this makes a total cost of 3.425 percent. The proposed
statutory rate for the record public performance right varies with the
station's gross advertising receipts: $250 annually for gross receipts
between $25,000 and $100,000; $750 annually for gross receipts between
$100,000 and $200,000; and 1 percent of net annual receipts for gross
receipts over $200,000. Stations with gross annual receipts under $25,-
000 pay no royalties. The 1 percent rate would raise the broadcaster's
total cost for playing recorded music to at most 4.425 percent of net ad-
vertising receipts, an increase of nearly 29 percent. The cost to radio
broadcasters for record public performance rights would be approxi-
mately $10 million.172
Since composers are price discriminating under the existing legal
regime, only the price setting provisions of the antitrust consent
decree and the broadcasters' monopsony power restrict composers'
earnings. The economic impact of judicial review over license fee
rates depends upon the extent to which this procedure sets effective
limits on the rates that would have otherwise prevailed. Although the
judicial price review requirements only apply explicitly to ASCAP,
BM's rates, in effect, are subject to the same restraints. Since broad-
casters require licenses from both ASCAP and BiMI, license fee nego-
tiations with both organizations must be based upon the same prin-
ciples-the extent to which broadcasters are likely to use the music
of each performing right society. Although, in theory, BMI might at-
tempt to charge fees out of proportion to those charged by ASCAP,
such action is sure to engender legal response. If the total fee to
broadcasters is perceived to be too high relative to past rate setting
formulae, broadcasters are likely to bring the matter to the courts
under the guise of challenging ASCAP's rate. If the court perceives
the same discrepancy, and attributes it to overreaching by BMI rather
than ASCAP, the matter will come to the attention of the Justice
Department which will threaten antitrust action. With the precedent
established by the ASCAP consent decree, all parties will perceive
172. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. In calendar year 1971,
ASCAP's domestic receipts from radio license fees were approximately$18,700,000. ASCAP's rate then was 2 percent of net advertising receipts, twice
the rate the Revision Bill sets for record public performance rights. If one
adjusts the $18.7 million figure to account for the increase in radio broad-
casting revenues from 1971 through 1972, the final figure is approximately
$10.5 million.
1974]
that similar constraints can be placed upon BMI under the antitrust
laws. The net effect is to restrain BMI from starting this process and
to induce BMI to use the same rate setting formulae as employed by
ASCAP.
During the 10 year period prior to the effective date of the 1950
decree, the combined ASCAP-BMI rate to radio stations was 3.45 per-
cent of net advertising revenues; in 1960, the combined rate was 3.325
percent. The rate climbed to 3.35 percent in 1967, to 3.428 percent
in 1970, to the present rate of 3.425 percent.).7 Although royalty rates
seemed to have stabilized subsequent to the consent decree, public per-
formance revenues of composers continued to increase, and it is the
composers' earnings, not the royalty rates, that count. Of course, if
both the royalty rates and the base to which these rates are applied,
net advertising revenues, had increased, composers would have earned
even more.
The problem, then, is: Although composers' revenues have in-
creased despite the consent decree, they might have increased even
more absent the antitrust decree. Certainly, the economic parameters
of both broadcasting and advertising changed after 1945. The advent
of television significantly increased the absolute and relative amounts
of advertising conducted through electronic rather than print media,
and this increase was reflected in dramatic increases in advertising
rates for radio and television time. Television also increased the total
amount of music broadcast, and radio programming underwent radical
change with respect to the use of music. Recorded music became the
dominant form of radio fare, with television taking over all other
types of entertainment formerly featured by radio stations. Broad-
casters' increased demand for music should have improved the com-
posers' bargaining power, but this increased power could be mani-
fested either through increased royalty rates or by stable rates applied
to a larger base of advertising revenues or both. That royalty rates re-
mained stable while composers' earnings increased indicates that com-
posers did benefit from these economic changes, but does not tell us
whether they maximized their position. Conceivably, were it not for
the consent decree, royalty rates also would have increased, thereby
further improving composers' revenues; or, it is possible that the in-
creased earnings achieved by composers represented all that their im-
proved bargaining position could yield.
We might suspect that increased demand for music resulting from
increased advertiser demand for broadcast time would be reflected in
increased advertising revenues for broadcasters, which would be
shared by composers through the royalty formula based on such
revenues. Increases in the relative use of music by radio broad-
173. ASCAP's rate from 1941 to 1959 was 2.25 percent. It was reduced to
2.125 percent in 1959, to 2 percent in 1967, and to 1.725 percent in 1972. BMI's
rates have been as follows: 1941-1965, 1.2 percent; 1966-1968, 1.35 percent;
1967-1970, 1.48 percent; 1971, 1.5 percent; 1972, 1.525 percent; 1973, 1.7 percent.
Thus, in the last decade the combined rate has, within a very narrow range,
moved up and then down, with BMI's rates steadily increasing.
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casters in lieu of other programming formats, however, should be re-
flected only in higher royalty rates, since these changes would not af-
fect advertising revenues. That royalty rates remained stable might
permit us to infer that the consent decree does limit composers' earn-
ings to some extent. But we cannot be entirely confident of this con-
clusion since it is possible that the overall increase in demand for
broadcast advertising would not itself support the experienced in-
crease in composers' earnings and that part of this increase is ex-
plained by the relatively higher use of music in radio and television
programming. That radio and television broadcasters negotiate sepa-
rately with composers, and that radio programming has increased the
amount and proportion of music used without increasing royalty rates
for radio-used music, increase the likelihood that the consent decree
has limited royalty rate increases that might otherwise be warranted
by the prevalent economic forces. 74
Certainly, however, the broadcasters' monopsony power has reduced
composers' earnings. These losses, combined with whatever losses
might be attributed to the antitrust decree, could well be sufficient
to permit record producers to earn substantial revenues from
their public performance right without affecting the broadcasters'
demand for recorded music.
If composers have not been maximizing their revenues under a
single right regime, the economic position and possibilities of com-





0 Qc+ Qm Qc
174. ASCAP executives seem to discount the decree as a factor in determin-
ing the rates charged broadcasters. Instead, they point to the collective bar-
gaining strength of the broadcasters. BMI executives, on the other hand, think
the decree has been a factor in determining the ASCAP rate.
1.974]
Line AB represents the demand curve for music and record li-
censes, and line AQm is the marginal revenue curve for that demand
curve. Since sale of public performance licenses relates to an exist-
ing record, and no additional costs are involved in selling these
licenses, only demand curves need be considered. Revenues from sale
of a public performance right will be maximized at the price where
marginal revenue is zero. Pm is the price that would maximize
revenues from the sale to broadcasters of a public performance right,
and Qm is the quantity of record public performance licenses that
would be purchased at this price. Total revenues is represented by
the rectangle Pm CQm 0. Pc is the price composers set when they hold
the only public performance right and Q, is the quantity of licenses
purchased by broadcasters at this price. The price is below the max-
imization price due to the restrictions imposed upon composers by the
broadcasters' monopsony power and by the existing antitrust consent
decree against ASCAP. Under these circumstances, composers' rev-
enues are represented by the rectangle PCEQCO, which is smaller than
rectangle PmCQmO by the area of rectangle DE Q0Qm. Pc+r - P, is the
price to be paid by broadcasters to record producers for their public
performance right under the Revision Bill. Pc+, is the total price
broadcasters must pay to composers and record producers for the right
to publicly perform copyrighted music incorporated into copyrighted
records, and Qc+r is the quantity of licenses that will be purchased by
broadcasters at this price. Total revenues of composers and record
producers generated at this price is represented by rectangle PC+, F
Qc+rO. Of these revenues, composers would receive Pc G Qc+rO, and
record producers would receive Pc+r F G P,. To compare the joint
revenues of composers and record producers under a dual rights ar-
rangement with composers' earnings when they hold the sole public
performance right, the areas of rectangles Pc+, F G P, and G E Q,
Qc+r must be compared. Since P, E Q, 0 represents composers' rev-
enues when they own the only public performance right, the second
rectangle G E Q, Qc+r, represents the composers' revenues lost due to
the establishment of a second public performance right for record
producers. The first rectangle, Pc+r F G Pc, represents the revenues
earned by record producers under a dual rights system. If the first
rectangle is larger than the second, the total revenues paid by broad-
casters to composers and record producers for public performance
rights will be larger under a dual rights system than was paid com-
posers under a single right system.
The total revenues of composers and record producers will be larger
under a dual rights system than were composers' public performance
revenues under a single right system if the price for music licenses
under the single right system (P) was below that price (Pm) where
marginal revenue equals zero, the price which maximizes composers'
earnings, and if the combined price for composers' and record pro-
ducers' public performance right under a dual rights system (P,+r) is
closer in absolute terms to the maximization price (Pm) than was P,.
In the figure, Pc+r is closer to Pm than P,, and therefore rectangle P,+,
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F G Pc, record producers' revenues, is larger than G E Q, Qc+r, com-
posers' lost public performance revenues. If the new price of broad-
casting recorded music is further from the joint maximization price
of composers and record producers, the joint revenues of composers
and record producers will be lower than the revenues earned by com-
posers when they held the only public performance rights. Although
composers might be able to recapture some or all of the revenue
earned by record companies from their public performance right, com-
posers will become net losers since total earnings available to all
music producers will have been reduced and, at best, they can only
get the entire reduced amount.
The impact of record public performance rights upon the joint
revenues of composers and record producers is important for two
reasons. With respect to composers' public performance revenues,
greater joint revenues means a smaller loss to the composer. That
is, if composers were charging too little for their sole public perform-
ance right, and the establishment of a second public performance right
significantly increased the joint revenues of composers and record
companies, a large portion of the record producers' revenues would
come from broadcasters' profits rather than from composers' earnings.
In the figure, record producers' earnings are represented by rectangle
Pc+rFGPc. Of these revenues, only the amount represented by rec-
tangle G E Q0 Q,+r is at the composers' expense; the remainder rep-
resents additional payments by broadcasters.
Another consequence of increasing joint revenues of composers and
record producers is that the total sums paid by broadcasters have been
increased. Since total revenues paid by broadcasters to composers
under a single right system is P, E Q, 0, and total revenues paid
to composers and record producers under a dual rights system is
PC+, F Qe+r 0, and since rectangle Pc G Qc+r 0 is common to both
of those rectangles, total sums paid by broadcasters will increase, since
it has been assumed that rectangle Pc+, F G P, is larger than rec-
tangle G E Q, Qe+r. To the extent composers are able to capture
record producers' public performance revenues by increasing their
price to record producers for the right to record their music, that is,
through mechanical reproduction rights, the net increase in available
revenues from broadcasters permits composers to compensate for their
public performance revenue losses, and probably to increase their total
earnings from public performance and mechanical reproduction rights
above those earned when they held the sole performance right.
To illustrate, public performance fees are computed as a percentage
of net advertising revenues, and, for purposes of this example, it is
assumed that advertising revenues subject to the license fee are pro-
rated in accordance with the quantity of copyrighted music and re-
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cordings used. Assuming that under a single right system the license
fee is set at 5 percent, and that net advertising revenues total $20 mil-
lion, composers would earn $1 million in license fees from record
broadcasts. Establishment of a record producers' -public performance
right requires broadcasters to pay an additional 1 percent of net ad-
vertising revenues. This price increase reduces copyrighted recordings
use and thereby reduces net advertising revenues subject to the li-
cense fees of composers and record producers to $18 million. Under
these circumstances, composers, assuming no change in their license
fee schedules, earn only $900,000. Record producers earn $180,000,
which increases total earnings of composers and record producers to
$1,080,000. If composers can capture $100,000 from record producers
through increases in mechanical reproduction fees, they can return
to their pre-record producer public performance right position,
whereas, if they can capture more than $100,000, they gain. Whatever
remains of the record producers' initial $180,000 increases record pro-
ducers' reserves by that amount.
Benefits to Composers from a Record Public Performance Right
If composers' earnings from their sole public performance right have
not been maximized, establishment of a record public performance
right will enable record producers to extract from broadcasters addi-
tional revenues that composers are unable to reach through their own
public performance right. Record producers, however, are dependent
upon composers for the right to produce records using copyrighted
music. This enables composers to use their mechanical reproduction
right to better their initial position by appropriating much, if not all,
of the revenues to be earned by record companies from broadcasters.
The principal limitation upon composers' capacity to extract the rec-
ord producers' public performance revenues is the compulsory licens-
ing requirements applicable to the mechanical reproduction right.
In terms of the graphic analysis, the revenue earned by record
producers from broadcasters, represented by rectangle Pc+, F G Pc, is
a potential additional revenue source for composers. If this rectangle
is larger than rectangle G E Qc Q,+r, which represents composers'
public performance revenues lost due to the introduction of a second
public performance right, composers will have the opportunity to re-
coup or exceed their public performance losses by capturing the rec-
ord producers' public performance earnings through increased fees for
licensing their mechanical reproduction right to record companies. At
most, composers might capture all the record producers' revenues
through this method.
In addition to their public performance right, composers control the
mechanical reproduction of their music through recordings. Thus,
composers may collect a fee for every record sold from record com-
panies wishing to record their music. Unless live musicians are used,
copyrighted music must be recorded before it can be broadcast. This
necessitates a close economic nexus between mechanical reproduction
and public performance rights.
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If the composer is the sole holder of both mechanical reproduction
and public performance rights, in negotiating with a record company
for the mechanical reproduction of his music, the composer considers
potential revenues both from sale of the record and from licensing
broadcasters. If the composer believes that a particular record com-
pany would be able to produce a record with exceptional broadcast
possibilities, he would consider that fact in setting his royalty for each.
record sold; that is, the composer would be willing to lower his price
with respect to record sales in order to have his music recorded by
a record company with peculiar capacities to make products attractive
to broadcasters. Therefore, even though current law only recognizes
public performance rights in composers, record companies can benefit
from their products' public performance earnings. In fact, a composer
might forego all record sales proceeds where public performance fee
profits constitute an abnormally high percentage of the composition's
total economic value. Where sales possibilities are limited but public
performance possibilities are extensive, it might be rational for the
composer to subsidize the record's production if necessary.
To analyze the relationship between composers' mechanical and
public performance rights, the division of profits attributable to the
sale and to the public performance of a recording of copyrighted music
between composer and record company must be understood. Within
the limits imposed by the special capacities of particular record com-
panies-the artists under contract and the efficiency of their sales or-
ganization-and by statutory compulsory licensing requirements on
recording license fees, the composer should be able to extract from
the record company all monopoly profits that the record company can
earn from the record produced with copyrighted music, monopoly
profits defined as those earnings greater than the normal return on
capital from enterprises of equivalent risk. Presumptively, successful
records of copyrighted music can earn monopoly returns for record
producers because they are demanded and the record company is the
sole legal source of supply. Since there are many record companies
vying for the right to use a copyrighted song, competition for copy-
righted music will permit the composer to increase his price to the
point where the successful record company earns no more than a nor-
mal profit from producing and selling the record. Through this proc-
ess, the composer extracts from the record company all monopoly
profits earned by the recording of his song.
The foregoing analysis assumes that the record industry is competi-
tive. Pure competitive conditions similar to those prevailing for raw
agricultural commodities, however, are rare, and the record industry
is no exception. Instead there are numerous companies, all of which
are both unique and interchangeable to some degree, and entry into
1974]
the industry seems relatively easy. The record making industry ex-
hibits monopolistic competition in which product differentiation is
achieved through the record companies' differing highly competitive
capacities to exploit particular copyrighted songs. Record companies
will therefore compete for songs, and abnormally large profits by
existing record companies will attract new entrants. Nevertheless,
record companies differ in important respects. These differences
emanate from their varying capacities to market recordings and
from the varying popularity of the artists under contract to each
company. Most established artists are under contract to some record
company, and composers, in licensing their songs, consider this fact.
Indeed, the contractual arrangements between composers and record
companies usually specify which artists will record. To the extent
certain record companies enjoy a particular capacity to exploit a song,
the composer would be willing to permit that company to retain more
of the profits earned by the record through sales or public perform-
ance fees, and such companies could earn more than normal returns
on capital. More precisely, the composer and record company would
share the extra income the more efficient record company could earn
from the copyrighted song. The precise share to each cannot
be predicted. The record companies' power to exploit their record
selling capacities is limited by the competition of other record com-
panies which, though less efficient, are still capable of exploiting the
song. Thus, the more efficient company could only demand a higher
percentage of the record's profits up to the point where the composer's
return is driven below the level he could achieve with the next best
company, as limited by the bargainer's knowledge of the relevant eco-
nomic parameters.
Since the supply of new music is limited by the number of people
with the requisite talent for such work, the capacity to write success-
ful music confers upon the holder a special kind of monopoly power.
In economics, the income attributable to unique talents is generally
called "economic rent." New composers have limited bargaining
power and must accept minimum royalty rates from record companies.
Established composers, however, can exert significant market power.
Once a composer has proven that records of his music will sell, record
companies will compete for his work. Such composers can therefore
demand royalty arrangements which extract a large percentage of the
profits expected from exploitation of records with their songs.
Since the only legal relationship between the composer and record
company arises from the composer's licensing of the record company
to record the copyrighted music, the transfer of the record company's
expected earnings from the sale of the public performance right must
be accomplished in the contract accompanying the basic license for
recording the composer's song. Theoretically, there are many ways
this could be done. From the composer's standpoint, the simplest and
most effective method would be to require the record company to as-
sign all public performance rights to the composer. If legally possible,
this would effectually return the composer to his former position as
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sole owner of the public performance right. He again would be
free to ensure that the price to broadcasters for the public perform-
ance right would be set at the level which maximized his total reven-
ues. Such an arrangement, however, would seem to be inconsistent
with the requirements and intent of the current legislative proposals
for the granting of a public performance right to record companies
and with any legislation likely to be enacted for this purpose.175
Arguably, this arrangement also might be deemed an antitrust viola-
tion. 176
Although composers should be able to extract a significant portion
of record producers' public performance earnings, certain legal and
economic factors may permit record producers to retain some of
these earnings. The arrangement least likely to conflict with the an-
ticipated statutory scheme would be a negotiated adjustment in the
per record royalty established with respect to record sales. The com-
poser could attempt to estimate the anticipated earnings by the record
company from public performance licensing fees and accordingly ad-
just upward the royalty rate attributable to record sales. This ap-
proach, however, has two drawbacks. There are possible difficulties
in estimating the potential earnings of the record from both sales and
the record company's public performance right. The second problem
derives from the limitations imposed upon the record sale royalty by
the compulsory licensing requirements of the Copyright Act. Under
the current Act, once a composer has licensed anyone to record his
music, or has recorded it himself, anyone is entitled to a license at
the fee of 2 cents per record manufactured. Since every potential
initial licensee knows the limits upon the royalty rate of subsequent
licensees, initial licensees will balk at paying royalty rates much above
the statutory maximum.177 The current Revision Bill would raise the
175. See text at page 158 supra.
176. See notes 43-52 supra and accompanying text.
177. Whether and to what extent initial licenses at more than 2 cents for
songs of normal length are issued is unclear. That such licenses, though un-
common, have been granted is indicated in SHEmEL & KRAsnovsKY 175-76. In
a letter to one of the present authors, Sidney Shemel stated that although he
had never been involved in a transaction which included such a license, he
had been informed by the Harry Fox Agency that such licenses have been is-
sued. Letter from Sidney Shemel to Lewis Kurlantzick, Oct. 9, 1973. The
Harry Fox Agency is the principal licensing agency for the mechanical repro-
duction right; it represents approximately 80 percent of the popular music
publishers. However, in a letter to one of the authors, an executive at the
Harry Fox Agency stated that he personally had never heard of an initial li-
cense at more than the 2 cent rate. Letter from Howard Balsam, The Harry
Fox Agency, to Lewis. Kurlantzick, Oct. 18, 1973. In a later letter, however,
the managing director of the agency indicated that initial licenses at more than
2 cents occur, but are quite rare. Letter from Albert Berman to Lewis Kur-
lantzick, Oct. 29, 1973.
As noted previously, note 26 supra, license fees for songs of more than nor-
mal length, that is, where the duration of use on a recording is more than
approximately 3.5 minutes, commonly exceed 2 cents. Compositions of more
than 5 minutes duration are regularly licensed by the Harry Fox Agency at
more than 2 cents. The extra compensation is ordinarily at the rate of 0.5
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statutory compulsory licensing fee from' 2 to 3 cents. Yet, even
with the augmented fee, the compulsory licensing requirement im-
poses a ceiling on the royalties the composer can charge both the initial
licensee and all subsequent licensees. Although the compulsory licens-
ing requirements do limit the price charged the first licensee to a
figure close to the statutory fee, the royalty could exceed 3 cents if
the first licensee gains significant financial advantages from being
first. Under most circumstances the first licensee of a music copy-
right enjoys some advantage over subsequent licensees. Compulsory
licensing rights now mature when the composer records his song or
permits someone else to record it. The licensee selected by the com-
poser thus enjoys the advantage of having the only available recording
for at least a short period of time, though this could be as little as
a week, depending on the impact of the song. The Revision Bill would
formally increase the lead time advantage' 78 to the initial licensee
somewhat by conditioning the right of other record companies to
demand a compulsory license upon public distribution of a record us-
ing the copyrighted music rather than agreement to permit the initial
recording.1'7 9
Whatever the impact of lead time, the statutory 3 cents fee sets
some limit on the rate that can be charged the first licensee, and
clearly establishes a 3 cents limit for subsequent licensees. To the
extent that the royalty rate attributable to record sales is below that
limit, the composer can raise these rates to the limit in recognition
of the record companies' potential earnings from a public performance
right. If all such earnings can be captured through rates below the
limit, the composer will not suffer from legislation granting record
companies a second public performance right. If capture of all record
company public performance earnings requires a rate above the stat-
utory limit, however, the composer may be unable to capture all such
earnings and the record company may be able to retain some portion
thereof. The record company can retain these earnings unless the
composer can compel it to grant other valuable concessions. There
is some evidence that composers with a "hot" song have been able
cent for each additional minute or fraction thereof. SimmL & KRASiLovsKy
181-82. The composer's leverage derives from the record company's desire to
conclude a negotiated license in order to avoid the statutory requirements of
monthly accountings on the basis of records manufactured. See notes 23-24
supra and accompanying text. This source of leverage would be diminished
under the Revision Bill, which requires quarterly payments on the basis of
records made and distributed, rather than monthly accountings on the basis of
records manufactured. For classical compositions, licenses are generally
granted at the rate of 0.25 cent for each minute of playing time. Thus, for
a 40-minute album of copyrighted serious music, a record company would pay
a mechanical license fee of 10 cents. S. SHEwmr & M. KRAs3.OVSKY, MoRE
AOuT Txrs Busnixss or Music 27 (1967).
178. "Lead time" refers to the "headstart' advantage, the advantage of be-ing the first and only one on the market with a product for a period of time.
179. Lead time is likely to be most important in those situations where a
song has already received some exposure, such as in a movie or show or viaperformances abroad. The composer and first licensee may also be concerned
with lead time where the composer sincerely desires to reserve the initial ex-
posure to a particular artist.
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to tie the license for that song to the purchase of other less popular
tunes at higher royalty rates than was merited by the intrinsic value
of the second song.180 Such devices would increase composers' capacity
to capture record companies' public performance earnings in situations
where the limits imposed by compulsory licensing preclude a royalty
rate high enough to achieve this end.
The composer's capacity to capture all revenues earned by rec-
ord companies from the sale of public performance rights does not
necessarily mean that record companies will have no incentive to
maximize such earnings. If the analysis is correct in concluding that
the composer will probably attempt to extract these earnings through
adjustments in the royalty rates for record sales, the record company
would retain all its public performance earnings. Since it would be
overpaying the composer for the mechanical reproduction right, to
break even the record company will be forced to maximize its public
performance earnings. In practice the royalty arrangements between
composer and record company in each instance can only approximate
the rate necessary to extract all public performance revenues. Thus
in each instance the record company has the opportunity to earn more
from public performances than it loses on the record sale arrange-
ments. The record company will therefore always do its best to maxi-
mize public performance earnings since it has, in effect, paid the com-
poser in advance for such earnings.
The foregoing analysis of the underlying economic factors affecting
the relationship between composers- and record producers applies as
well to jukebox performances. Similar to the fate of the fees paid
by broadcasters to record companies pursuant to the proposed public
performance right, the composer, subject to the 3 cents compulsory
license ceiling, should be able to "recapture" much, if not all, of the
revenues earned by record companies from jukebox royalties. This
recapture would be effected by altering the price the composer
charges the record company for the right to record his music in the
first instance.
Although the limitations imposed by the compulsory licensing re-
quirements for copyrighted music will, in some important cases,
restrict the capacity of composers to capture earnings from the record
companies' public performance right, composers can improve their
position by establishing their own record companies. Such action
would fit the classic pattern whereby institutional arrangements
which fail to reflect current economic realities are abandoned for
alternative arrangements. Thus, if composers' capacity to capture rec-
180. See SHmiEL & KRAsrnovsKy 175-76.
1974]
ord companies' earnings from the public performance right are limited
by the compulsory licensing requirements on copyrighted music, com-
posers, instead of exploiting their music through record companies,
can do better by establishing their own record companies. Through
such action, consumers. can retain all earnings that the first recorder
of a composition could earn through a record public performance
right.
Even so, the composer still would be endangered by record com-
panies exercising their statutory compulsory licensing right for use
of the copyrighted music. This would be a problem with respect to
songs with a very high prospect for record sales and public perform-
ance. A composer-record maker would welcome a demand from a sec-
ond company for a license to record his song only in situations where
the artists available to the second company could increase the sales
and public performance potential of a song beyond those realizable
through sale and performance of the initial record. Under these con-
ditions, the composer might license at less than the statutory fee if
this were necessary to induce the second company to record the song.
The establishment of a public performance right in records would
make other record companies more anxious to take out licenses, -but
again, composers should be able to capture such earnings through
higher license fees, up to the statutory limit. Thus, for example, if,
in the absence of a record public performance right, the price of a
license by a second recorder would be 1.5 cents per record and a record
public performance right was worth no more than an additional 0.5
cent per record to a potential licensee, the composer should be able
to increase the license fee to 2 cents. Since the second record company
could earn 0.5 cent per record through public performance earnings,
this would make his net royalty obligation 1.5 cents, and it has been
assumed that this price represents the true bargaining position of the
second record company. If the second record company were unwilling
to raise the license fee to 2 cents, other companies would bid up the
price of licenses to that level. Ignoring the differences in the capaci-
ties of record companies to exploit a song commercially, competing
record companies would be willing to pay up to 2 cents per record,
since they could expect to earn 0.5 cent from a public performance
right in addition to earnings expected from record sales which we
have assumed to be no more than 1.5 cents per record.""
Where the sum of the license fees, absent a record public perform-
ance right, plus the expected revenues from such a public performance
right, exceeds the statutory compulsory license fees the composer;
even if he established his own record company, probably will be un-
able to capture all revenues earned by record companies from the pub-
lic performance right. This is most likely to happen with respect
to the most popular songs where demand for licenses should drive
license fees up to the statutory maximum. Moreover, licensed record
181. With respect to the graduation among record companies caused by effi-
ciency differences, see text at pages 227-28 supra.
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companies can anticipate substantial public performance fees, but
since the license fee already is at the maximum, the composer has no
method of capturing these public performance fees. It might be ar-
gued that the composer is being doubly injured; the compulsory li-
censing provisions limit his direct license fees to the statutory maxi-
mum in a situation where a higher price could be obtained, and, addi-
tionally, although substantial record public performance fees will be
earned, the composer has no way of capturing them. The compulsory
licensees, however, may not be able to keep all the performance fees
either. Since any record company may obtain a license to record at
the statutory fee, popular songs are likely to generate many renditions
which will then compete for broadcast time. The result will be a large
total of public performance fees generated by a particular copyrighted
song divided among many recorders.
Should Composers Benefit?
The government might view the prospects of increased composer earn-
ings through capture of public performance fees initially earned by
record producers as a violation of ASCAP's consent decree. The prin-
cipal thrust of this decree, and, in part, that applicable to BMI, is
to ensure access to copyrighted music to broadcasters. The decree also
imposes limits on the price composers can charge broadcasters, which
may be viewed as a device to ensure that ASCAP does not circumvent
the decree by setting unreasonably high license fees. Increased earn-
ings by composers through capture of record producers' public per-
formance revenues might be deemed an indirect violation of these
price limits. Arguably, congressional recognition of a second per-
formance right would be an implicit authorization of the re-
capture process; Congress could be held to have intended all the con-
sequences of granting a second public performance right, including
increased earnings by composers. Such an argument, however, is un-
sound. The legislative history unequivocally demonstrates that the
new public performance right is intended to benefit record companies
and performers, not composers. There is no suggestion of any interest
in relieving composers from any restraints imposed under the antitrust
laws. To imply such an intent would exceed the claims of the most
imaginative and sympathetic interpreter.
Perceiving the inconsistency between increased composer revenues
through capture of record producers' public performance earnings and
the clear intent of the consent decree is easier than devising effective
restraints. An effective remedy would require the Justice Depart-
ment and the courts to expand their surveillance of composer pricing
to include the agreements between composers and record producers
with respect to the mechanical reproduction right, in addition to the
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prices charged broadcasters for the public performance right. Unless
the violation was quite unambiguous, the Justice Department would
be very reluctant to undertake continuous supervision and evalua-
tion of the huge number of recording contracts.
The treatment of composers by our legal economic system is a sub-
ject of constant controversy and complexity. Some composers do very
well; many do quite badly. Undoubtedly, while most of the benefits
accruing to composers from a second public performance right will
go to the more successful ones, some benefits will trickle down to the
less fortunate majority. In any event, it is quite clear that although
the proponents of a record producers' public performance right did
not intend to harm composers, neither did they particularly desire
to benefit them. Indeed, their predominant, if not exclusive, concern
was to assist record companies and performers. If composers are to
be assisted, there exist far more effective methods of accomplishing
this than by granting record producers a public performance right.
Methodological Matters
The organization of this article has been dictated by the pending re-
visions of the federal copyright law. This may be deemed a lawyer's
perspective. An economist specializing in industrial organization
would view the same legal and institutional arrangements quite dif-
ferently. He would perceive the various contending groups as an in-
dustry consisting of composers, record companies, performers, broad-
casters, and advertisers. The establishment of a public performance
right for record producers would interest him primarily in terms of
the effect of introducing a new claim upon the division of industry's
total revenues. The economist certainly would commence his analysis
with the assumption that the ultimate division of additional rev-
enue would differ from that envisioned by proponents of the record
public performance right. He also would be quite wary of relying
too heavily upon behavioral conclusions deduced from a priori eco-
nomic models. Most models, including the one employed here, assume
maximizing behavior by all participants. But any economist knows
that the reality of such an assumption may be undermined by in-
adequate knowledge, rigidity of response, and peculiar institutional
constraints.
According to the foregoing analysis, amending the Copyright Act
to establish a record public performance right is unlikely to produce
the results envisioned by its proponents. Bearing in mind the cau-
tions just stated, the economic situation is too complex to permit any
but tentative, specific a priori predictions of the actual impact of the
proposed legislation. Under these circumstances, if a second public
performance right is created the legislation should ensure that the rel-
evant statistics are generated to permit Congress to determine the ac-
tual results of its action, and Congress should be willing to reexamine
the legislation if the outcome does not conform with its expectations.
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Perhaps Congress should go further and limit the initial operation of
the public performance right to a limited period, such as 5 years, with
permanent enactment depending upon the experience during the ex-
perimental period. Although Congress has the authority to require
the interested parties to keep and make available financial data rele-
vant to the activities affected by copyright legislation, some crucial
questions will be very difficult to answer even if all financial informa-
tion at the disposal of the record industry is made available.
The ultimate effect of the establishment of a public performance
right for records in accordance with the Revision Bill will depend
upon the response of broadcasters to higher license fees, the capacity
of composers to maximize their earnings under the existing legal
regime, the ability of composers to capture the public performance
earnings of record companies through increased royalty rates for
mechanical reproduction rights, and the respective abilities of record
companies and performers to alter the statutory division of record
public pierformance fees between them through adjustments in the
compensation received by performers from record sales. Broadcasters'
reaction to higher license fees should be easy to measure. ASCAP
and BMI keep detailed accounts of the records broadcast by radio and
television stations. Similar accounts will be kept by whatever organi-
zation is established to distribute record public performance fees to in-
dividual performers and record companies. If broadcasters' demand
for music licenses does not decrease, composers have not been injured;
if such demand decreases, composers' public performance revenues
also must decrease. It is possible, however, that some of 'these losses
might be balanced by increases in composers' earnings from their me-
chanical reproduction right. Unfortunately, this phenomenon may be
very difficult to measure. To do so, it would be necessary to know
the actual contractual terms between composers and record companies,
both before and after the establishment of the record public perform-
ance right, and to isolate the effect of the new public performance
right from all other possible factors that might affect the terms of
these arrangements. Clearly, this only could be done on a sample
basis, thereby creating the problem of devising adequate sampling
techniques. To ensure the availability of the necessary data, Congress
would 'have to require composers or record companies to retain all
relevant contracts and to make these available to authorized congres-
sional investigators. It would not be necessary to know actual earn-
ings under these contracts; the per record sale royalty rates should
be sufficient.
Assessment of the actual division of public performance revenues
between record companies and performers would present analogous
problems. The authors predict that this division will not correspond
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to the equal split dictated by the Revision Bill, but, rather, ultimately
will be determined by the economic forces establishing the relative
bargaining strength of the parties. Evaluation of the validity of this
prediction would require knowledge of the royalty rates paid
to artists by record companies. Changes in these rates, however, are
influenced by many factors, for example, how "hot" the artist is at
the moment. Given the large number of performers and the
extremely rapid turnover among recording artists, record companies
must be the ones required to maintain adequate files of their contracts
with performers. The authors also predict that, after an adjustment
period, record production would increase, but that record company
profit levels would remain constant. Monitoring record production
is simple enough, although isolating the effect of the public perform-
ance right might be very difficult. Monitoring the profit levels for
all record companies would present formidable problems, but it might
be sufficient to limit the investigation to the larger companies which,
hopefully, would be typical of the industry as a whole. Since profit
figures for record companies are now closely held secrets, public ac-
cess to this information would require special legislation.
Conclusion
Although tracing all the consequences of granting record producers
a public performance right for their product, in addition to those long
held by composers of the music used in the recording, requires
complex economic analysis, reasonably accurate predictions can be
made of the impact of such action upon all potentially affected parties.
None of the likely outcomes would justify the establishment of a sec-
ond public performance right with respect to records.
The key factor is the broadcasters' reaction to the increased costs
of using recorded music that would result from legislation requiring
radio and television stations to acquire licenses from record producers
as well as composers. Almost certainly, broadcasters will absorb the
increased costs and will not reduce their demand for music licenses.
More popular records would be produced and prices for records might
well decrease, but there would be no significant impact upon the pro-
duction of classical records. Record companies and performers would
benefit in the short run, but probably not in the long run. Moreover,
the division of public performance fees between record companies and
performers would not conform with the equal split specified by the
Revision Bill. Composers should gain by capturing most of the reve-
nues collected by record producers pursuant to the proposed legisla-
tion, thereby avoiding some of the restrictions on composers' earnings
imposed by the existing antitrust consent decree against ASCAP.
Furthermore, there seem to be no workable legal devices to prevent
the composers' recapture of revenues.
The best possible outcome from giving record producers their own
public performance right would be to reallocate resources to increased
record production at the expense of broadcasters' profits. The desir-
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ability of such reallocation, of course, depends upon one's evaluation
of the utility of additional popular recordings. Nevertheless, the ef-
ficiency of resource use would be reduced via an increase in the costs
of administering a copyright regime incorporating a public perform-
ance right for record producers in addition to that enjoyed by com-
posers. Income attributable to the sale and performance of recorded
music would be transferred from broadcasters to record companies
and popular performers. 'Yet, both these groups seem to be prospering
under the existing copyright regime and record companies seem
to enjoy sufficient incentives to produce a very large output of new
recordings. Claims that certain performers are injured under the cur-
rent arrangements are unfounded. According to the analysis, per-
formers already are compensated for their capacity to produce records
attractive to broadcasters. Moreover, the record producers' increased
income ultimately may be translated into increased record production
and increased earnin gs for composers. After a short adjustment
period, profit levels and compensation of performers should return to
current levels.
Classical music may need and deserve financial support, but estab-
lishing a record public performance right will be of limited benefit.
Although this right will increase slightly the earnings of classical
records, the additional revenues will be too small to affect classical
record production. Whatever the reality of record companies using
their earnings from popular records to subsidize their classical opera-
tions, no substantial amounts of additional revenues for this purpose
will be available, since the public performance right will increase rec-
ord company earnings only in the short run. In any case, direct public
subsidy of the arts, such as the National Endowment for the Arts,
is preferable since it is subject to public scrutiny and certain in amount
and recipient.
The uncertainty of result, the tenuousness of the individual claims
of potential beneficiaries to an increased share of the revenues at-
tributable to the public performance of music, and the inevitable in-
crease in transaction costs attendant upon the establishment of a new
public performance right, combine into a strong argument against en-
actment of the proposed changes in the copyright laws. Furthermore,
in considering such action, one should consider that the temporary
federal protection against unauthorized record duplication has become
permanent. Although such protection is warranted, anti-duplication
protection assists record producers at the expense of imposing signifi-
cant additional costs on record buyers and to some degree dilutes the
composer's control over the use of his music. 182 Therefore, caution
182. See Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of
Sound Recordings, supra note 12, at 232-36.
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is warranted before granting record producers further benefits at the
expense of broadcasters, and possibly composers and radio listeners.
Finally, establishment of the public performance right inevitably will
increase the existing strong pressures inducing record producers to
offer improper inducements to employees of the broadcast industry
to get their records played on the air.
